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Abstract
This project focuses on domestic political pressures in response to di↵erent kinds of inter-
national threat. In explaining the domestic politics of external threat, I seek to answer why
states choose escalate conflicts over some issues and not others, against rivals at certain times
and not others, and choose to abuse human rights during some conflicts, but not others. I
focus specifically on the interaction between the external threats of territorial competition
and interstate rivalry with domestic political institutions to predict outcomes in interstate
conflict such as escalation to war and rival conflict severity, as well as the propensity to re-
press human rights. I argue that democratic states, which are driven by popular support, are
more likely to engage in conflict and repression when public goods issues such as symbolic
territory (e.g. Jerusalem, Kashmir) are contested. In contrast autocratic states, which are
dependent on elite support, are more likely threats salient when they threaten private good
distribution, or when land such as resource rich territory, is on the line. In three empirical
chapters, I explore the domestic politics of threat in three arenas. First, I examine how
domestic considerations a↵ect when and over what kinds of territory that state go to war;
examining militarized territorial conflicts and territorial claims from 1816-2001. The second
empirical chapter explores how domestic political concerns a↵ect the escalation of conflict
between international rivals from 1816-2001. Finally, the last empirical chapter explores how
territorial conflict, rival conflict, and domestic politics intersect to alter states tendencies to
abuse human rights from 1977-2001.
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Chapter 1
The Internal Politics of External Threat
Do domestic political concerns lead states to evaluate external threats di↵erently? Although
there is a plethora of research on the conflict propensity states based on regime type, as well
as a fruitful research program devoted to the salience of threats over di↵erent issues, most
research has not tried to integrate domestic politics into a study of issues. This dissertation
project attempts to answer whether and how domestic politics influences states’ decision to
escalate conflict in di↵erent issue contexts. Furthermore, I investigate how this interaction
between conflict context and domestic politics leads states to alter their repressive strategies
during international conflict. I argue that similar motivations that lead to conflict escalation
drive repression dynamics and that democracies and autocracies are fundamentally di↵erent
in how they evaluate external threats. I begin with an empirical illustration of the United
States’ entrance and domestic conduct during World War II.
Until the very end of the year in 1941, the United States remained only informally involved
in World War II. Nazi Germany had invaded Poland in 1939, which formally launched the war
in Europe. In the Pacific, Imperial Japan had been at war with China beginning in 1937 and
had been involved in economic crises with the Allied powers. Although the United States
government felt threatened by the Axis powers and sensed war was coming, it remained out
of the war. Domestic opposition and reluctance to America’s entrance toward the war were
seen as the primary reasons for remaining out of the war in the 1930s. Although the situation
in Europe and the Pacific were considered threatening, neither conflict seemed to be directly
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targeted against the United States and its inhabitants. Thus, the American public was
reluctant to become involved (Vasquez, 1998b; Vasquez and Gibler, 2001; Kimball, 2003).
After the attack on Pearl Harbor in December of 1941, a direct strike on U.S. territory
and citizens, the United States response was much clearer. The threat posed by the Axis
powers had now clearly been directed at the United States’ territory and people, and it
immediately responded by declaring war against Japan. This declaration of war was met with
public support. Once Imperial Japan attacked U.S. territory and targeted American citizens,
the American audience was no longer reluctant and in fact demanded action (Vasquez and
Gibler, 2001).
Only a few months after entering the war, the U.S. government also began systematically
repressing Japanese Americans by forcing them to live in so-called internment camps through-
out the country (Ng, 2002). Democratic governments are known to be the most respectful
of the human rights of its citizens, upon whose support they depend on to maintain o ce
(Davenport, 2007). Why would a democratic government at its peak of popularity choose
to repress some of its own electorate? Human rights research has consistently shown that
democratic states are significantly less repressive than dictatorial regimes(Davenport and
Armstrong, 2004; Bueno de Mesquita, Downs, Smith and Cherif, 2005), and yet during
World War II, the United States in systematic repression that was sustained throughout the
war. In the context of the war it was facing, the U.S. public was supportive of such extreme
abuses to human rights.1
1Even though the United States was at war against Japan, Germany, and Italy, repression of this scale was
focused on Americans of Japanese descent and not nearly as much on German or Italian Americans. Over
100,000 Japanese Americans were detained (Zinn, 2003 [1980]) while nowhere near as many German or Italian
Americans (either proportionally or in gross numbers) were moved into camps (Fox, 1988). A major part of
the reason behind this decision might not be because Japanese Americans somehow represented a bigger threat
to national security, but because public sentiment was more fearful of Japanese Americans than of German or
Italian Americans. Thus, American leadership was responding to a very publicly driven sense of insecurity.
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What aspects of domestic politics drive states to escalate international conflicts and shift
repression at home during those conflicts? External threats are potentially menacing contexts
in which states sometimes operate. They can represent contentious issues, such as disputed
territory, maritime, or policy disputes, or dangerous relationships with other states, such as
international rivalry, or when a state is on the receiving end of potentially damaging economic
sanctions. When facing such threats, states can choose to act belligerently or peaceably, by
engaging in militarized conflict or attempting to settle. In the context of these external
threats, governments can choose (or not) to repress portions of the domestic population
in order to shore up political support. I contend that the interplay of two major factors
influence both of these decisions: the type of threat the state is facing and domestic political
considerations. For an explanation of these two decisions to make in the context of external
threat, to choose to escalate militarized conflict (or not) abroad and repression (or not) at
home, the answer is the same. In the case of American entrance into World War II and
the subsequent repression of Japanese Americans, both decisions were made with domestic
support in the context of the conflict with Imperial Japan.
My explanation is rooted in the assumption that the chief goal of state leaders is to maintain
o ce, the logic of political survival (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and Morrow, 2003).
Thus, responses to external threat such as escalating conflict, going to war against a rival,
or domestic repression are chosen, in part, to build or maintain political support domestically.
Certain types of threat, or threats across issue areas, will a↵ect di↵erent regime types in
contrasting ways. External threats experienced by states may range from seemingly minor,
economic issues such as fishery rights all the way to war over territory or against ruling
regimes. Threats can a↵ect the general public, such as contesting symbolic territory, or
may only a↵ect small portions of a population, such as a dispute over mineable resources.
Depending on the domestic politics of states, certain threats are considered more important
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than others.
Escalating conflicts may be very costly for states, in terms of military resources, political
capital, and human cost. Leaders, sensitive to the wishes of their key domestic audiences,
are more likely to choose potentially costly foreign policy options if they feel they have to in
order to maintain support. For my explanation, the key distinction among states’ domestic
politics is how leaders are chosen, which in turn determines their key constituency. Whether
states are democratic or autocratic matters most for understanding the domestic politics of
international threat.
For democratic states, leaders depend on support from the general public to maintain o ce.
When faced with an external threat, the government must determine the salience of the
threat. If the threat a↵ects the general public, or is over a good that has broad public
attachment, such as symbolic territory, then such a threat is more likely to have high salience
for the democratic government. In this scenario, a democratic state is more likely to act
belligerently. Failing to consider the more violent path might make the leader appear weak on
an important security issue and may present a risk to losing o ce. If the threatening context
concerns a private good, such as mineable resources that enrich the elite, then a democratic
government might do better domestically by choosing a more peaceful path. Escalating a
conflict over an issue that a↵ects only a small group of the public can create substantial
political costs by risking the significant material and human costs associated with conflict.
In such scenarios, the best political strategy might well be to come to some sort of peaceful
arrangement or compromise with the opposing state.
For autocratic states, the story is more complicated. Unlike democracies, which have a
unifying characteristic of electoral accountability–the mechanism that ultimately drives the
public good orientation in policy-making–autocracies vary greatly in terms of support coali-
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tions. Autocratic states generally rely on the support from a subset of elite more than the
general public. Although some governments make appeals to the public occasionally, their
base support comes from the elite (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007; Svolik, 2009). In terms of
assessing which threats they might view as so salient to pursue violence internationally, it is
more likely to be those threats against elite interests.
In addition to the decision to escalate international conflicts, the government must choose
strategies to maintain support with their key domestic audience. One possible strategy is
through the use of political repression domestically. Repression is generally used as a strategy
to boost domestic political strength relative to a level of threat to the government (Poe and
Tate, 1994).2 In dictatorial political systems, repression is normal and routine policy used to
maintain control, and is often conducted through the use of the military rather than the legal
system. In democratic states, the norm is to not be repressive, relying instead on the legal
system to manage potentially violent domestic threats and the electoral system to regulate
political opposition. In periods of international conflict, however, democratic leaders make
decisions regarding repression based on what they expect the public will respond to positively.
When democracies are involved in salient interstate conflicts, domestic security becomes
a public “good” in its own right, and the general public may become more supportive of
repressive actions by the government. When employing their militaries to external conflict,
autocratic regimes could face the trade o↵ of pursuing the conflict abroad and maintaining
repression at home.
2Poe and Tate (1994) view threat to the government and external threat in much the same way. External
threat in the form of an interstate war threatens the state, which in turn can threaten the regime. A civil war is
more regime specific threat. This leads to an argument in which all threats tend to be conflated as conceptually
the same. In this project, and contrary to prior works in the structural correlates of Human Rights abuse (Poe
and Tate, 1994; Poe, Tate and Keith, 1999; Davenport, 2007) I focus exclusively on the role that international
conflict plays.
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1.1 Theoretical and Empirical Developments and
Contributions
The general expectations of this explanation are that in the context of external threats to
the public good, democratic states are more likely to choose violence, both abroad and at
home. Conversely, autocratic regimes will, in general, be more likely to act belligerently when
elite interests are being threatened. Turning inward, the involvement in conflict alters the
repressive tendencies of regimes, leading to crack downs by democratic governments, but an
easing of repression by autocratic regimes. From these general expectations, I develop and
test several empirical implications in this project.
In order to draw out specific expectations, I explore theoretically and analyze state behavior
in response to two di↵erent arenas of external threat: territorial conflict and international
rivalry. External threat is conceptualized as the competitive context between states, which
can be issues of contention or general competition between states over a long period of
time. These two arenas of disputed territory and rivalry were chosen because they have
consistently been shown to be among the most conflict prone threat environments (Diehl
and Goertz, 2000; Senese and Vasquez, 2008). Furthermore, territory is a specific issue
threat, while rivalry o↵ers a broader issue context, as well as a longitudinal one, in which to
derive empirical implications.3 They are by no means the only threatening environments that
one could examine. They are simply the ones in which I expect the domestic political dynamics
described above to most clearly take hold as both have been shown to have high domestic
salience (Huth and Allee, 2002; Colaresi, 2005). Territorial competition and interstate rivalry
are thus the laboratories in which I expect the relevant processes driving belligerent policy
3Other possibilities include alliance conflicts, arms race contexts, or economic coercion. Nevertheless, these
threatening environments are also often occur as the result of territorial competition or rivalry (Rider, 2009).
Territorial threat is generally considered a underlying cause of interstate violence (Vasquez, 1993), and thus
important to be examined for this study.
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choices to occur.
Within the threatening environment of competing territorial claims, there are several impor-
tant empirical implications. I expect that democratic states will escalate conflicts (militiarized
interstate disputes) over territory when the territory is of “public” value. Public attachment
when land has symbolic, historical, or homeland ties to a state. Conversely, I expect that
autocratic states are more likely to find territory salient when it is of largely “private” value,
such as territory that is resource rich, the taking of which would be mostly of benefit to the
elite.
Interstate rivalry, periods of repeated militarized conflict between two states, is a threatening
context that becomes normalized in the state policy making process (Diehl and Goertz, 2000;
Colaresi, 2005). I expect that democratic states will escalate hostilities against rivals when
public demand is most relevant, during election cycles. I further expect that autocratic rivals
will be most escalatory when the elite is most challenged, during periods of domestic unrest.
Finally, these two threatening environments can alter the repressive tendencies of the state.
During peaceful periods, states reach an equilibrium of repression. Democracies are typically
not repressive, whereas autocratic states use it as a policy tool to maintain control for the
elite against opposition elements among the general public (Poe and Tate, 1994; Davenport,
2007). The participation of the state in an external conflict may act as an exogenous shock
to the system of state repression. When engaged in territorial conflict, democratic states will
have the public backing to mitigate dissent and therefore are more likely to increase repression
in order to provide public security. Autocratic states, which typically provide security to the
elite through broad use of repression, may face the dilemma of putting military resources
abroad at the expense of employing repression at home. Counterintuitively then, autocratic
states may decrease repression during periods of territorial conflict. In international rivalry,
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because conflict is a normal part of the policy-making process, rival conflicts may not act as
an exogenous shock, and repression may not be altered by states.
In this project, I develop a multifaceted explanation of the choices that governments make
under external threat. Behaviors such as conflict escalation, rival dynamics, and domestic
repression are all explained by understanding the interplay between the type of threat states
face and domestic politics. This research brings together several di↵erent research programs
in a new way. By examining how di↵erent domestic political systems contextualize interna-
tional threats, this explanation o↵ers new insights for both the research programs focus on
domestic politics as well as on the role of issues in conflict. Although there is some research
that focuses on the domestic politics of territorial competition (Huth and Allee, 2002) it does
not focus on how democracies and autocracies will vary in the way they value certain types
of territory. Conversely, even though there is research on how multiple aspects of territory
are valuable (Hensel and Mitchell, 2005), it does not focus on how those value orientations
are a↵ected by domestic politics.
This project introduces new findings that add our understanding of domestic politics role in
conflict behavior, and links to research on issue conflicts and rivalry. In addition, this expla-
nation o↵ers a theory of human rights abuses during international conflict that is integrated
with theories of conflict, rather than being included as just a control as it so often is in stud-
ies of repression. Prior work in explaining the repressive tendencies of states has produced
mixed findings regarding the role of international threat (Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe, Rost and
Carey, 2006; Davenport, 2007). Theoretically, past approaches have largely treated interna-
tional threat as a simple variable (or control) in a model accounting for variance in repression,
with little conceptual attention paid to it. By contrast, I explain domestic repression during
international conflict as a function of the conflict process, based on the way domestic politics
influences the handling of issues of contention.
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1.2 Previous Research on Territorial Threat, Rivalry, and
Repression
In this section, I briefly outline the major works that relate territorial competition and ri-
valry to domestic politics. I also outline the literature that focuses on the role international
threat plays in domestic repression. Although the research program that focuses on the role
that territoriality plays on war and rivalry dynamics is progressive and robust, the literature
that explicitly links the role that domestic politics plays in territorial conflicts and rivalries is
relatively scant.
1.2.1 Domestic Politics and Territorial Competition
Territorial competition and the role it plays in the outbreak and escalation of international
conflicts have become the foci of a robust and growing research program over the past two
decades (Vasquez, 2009). Unsatisfied with the dearth of empirical support for realist ex-
planations of conflict, researchers sought out to find an explanation of conflict onset and
escalation that did not rely solely on the role of power. Vasquez (1993) provides the first
systematic explanation of war occurrence in which territorial competition is the central com-
ponent. Vasquez (1993) explains that territorial competition is an underlying factor for war,
further developing an explanation that expanded upon findings provided by researchers such
as Bremer (1992), who found that neighboring states are more likely to go to war. In his
explanation, known as the Steps-to-War model (Vasquez, 1993; Senese and Vasquez, 2008),
dyads that repeat territorial disputes with each other are more likely to engage in what
Vasquez describes as “power politics” behaviors such as arms racing and the formation of al-
liances. Although realists (Waltz, 1979; Walt, 1987; Mearsheimer, 2001) tend to see alliance
formation (external balancing) and arming (internal balancing) as security-seeking behaviors
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that stabilize relations between states, the steps-to-war perspective contends that they do
the opposite.
Empirically, there is substantial evidence to support the claim that territorial conflicts are
the most dangerous of issues. Vasquez and Henehan (2001) conduct a study in which they
compare militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) based on the issue at stake for the revisionist
state. There are four categories of issues in the Correlates of War MID dataset (Ghosn,
Palmer and Bremer, 2004): territory, policy, regime, and other. Among these four categories,
territorial disputes are shown to be the most war prone. Further evidence provided by Senese
(2005) shows that territorial competition, not merely contiguity, is the key underlying factor
that leads dyads to enter into militarized disputes and escalate those confrontations to war.
Indeed, if contiguity represents Most and Starr’s (1989) “opportunity” concept, and territorial
competition represents their “willingness” concept, then clearly willingness is what drives
states to war.
But what makes states so willing to fight over territory? Huth (2000) outlines four major
reasons for why territorial disputes so often lead to militarized conflict. Territory is seen
as a highly salient issue, but Huth contends that this is open to question, relative to other
issues. Another reason that militarization of territorial disputes is more likely because it
is easier to mobilize domestic support because of populations associated with the territory.
Further, Huth notes that militaries are trained to take territory and hold it, providing a better
opportunity for militaries to get involved in resolving territorial disagreements between states.
Finally, he points to the proclivity of authoritarian leaders to escalate territorial conflicts. His
argument, in line with the arguments by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), is that the private
good distributional aspect of territorial acquisition is appealing to authoritarian leaders. This
argument fits with later work by Huth and Allee (2002) that authoritarian leaders, able to
withstand public opposition, are more willing to “risk it” when it comes to territorial conflict.
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There are a number of di↵ering explanations of why territorial competition becomes so salient
that states go to war over it. This project adds yet another. Among the most common
rationales of why territorial competition becomes violent are that the material value of land
leads to states to attempt to seize territory from other states, that the symbolism or intangible
salience of territory essentially makes settling over it more di cult, or that humans are
inherently territorial and that competition over physical space is naturally more violent. None
of these explanations is inherently contradictory, although the theories behind them may be
seen as competing and sometimes predict di↵erent outcomes. Many of the publications that
focus on the relationship between territory and war actually do not favor one explanation
over another, noting that any of these reasons may drive states to war (Vasquez, 1993).
It is incumbent upon researchers, however, to find the most common path from territorial
competition to war and to delineate when which root of territorial war is at work at which time
and within specific dyads. This project’s explanation of the way that domestic politics can
help drive territorial competition into violent outcomes fits best within the second category
of explanation (the intangible salience explanation, which I also describe as the indivisibility
argument).
The role of domestic politics in these explanations of territorial importance and proclivity
to violence is usually implicit at best. Vasquez (1993) emphasizes the role of hard-liners
in state leadership roles. He notes that as territorial disputes repeat, hard-liners become
more powerful through outbidding processes (later theorized about by Colaresi (2005) and
by Goddard (2006)) and pull states along the war path. Huth and Allee (2002) examine
the e↵ects of the democratic peace in territorial disputes. They find that democracies are
less likely to launch disputes, but also less likely to back down in negotiations. They find
that although autocratic states are more willing to gamble by launching claims against other
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states, they also are less intransigent in bargaining over territory. Furthermore, autocracies
are the most likely to launch militarized disputes against other states over territory. Bueno de
Mesquita and his coauthors (2003) frame territorial disputes as purely about resources and
private gain. Small selectorate states (autocracies), whose leaderships stay in power through
the distribution of private goods to an elite, seek out territory solely for its material value in
order to split the spoils of victory.
Regarding how democracies deal with territorial conflicts, two works are especially prominent.
Using a dataset that focuses on territorial claims in Western Hemisphere and Western Europe,
Mitchell and Prins (1999) find that democracies, in general, are significantly less likely to have
militarized interstate disputes with each other over territory. In developing an explanation for
such a finding, Gibler (2007) notes that when states have settled borders, there is greater
security from invasion and less of a need to centralize the state and militarize. This, in
turn, leads states to democratize. Thus, when states have settled borders (no territorial
competition), they are more likely to become democratic, and thus more likely to have peace
between each other. What neither of these studies do, however, is provide for an explanation
of democratic behavior in militarized territorial disputes that they do have. Although we
know that democracies do not have wars against each other, territorial conflicts are fought
by democracies against autocratic states. These conflicts often become violent and can lead
to rivalry and war.
In the years since the release of the original version of The War Puzzle, Vasquez (2009) notes
that there have emerged three empirical patterns about territorial competition and war: that
1) territorial competition makes the outbreak of militarized disputes more likely, 2) that these
disputes are likely to repeat, and 3) that these repeated disputes are more likely to lead to
fatal conflicts and war. Yet, although the empirical patterns and findings that have emerged
since 1993 confirm that the territorial explanation of conflict and war has merit, the research
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only provides an implicit (at best) explanation of the role of domestic politics in territorial
competition. Domestic political concerns often play a role in the explanations provided above,
but never in a clear or systematic fashion.
1.2.2 Rivalry and Domestic Politics
International rivalry is a context in which states find themselves, rather than a simple ex-
ogenous factor that influences the decision to go to war. Although there are a number of
di↵erent operational definitions of rivalry (see for example Klein, Goertz and Diehl (2006)
and Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson (2008)), there is conceptual agreement that rivals are
states that view each other as enemies (over one or a series of issues) and expect future
confrontations. Some past research has focused on what makes rivals more likely to go to
war, what makes rivalry more likely to terminate, or rivals’ conflict dynamics. Typically, such
research focuses on the role that rivalry plays (as an independent variable) on levels of vio-
lence, escalation to war, or conflict initiation (Diehl and Goertz, 2012). The role of domestic
politics in rivalry is often mentioned, but is under-theorized as a factor in rivalry development
and dynamics.
Interstate rivalry is a particularly complicated threatening environment. For one, it is not a
one-time threat, but rather a long-term competition between states that can create a cycle
of policy-making. Second, it is often the most violent of threat environments. Diehl and
Goertz (2000) note that over half of wars in the international system from 1816-1992 were
fought between “enduring” rivals. Rivals also fight over high salience issues, such as territory.
Tir and Diehl (2002) note that the vast majority (81%) of enduring rivals have at least one
militarized interstate dispute over territory. Vasquez (1996) contends that rivals who fight
over territory are the most likely to go to war.
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Major works on rivalry focus on rival dynamics, which is how hostility or other factors change
over time within a rivalry. Diehl and Goertz (2000) argue for the punctuated equilibrium
perspective on rival dynamics. This theoretical approach, adapted from the punctuated
equilibrium theory of evolutionary biology, emphasizes the relative stasis of rival behavior;
over time, rivalries maintain a similar level of hostility toward one another. Sometimes there
are periods of rapid escalation or de-escalation that interrupt these periods of stability. Factors
associated with rapid shifts in hostility include external “shocks”, such as a global war, or
internal “shocks”, such as joint democratization. The emergence of a jointly democratic rival
dyad is associated with the end of a rivalry. This implies a domestic component to the rivalry
process.
In a similar fashion to the research on territorial competition, studies on interstate rivalry
implies a domestic mobilization story as well as implications for domestic politics (Hensel,
1999; Diehl and Goertz, 2000; Colaresi, 2005). Beyond the major finding that the occurrence
of joint democracy among a pair of rivals is su cient for the end of the rivalry (Diehl and
Goertz, 2000; Conrad and Souva, 2011), there is very little explicated in rivalry theories
to give a fuller understanding of the domestic politics-international rivalry relationship. For
example, Hensel (1999) explicitly incorporates domestic mobilization into his explanation of
rivalry development, but the domestic processes described in the theory are never tested
empirically. Thus, a more focused e↵ort to bring domestic politics into the explanation of
rivalry must be taken.
Colaresi (2005) develops a theory of rival escalation and maintenance based on domestic
political concerns. He argues that rival outbidding processes drive whether rival states choose
to escalate the rivalry or maintain typical levels of hostility. Outbidding occurs when domestic
actors compete over which takes a more hard-line position against the rival state. An example
of this might be both Republicans and Democrats in the United States competing over who
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was tougher on communism during the US-Soviet rivalry. When outbidding levels are high,
as when the stakes of rival competition are high, states are more likely to escalate hostilities
against a rival (Colaresi, 2005, 23). Although this story is compelling, there is little about
the potentially intervening contextual role of domestic institutions. For instance, it could
be that democracies and autocracies have di↵erent experiences with outbidding that a↵ect
their conflict decision making. Democracies have regular elections, which is a public and
institutionalized forum for outbidding to occur. Autocratic outbidding may occur privately
and for very di↵erent reasons than to gain public support. This project seeks to rectify this
shortcoming by explicitly incorporating the role of domestic institutions into the explanation
of rivalry dynamics.
1.2.3 International Threat and Human Rights
When compared to the number of studies linking civil war to repression, studies focused on
international conflict and domestic human rights abuse are few. Research with some deep
roots on the relationship between how international conflict shapes domestic institutions
sheds some light on the linkage between interstate conflict and human rights. Research
by Rasler and Thompson (1985), Tilly (1992), and more recently by Thies (2005; 2007)
and Gibler (2010) emphasizes the role that external threat plays on state centralization
and development. They contend that states centralize, form large militaries, and increase
taxation in order to deal with threats from other states. These states tend to be less likely
to be democratic. Gibler (2007) argues this is why neighborhoods of democratic states (and
by extension, less repressive states) emerge in neighborhoods that also have more secure and
settled borders. The implications of this line of reasoning is broadened to suggest that the
democratic peace is actually an extension of this phenomenon. In thinking about domestic
repression specifically, this logic suggests that when states are involved in an international
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conflict, they are likely to centralize (however briefly) in order to deal successfully with the
external threat, and may increase repression at home to address internal threats or to quiet
opposition.
Lebovic and Thompson (2006) examine the relationship between involvement in the Arab-
Israeli conflict and domestic repression. They outline the general logic that prevails in most
studies, seemingly derived from the war making and state making literatures. When states
experience external threat, the best way to tackle it is with a unified response at home, and
attend to internal threats as well. They also test the reverse hypothesis, which focuses on a
rallying e↵ect; when states are threatened externally, their domestic audiences rally to support
the government, thus reducing the need to repress the opposition, or internal threats. They
generally find support for the argument of the former hypothesis, that repression increases
during periods of conflict.
There are a number of empirical studies that incorporate some proxy of external threat (usu-
ally whether a state participates in an interstate war in a given year), but there is typically
little theoretical focus on the precise relationship between international conflict and domestic
repression. The theoretical logic underpinning the path-breaking studies by Poe and Tate
(1994) and Poe, Tate and Keith (1999) is based on the concept of the “strength/threat”
ratio (this is further explicated by Poe (2004)). The idea is that repression occurs when
a government’s political strength is lower relative to the level of political threat. Although
interstate war poses an indirect threat to a government’s domestic strength, it should pro-
vide some impetus to repress domestically in order to ensure the regime’s stability. The
strength/threat ratio logic is more straightforward with respect to other factors in their
models, such as economic development and democratic institutions (which strengthen do-
mestically, thus lessening repression) or involvement in civil war (which directly threatens,
and leads to an increase in repression).
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Davenport (2007) o↵ers the most far-reaching research project on the linkage between con-
flict, domestic politics, and domestic repression. Theoretically, Davenport posits that do-
mestic politics exerts pressure from two sources: voice (the people) and veto (institutional
players). These two pressures can work together in di↵erent ways to lessen the state’s ability
to repress. During periods of conflict, which Davenport uses to mean either international
or civil conflict,4 the ability of these domestic political forces to prevent repression is less-
ened. He finds, in general, that conflict, both civil and international, leads to an increase in
repression.
Empirically, prior research has produced mixed findings with respect to involvement in in-
ternational conflict and domestic repression. Findings in the war-making and state-making
literatures are suggestive that there is a link, but focus on di↵erent dependent variables.
Lebovic and Thompson (2006) find a link between the Arab-Israeli conflict and repression, but
their focus is limited to one region. The major cross-national quantitative studies (Poe and
Tate, 1994; Poe, Tate and Keith, 1999; Poe, Rost and Carey, 2006; Davenport, 1995; Dav-
enport and Armstrong, 2004; Davenport, 2007; Davenport, 2007a) suggest mixed findings.
Some of these studies find a statistically significant, but substantively weak, positive rela-
tionship between international war involvement and domestic repression, while others (Poe,
Rost and Carey, 2006) find no significant link at all. Of these, the work by Davenport
(2007) stands out as the research that attempts to integrate our understanding of domestic
politics, with violent conflict, and repression. Two other recent studies (Caprioli and Trum-
bore, 2006; Sobek, Abouharb and Ingram, 2006) examine international conflict and domestic
repression, but their causal direction is reversed from my study. Both of these studies find
that more repressive regimes are more likely to be involved in or launch international conflicts.
4While the book separates the two types of conflict empirically, much more of the focus is on civil conflict.
The major reason given for this is that there are a dearth of international wars, the indicator he chooses, during
the period of the data, which is from 1980 onward.
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Prior research that examines the cross-national correlates of repression tends to emphasize
the role that domestic institutions play in the repressive behavior of regimes (Poe and Tate,
1994; Davenport and Armstrong, 2004; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005). Their empirical
models tend to test the additive, and individually independent, aspects of di↵erent factors
surrounding repression, without examining how the presence of one factor might play a role in
the e↵ect of another on human rights. One reason why interstate conflict as an explanatory
variable may not show the same impact as civil conflict or democracy, is that its impact may
be conditioned by domestic politics. Much of the research in the past twenty years has been
focused on the role of domestic politics on conflict behavior, exemplified in the democratic
peace research program. It could be that the motivations for repression during international
conflict are conditioned by similar motivations that influence decisions for conflict di↵erently
across regime types. Davenport’s (2007) research goes the furthest toward contextualizing
conflict through domestic politics, but that study does not contextualize the international
conflicts themselves.
Research on international conflict and human rights abuse often lacks attention5 of the
context of the conflict. Cross-national research on repression (Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe,
Tate and Keith, 1999; Davenport, 2007) typically include a variable to represent “interstate
war,” usually employing the Correlates of War definition of a conflict that incurs 1000 or
more battle deaths (Sarkees, 2000),6 but wars only represent a small number of the interstate
conflicts that occur (Bremer, 1992). Furthermore, some of these conflicts are more salient
than others. Repression may occur in much lower intensity conflicts if the conflicts are
important domestically, even if the conflicts do not escalate to war. In recent years, there is
5Lebovic and Thompson (2006), writing on the Arab-Israeli conflict, do note that rivalry (and linked rivalry
across the region) is part of the story to understanding the relationship between conflict and repression.
6Poe, Rost and Carey (2006) use a di↵erent indicator, employing the Uppsala conflict variable, which
incorporates lower fatality conflicts. They also include interventions into civil wars within their international
conflict variable.
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a thriving research program that focuses on the issues of conflict, such as territory (Vasquez,
1993; Hensel and Mitchell, 2005; Gibler, 2007; Senese and Vasquez, 2008), as well as the
actor-context of conflict, such as international rivalry (Diehl and Goertz, 2000; Colaresi,
Rasler and Thompson, 2008). These studies have consistently shown that these contexts
matter for understanding why conflicts escalate to war (Senese and Vasquez, 2008), which
actors dominate war-fighting (Diehl and Goertz, 2000), as well as how the salience of issues
can impact when states fight (Hensel and Mitchell, 2005). In this study, I attempt to link
how the salience and context of conflicts operate within the context of domestic political
institutions to influence decisions on whether states alter their repressive strategies.
1.3 Outline of the Dissertation
In this dissertation, I explore how the internal politics of external threat a↵ects propensity for
conflict abroad and repression at home. In Chapter 2, I develop the theory first at an abstract
level, focusing only on the concepts of external threat as public or private goods and how
democratic and autocratic systems respond to such threats. From this discussion, I derive
two general expectations about conflict behavior: that democracies are more likely to choose
violent policies in response to threats to the public good and that autocratic regimes are
more likely to respond to threats against the private goods of the elite. In order to draw out
empirical implications, I then examine how this explanation applies in two arenas of external
threat: territorial competition and international rivalry. I examine the public and private
good aspects of territory to generate some general expectations regarding when conflicts
are more or less likely to escalate to wars. I then focus on international rivalry in order to
generate predictions about how domestic political considerations a↵ect di↵erent regime types
propensity to escalate rivalries. Finally, I discuss how these two types of international threat
alter the repressive tendencies of regimes, thus providing an explanation of repression during
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international conflict that is tied to an explanation of conflict behavior.
In Chapters 3, 4, and 5, I take the general expectations developed in Chapter 2 and derive
several testable hypotheses and analyze them. Chapter 3 tests the hypotheses on dyadic
territorial conflict, testing the predictions for escalation to war. Chapter 4 focuses on how
domestic political considerations a↵ect rival dynamics such as escalation of the rivalry to war
and the severity of disputes. In the final empirical chapter, Chapter 5, I analyze the hypotheses
for domestic repression during periods of territorial conflict and rivalry. Empirically, then, this
project employs several tests of the central argument at the dyadic level (Chapter 3), from
a longitudinal perspective (Chapter 4) as well as at the monadic domestic level (Chapter
5). This contribution provides new and progressive findings across several conflict research
programs. I conclude the dissertation in Chapter 6 by discussing potential future research
projects that stem from this research.
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Chapter 2
Regime Type, External Threat and
Violence
How does domestic politics influence how states evaluate the importance of external conflict?
At the heart of this explanation is the assumption that government leaders make policy
decisions to respond to external threats with considerations for how such decisions a↵ect
their prospects for maintaining power. The most important factor in understanding how
domestic politics a↵ects how states react to threat is the method for selecting governments.
How government leaders are selected helps to determine which domestic groups must be
satisfied in order for governments to stay in power. Although across states, there are many
di↵erent political systems, from parliamentary and presidential democracies to elite based
one party systems, military regimes, and monarchies, there is one distinction that is key for
my explanation. Whether a government is elected or not is the most important factor in
determining the key constituencies within the domestic population.
In this chapter, I begin my theoretical explanation by broadly defining the concept of external
threat. I then state some assumptions about state-leader motivations, drawn from the logic
of the Selectorate theory (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003), and from these assumptions, I
create a general story about threat and domestic politics. I then break down domestic politics
in a more nuanced fashion, examining di↵erent domestic political arrangements and their
e↵ect on responses to threat. Finally, I explore the ways in which di↵erent kinds of threat will
interact with di↵erent domestic arrangements to generate some general expectations about
the policies that states pursue in response to the external threats of territorial competition
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and international rivalry.
2.1 External Threat and Internal Political Pressure: Core
Assumptions and Summary
At the outset, I must define what is meant by “external threat.” Threat can signify anything
from the use of force by a state (or what might be considered a low level militarized dispute) to
a full-scale war, or it may simply be an issue of contention between states that may someday
arise into a crisis or conflict. I prefer a broad definition of threat, rather than to assume a
certain level of hostility or importance. As the explanation will make clear, the more salient
the threat, the more likely a state will pursue violent foreign policies to deal with the threat.
Because my theory is as much an explanation of threat salience as of anything else, I prefer
to leave the concept of threat with a minimal threshold, one that will encompass a range of
threats. Thus, I define “external threat” as any issue or context in which two or more states
are in competition with each other. In this space of this project, I will focus on two types
of threat: territorial competition and interstate rivalry. In later chapters, these threats are
operationalized as interstate conflicts. Nevertheless, I develop a theoretical backdrop that
can be further developed to make predictions regarding how states deal with other types
of threat, whether they be economic, regime oriented, or those emerging from a non-state
actor.
I argue that as the domestic salience of a threat increases, states are more likely to pursue
violent policies to deal with it. This claim has empirical support, as Hensel and Mitchell
(2005) find that as the salience level of territorial claims increases, states are more likely to
become involved in fatal militarized interstate disputes and war.1 The domestic salience of
1The authors also found that states are more likely to negotiate over territory when salience is high, leading
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threats is explained by leader motivations to stay in power. Thus, my first assumption is
that state leaders are motivated [largely] by a desire to maintain o ce. Other policy (foreign
or domestic) preferences that may motivate a leader are secondary to this one as without
maintaining power, a leader is not in a position to deliver on any other policy preferences. This
is not an unusual assumption in research that focuses on the domestic sources of international
behavior (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).
My second assumption is that every leader, regardless of how authoritarian, has to answer and
satisfy some domestic constituency in order to maintain o ce. This key domestic audience,
conceptually similar to a “selectorate” (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003), has the power
to remove the leader and replace the government, through some mechanism.2 Unlike the
Selectorate approach, I have no expectations about the size of the selectorate, per se, except
that democratic states will have larger ones than autocratic states. The key distinction
among domestic audiences for my theoretical approach is not coalition size so much as the
method through which the audiences select the leader. Given this, it is thus the chief policy
preference of a leader to maintain o ce through keeping support of the relevant domestic
audience.
I argue in my general framework that not all international threats are equally relevant to a
state. The relevance, or salience, of international threats is determined by the domestic audi-
ence. This line of reasoning goes against the realist (Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 2001) grain
that dominated international relations research for nearly half a century. Realism argues that
domestic politics plays, at most, a role at the periphery of decision-making regarding interna-
to the inference that as salience increases, states are more likely to seek settlement over the issue, whether
peacefully or violently. My explanation focuses solely on the violent policies of conflict escalation and repression,
but could also be extended I believe into more peaceful forms of conflict management.
2The mechanism of removal, whether through coup, leader death, party or national elections is important to
my theory, but not for the general framework that I am building presently. What is important for understanding
the general relationship between external threat and domestic political pressure is that there is a key domestic
audience without whose support the leadership cannot maintain government control.
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tional threats. The major motivating factor for foreign policy behavior is the maintenance of
a power balance in the international system. By achieving this balance, states create a stable
system. Because of this motivation, the major goal is to gain power, relative to other states.
In contrast, I contend that states are motivated by domestic concerns, and whichever threats
they deem in the “national interest” are, at least in part, determined by political ambitions
at home. This contention requires some justification. A thought experiment should prove
useful for making the case that this is at least a reasonable conjecture.3
If a leader is faced with a threat that is vital from an international perspective, but not
important from a domestic perspective, why would the leader pursue such a conflict? Suppose
State A could gain a strategic advantage (however defined) within its region by taking territory
from its neighbor, State B. Now also suppose that the territory is essential for State B’s
economy, but not for State A. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that State B will not give up
the territory without a fight.4 The question is, then, does State A go after the neighboring
State B’s territory, which will provide a strategic advantage? Given State B’s attachment
to the land, this would mean a militarized conflict. Even though the land o↵ers a strategic
advantage, attempting to take it risks conflict, so State A’s constituency may not place a
high value on taking the territory. If State A were to launch a conflict over that territory,
the domestic audience might be more likely to replace the government. Therefore, it is more
prudent (Morgenthau, 1993 [1948]) for the leader to not seek out the territorial conquest
and the potential strategic advantage, relying instead on the preferences of the key domestic
audience. Suppose instead that State A had historical attachment to part of State B’s
territory, it might then become prudent for State A to engage in a conflict over that territory,
3The reasonableness of this logic is actually tested throughout this project in various ways, and I believe
the empirical record more clearly and starkly justifies this argument than the thought experiment or any other
abstract language.
4In this thought experiment, the neighboring state has both international (strategic) and domestic (eco-
nomic) reasons for valuing the territory, and therefore the distinction between “realist” and “liberal” motives is
unnecessary.
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because it is more salient to the identity of State A’s audience, rather than just provide a
strategic advantage.
My general contention of this dissertation is that states are more likely to respond violently
to external threats when such threats are considered more salient domestically. The thought
experiment above is meant to illustrate that this argument is empirically plausible, not that
is true for most states most of the time. It will thus be subject to thorough empirical
testing in this project. Empirically, it can be shown to be false if all states, regardless
of domestic political di↵erences, tend to place the same amount of salience on external
threats. Regarding contested territory, for example, if states, regardless of domestic political
di↵erences, only valued it for its “intrinsic” or objective (economic or strategic) value (Goertz
and Diehl, 1992), then a realist depiction of threat salience is more accurate. If states do
alter valuation of territory according to di↵erences in domestic politics, however, then my
general line of reasoning has some scientific merit.
How, exactly, do domestic political concerns shape responses to external threat? First, the
salience of a threat must be determined. As I further elaborate below, the salience of an
external threat corresponds to the interests of the key domestic constituencies of a state.
All governments must provide a mix of “public” and “private” goods to their constituencies
in order to maintain o ce (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). I argue that di↵erent external
threats, the issues and contexts in which states compete, correspond to a conception of
public or private goods.5 The salience of threats in di↵erent contexts is thus conditioned by
how domestic politics are organized. As I further elaborate below, how the leader is selected
5This contention is notably di↵erent from that of Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003). They contend that
victory in war is a public good, as the entire nation is protected through such victory, which I contend is
conditional on both the issue of the conflict and the domestic arrangement of the state. They also contend
that the conflict issue of territorial revision is a private good, as states with small winning coalitions are interested
in it for its resource wealth. I argue that there are number of di↵erent reasons that states, both democratic
and autocratic, choose violent policies over territory, which can often take on a very public-good orientation.
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is key to understanding the conditional e↵ect that domestic politics have on threat salience.
In contrast to the Selectorate theory, developed by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), I
contend that rather than think of regimes as dealing with a continuum of a winning coalition
and selectorate, the key di↵erence among states is whether their leaders are elected or not
(democratic/not democratic). These categorizations of regimes determine whether states
must rely primarily on public goods to maintain o ce, primarily on private good distribution
to the elite, or on some mixture of the two.
When faced with a threat over a salient issue or in a salient context (such as rivalry), states are
more likely to engage in violent policies abroad to settle the issue (Hensel and Mitchell, 2005).
Escalation to war (by extension) should be more likely. Because if a threat is particularly
salient to a key domestic audience, the government of a state could risk losing power if it
does not react in a strong fashion.6
Once engaged in a conflict over a salient issue, the goal is to win as well as maintain support
domestically. From the war-making and state-making literature (Tilly, 1992; Rasler and
Thompson, 2012), it is thought that states become more centralized internally to deal with
threats externally. This leads to greater bureaucracy and taxation, as well as repression
by governments against their own citizens. Recent work has found that territorial conflict,
makes citizens less tolerant (Hutchison and Gibler, 2007) and that territorial threat can
lead to some bureaucratic centralization (Gibler, 2010). Regarding the act of repressing
the citizenry, research results have been mixed. Work has generally shown a statistically
significant, though substantively small, relationship between involvement in an interstate
war and increased domestic repression (Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe, Tate and Keith, 1999;
6This logic runs counter to some recent theoretical work in the democratic peace by Debs and Goemans
(2010). These authors argue that autocratic states are more sensitive to the costs of war and war failure than
democracies. This project does not contend any di↵erently with respect to war loss, but failure to attempt to
settle or stand strong on a particularly salient issue may also hold consequences for both regime types.
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Davenport, 2007). My explanation of this relationship, more fully developed below, makes the
claim that variation in repression during international conflicts is conditional on the salience
of the threat in the conflict as well as on domestic politics. Counterintuitively, when states
are faced with threats to the general public and are sensitive to their will, they are more likely
to increase repression in order to provide security. In contrast, the states that are typically
repressive (autocracies), may have use military resources to pursue the conflict that they
would ordinarily use for repression, and thus are more likely to decrease repression in salient
conflicts.
In order to justify fully the above predictions, I begin with an exploration of how the salience
of external threats is conditional on domestic political arrangements. This makes certain
regime types more likely to respond violently when the issue at stake is important to their
key constituency. I follow up this examination of regime type and threat salience by turning
inward and discussing the ways in which domestic politics and threat salience in turn a↵ect
variations in domestic repression during international conflicts.
2.2 Domestic Di↵erences and Threat Salience
There are fundamental di↵erences between democracies and autocracies and these are im-
portant (Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi, 1996). The chief among these is that
democratic governments are elected by the public, which ensures that the key audience in
a democratic state must be su ciently large to necessitate public good distribution as the
norm. The winning coalition in a democracy may vary according to institutional arrange-
ments. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) note that in proportional representation parliamen-
tary systems, minority coalitions exist such that a winning coalition is less than half of the
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selectorate.7 Su↵rage rules for a modern conceptions of democracy mean that the electorate
is essentially the whole of the general public. Furthermore, when considering the dilemma
of public versus private good distribution, a leader must look to the general population in a
democracy because a support coalition may shift considerably between elections. In other
words, leaders must attempt to win support from as many voters as possible and not neces-
sarily from the exact same voters that supported them in the prior election. The defining and
unifying characteristic of democratic regimes is that they are susceptible to public pressure
and being ousted as a result of the public will through regular elections. It is this mechanism
of electoral accountability that will make certain external threats more salient for democratic
governments than other threats.
Autocratic governments, which I conceptualize here as all non-democratic regimes (Przeworski
et al., 1996), have a wide array of support coalition sizes.8 According to the selectorate logic,
autocratic leaders’ survival depends on the distribution of private goods to the elite.9 The size
of this support base will condition how much each member of the elite receives. Furthermore,
depending on how credible a potential leadership challenge is to a dictator, s/he may be will-
ing to get away with less good distribution to the elite and not be seriously threatened. There
are two major autocratic types according to Svolik (2009), leaders who are “established” and
regimes that are “contested.” Established leaders, who do not have any legitimate fear of
being overthrown from within the elite, have much more freedom in terms of policy making.
7Furthermore, in a majoritarian system that does not have compulsory voting, a portion of a portion of the
voters (general public) that showed up to vote are the winning coalition. In the United States, for example, if
roughly half of eligible voters and the winner wins just over 50%, then the winning coalition is roughly 25% of
the selectorate.
8There are many di↵erent ways to compare di↵erent autocratic regimes. Geddes (2003), for instance,
breaks them apart according to whether they are military, personalist, or single-party regimes. Svolik (2009)
conceptualizes autocracies according to the degree of contestation leaders experience. Weeks (2012) employs
a modified coding of the Geddes data.
9By elite, I mean a support base that is not the general public. For example, in the Soviet Union, although
the number of party members who had a role in selecting leadership was very large, one could still consider
them elites.
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They also be able to draw on legitimacy claims that appeal to those outside of the elite,
such as territorial claims tied to the homeland. Contested regimes are ones in which the
elite constituency can credibly threaten to oust the leader. Such autocratic leaders may rely
solely on the distribution of private goods to an elite class in order to stave o↵ would be
replacements. Whether a regime is contested or established helps determine which types of
external threats are particularly salient and more likely to go to conflict.10
In an international environment that is threatening, a leader must determine a course of
action for the state. To militarize and pursue conflict requires support domestically from
the winning coalition. This does not necessarily mean public support as it is conventionally
treated in the literature on domestic politics and international conflict (Fearon, 1994). When
facing a threat from another state, governments can respond (in general) either belligerently
through the use of force or militarizing hostilities or they can act more peaceably, either
through acquiescing to the other state or negotiating a settlement on the contested issue.11
Choosing belligerent policies is potentially very costly, in terms of resources, human costs,
and political capital. Thus, it seems logical that a government whose chief priority is retaining
power domestically, will only choose such costly policies when it is in its primary constituency’s
interest.
10Although I explore this conceptualization of contested leaderships in autocratic states theoretically in this
chapter, I only empirically delve into the major di↵erences between democracies and dictatorships. I discuss
how one might explore the spectrum of autocratic states in the conclusion chapter.
11This project is interested in determining why states choose the more belligerent path. As previous research
has noted (Huth and Allee, 2002), a complete understanding of conflict should teach us something about
peaceful conflict resolution as well. In explaining the decisions to go down a more violent and militarized path,
there are some implications for why states choose more peaceful courses of action in the context of external
threat.
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2.2.1 International Threat as Public or Private Goods
When facing a threat by another state, governments must determine the salience of the
issue over which they are being threatened. I assume, based on prior work (Hensel and
Mitchell, 2005), that states are more likely to choose potentially costly policies such as
conflict when threatening issues are of the highest salience. Salience is determined the
domestic audience to which the threat is most important. Does the threat pose a challenge
to the existence of the state, or to vital interests of the general public or the ruling class? If a
threat is determined to be of vital interest to those that determine who leads the state, then
it is more likely that a government will choose potentially costly courses of militarized action
over such a threat. As noted above, I conceptualize threat as the issue in contention, rather
than exclusively as actions by another state. The issue dimension is important because it
represents the policy and bargaining space over which states compete. As such, certain issues
over which states threaten each other can correspond to the notion of public or private goods.
Viewing threat as disputed issues and examining them through the lens of public or private
gives a context for understanding when a threat will be viewed as salient. Certain actions
by other states may only be considering threatening if the issue in contention is salient. By
placing threats within an issue context, one can determine whether belligerent policy choices
become more likely as domestic salience increases. Threats can concern a number of di↵erent
issues, each with varying salience to states. Governments determine the salience of the threat
by whom it a↵ects the most domestically. According to Engerer (2011),12 the conventional
view of public goods is that they are non-rival and non-excludible. That is, if one person
partakes in the good, it does not take away from another person’s ability to enjoy it. There
is enough to go around, so no one has to compete for access to the good, as opposed to a
12Engerer’s work concerns security as an economic good. My conception is di↵erent in that I contend that
the security provided by pursuing violent policies approaches “public” or “private” status, but do not conform
strictly to such definitions.
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common good, such natural resources (see Ostrom (1990)), which may dissipate over time.
“Public good” threats occur over issues that will e↵ect the public as a whole. If a state’s
national identity or sense of security is on the line, then a threat against that identity or
security can be viewed as a threat to a public good.
Private goods are those that in which actors compete over access and there is a limited
amount. “Private good” threats will concern issues for which the elite or ruling class is
most concerned. Because elite-based dictatorships are based in private good distribution, an
international threat constitutes a private-good oriented threat. Depending on the domestic
political arrangements of a state, “public good” threats will be more salient than “private
good” threats, and vice-versa.
Once a government determines what kind of threat it is facing, whether it primarily concerns
a public or private good issue, it must choose how to respond. When engaged in a threatening
situation with another state, governments choose between two types of policies. They can
choose belligerent policies, which include militarization, engagement of militarized conflict, or
war. Alternatively, they can choose more peaceable ways of handling the threat, which include
acquiescing to the other state or engaging in negotiations. Each course of action could be
potentially be politically costly. The likelihood of either set of actions is conditional on the
type of threat a state is facing and the domestic political considerations that governments
must make.
For democratic states, if a threat concerns the general public, or is over a good that has
broad public attachment, such as symbolic territory, then such a threat is more likely to have
high salience. In this scenario, a democratic state is more likely to act belligerently. To
not at least consider the more violent path might open up the leader to appear weak on
a salient security issue and risk being ousted from o ce. If the threat concerns a private
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good, over an economic issue such as oil-rich land, then a democratic government might do
better domestically by choosing a more peaceful path. Choosing conflict over an issue that
a↵ects only a small group of the public can create significant political costs by risking the
high material and human costs associated with conflict. In such scenarios, the best political
strategy might well be to come to some sort of peaceful arrangement with the opposing
state.
For autocratic states, the story is less simple. Unlike democracies, whose unifying char-
acteristic is electoral accountability–the mechanism that ultimately drives their public good
orientation in policy-making–autocracies vary greatly in terms of their support coalitions.
Autocratic states generally rely on the support from the elite more than the general pub-
lic. Although some governments make appeals to the public occasionally, their base support
comes from the elite (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007; Svolik, 2009). In terms of assessing
which threats they might view as so salient to pursue violence internationally, it is more
likely to be those against elite interests. Thus, external threats that a↵ect the private good
distribution of autocratic governments make the use of violent foreign policies more likely.
Pursuing threats to public goods by engaging in conflict could divert resources and attention
away from maintaining the elite regime through the distribution of private goods, leaving the
government open to domestic threat.
From this abstract discussion, I have two general expectations about the interaction of exter-
nal threat and domestic politics. First, democratic states, whose key characteristic is reliance
on public support, are more likely to find threats that primarily a↵ect the general public to be
of the highest salience. Conversely, I expect that autocratic states, whose key constituency
is the elite, will find external threats to private good distribution the most salient. This is
summarized in Figure 2.1 below. The task now remains to explore these general and abstract
expectations in two di↵erent issue contexts: territorial competition and rivalry.
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Figure 2.1: Salience by Threat and Regime Type
Threat to Public Good Threat to Private Interest
Democracy Highest Salience Lower Salience
Autocracy Lower Salience Highest Salience
Under highly salient threat contexts, states are more likely to choose violent foreign policies
and alter repressive behavior at home. Providing security of the public welfare for democracies
and private good distribution for autocracies are vital for governments to maintain support
and power domestically. In these threat contexts, states become more likely to choose high
cost policies such as escalating conflicts. Domestically, they become more open to altering
policy practice with respect to repression in order to secure the home front politically or
provide more resources for the conflict abroad. The following three sections focus on how to
take this abstract explanation of threat salience to draw out expectations for conflict behavior
and domestic repression in the context of territorial competition and international rivalry.
2.3 The Internal Politics of Territorial Threat and Conflict
Escalation
The role of domestic politics in explanations of territorial importance and proclivity to violence
is usually implicit at best. Vasquez (1993) emphasizes the role of hard-liners in state leadership
roles. He notes that as territorial disputes repeat, hard-liners become more powerful through
outbidding processes (later theorized about by Colaresi (2005) and by Goddard (2006)) and
pull states along the war path. Huth and Allee (2002) examine the e↵ects of the democratic
peace in territorial disputes. They find that democracies are less likely to launch disputes, but
also less likely to back down in negotiations. Although autocratic states are more willing to
gamble by launching conflict over claims against other states, they also are less intransigent
in bargaining over territory. Furthermore, autocracies are more likely to launch militarized
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disputes against other states over territory. Bueno de Mesquita and his coauthors (2003)
frame territorial disputes as purely about resources and private gain; small selectorate states
(autocracies), whose leaderships stay in power through the distribution of private goods to
an elite, seek out territory solely for its material value in order to split the spoils of victory.
Hensel and Mitchell (2005) (see also Hensel, Mitchell, Sowers and Thyne (2008)) focus on
the importance of territory and its role in conflict onset. Employing the Issue Correlates of
War dataset, which focuses on issues of contention between states, they categorize territory
according to tangible and intangible salience. Tangible salience means that a territory is rich
in resources or material value, or holds some strategic value. Intangible salience indicates
that the land serves as a historic homeland or has symbolic value for a state. They find that
overall salience leads to a higher likelihood of MIDs and fatal MIDs. Even though tangible
salience leads to higher likelihood of all kinds of militarized disputes, intangible salience is
positively associated with only the most severe disputes (fatal MIDs and war). They also find
that intangibly salient territory is positively associated with peaceful settlement of territory.
This could mean that the most salient territory is very likely to be either settled or militarily
contested. Understanding when one action is chosen over the other is key in understanding
MIDs over disputed territory. One reason for why territory can become indivisible is that by
rallying around the issue, the domestic public might make it impossible for leaders to back
down (Vasquez, 1993; Goddard, 2006). Perhaps certain domestic political arrangements lend
themselves to conflict over territory more easily than others.
Huth and Allee (2002) and Gibler (2007) take on the intersection between disputed territory
and domestic politics. Huth and Allee seek to explain how states settle or resort to force over
disputed territory. They do not look at MIDs per se, but more often lower level (in terms
of hostility) interactions. Their major findings are that autocrats are more likely to resort to
force over disputed territory, while democracies are least likely to give in during negotiations
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over disputed territory. They explain that autocracies have leaders that have more secure
terms of o ce and are thus more willing to gamble by resorting to force. By contrast,
democracies are more constrained and more likely to be punished for poor performance (also
put forth by Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson and Smith (1999)), and thus are less
willing to risk using force and losing territory. In negotiations, however, democracies also
attempt to avoid losing territory that may have value with the general public and are thus
less willing to compromise.
Gibler (2007) turns the democratic peace argument on its head. Rather than focus on the
role of domestic institutions’ influence on conflict, he focuses on the conflict (or settlement
of conflict) and its role in institutional selection. He explains that when states have settled
territory and borders, they have less need to centralize, mobilize, and militarize their state
in order to deal with external threats. Because of the this, states become more open and
democratic. Therefore, the democratic peace exists because of settled territory. The causal
arrow is that settled territory leads to democratic states, which then leads to peaceful regions.
When controlling for stable borders, Gibler finds no dampening e↵ect of joint democracy on
MID onset. The major problem with Gibler’s theory is that it does not deal with what happens
when democracies do have disputed territory (as Huth and Allee 2002 clearly show that they
do). A fuller theory of the role of territory and MIDs should engage how the interaction
between domestic politics and contentious issues lead to di↵erent likelihoods for conflict.
How does the abstract framework developed above apply to territorial conflict? As Hensel
and Mitchell (2005) clearly show, territory is not valued for the same reasons by every state.
If states value territory di↵erently, then understanding when territory is a salient issue that
leads to conflict is important. For understanding the contexts in which territory might be
valued in such a way as to lead to violent conflict, I believe the answer lies in domestic politics.
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Certain territory lends itself to being treated in a public or private fashion. It is not from a
straight examination of the land itself. If we are to follow the logic of Goddard (2006), then
the symbolic, indivisible characteristics of territory are constructed by political leaders in order
to promote hard-line elements within the domestic political realm. That territory as a public
goods issue is something that can be constructed via domestic political process is in line
with both Vasquez (1993) and Colaresi (2005). Applying the idea of tangible and intangible
salience developed by Hensel and Mitchell (2005), it appears that intangible territory would
lend itself to this kind of salience construction. Territory that has primarily tangible salience,
such as resource wealth, seems to be less apt to have this public appeal. Nevertheless,
contested territory may have numerous salient aspects, and does not always lend itself to a
clear dichotomization.
Goertz and Diehl (1992) discuss two types of territorial value: intrinsic and relational. The
intrinsic value of territory conforms to the resource or strategic importance of territory. The
resource value of territory, such as mineral wealth, would be the same for either state that
competes over it. The relational context of valuing territory leads states to regard territory
di↵erently. Homeland territory is relational. One state may consider territory as a homeland,
and therefore very valuable, while the other does not consider it this way. Thus, the context
of a territorial claim is more relevant for the intangible aspects of territory (Hensel and
Mitchell, 2005). From the viewpoint of my explanation, the relational aspects (less tangible
or more public) aspects of territory are most salient for democracies because homeland claims
are more likely to resonate with the general public. The intrinsic value of territory, such as
its resource wealth, is more likely to resonate with elite interests in autocratic states because
acquisition and control of such territory can increase the private good output of a government.
Generally, democracies are more willing to be involved in conflicts and war over territory
when the territory that has symbolic or intangible value, making it more like a public good.
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Because of the public orientation of such territory, backing down can become very di cult
for leaders who rely on mass support to maintain o ce. This could lead to elections based on
outbidding over contested territory and lead to it becoming seemingly indivisible (Goddard,
2006). In general though, and taking from Gibler (2007) and other research on jointly
democratic disputes (Mitchell and Prins, 1999), we should expect such conflicts involving
democracies to be fought against autocracies (Huth and Allee, 2002). Mitchell and Prins
find that democracies may be involved against each other in disputes, but usually they are
over maritime issues, not landed territory, or economic issues such as fishing rights, and these
disputes are not particularly severe.
Although democracies attach a higher salience to territory of a certain kind, once violence
over territory occurs and repeats, territory is more likely to become framed as a public good.
Research on democracies in conflict (Reiter and Stam, 2002; Huth and Allee, 2002; Bueno de
Mesquita et al., 2003) indicate that once democracies enter into a conflict over a high salience
issue, winning the conflict becomes a good to deliver in its own right. Territory is an issue
that is vulnerable to “outbidding” domestically, making it more likely to lead to escalation
(Vasquez, 1993; Goddard, 2006). Thus, once violence occurs over territory, war is more
likely when a democratic state is involved. Because territorial violence is unlikely between
jointly democratic states, such wars over territory are most likely to occur when a democracy
is fighting an autocratic state.
Autocracies, on the other hand, are more likely to focus on the tangible qualities of territory.
For their relevant domestic audiences, the material value of territory may be more important
than the symbolic qualities of it, because the material value of territory can directly impact
private good distribution. Therefore, we can expect that, in general, territorial conflicts
between jointly autocratic dyads to be fought over tangibly salient land, rather than symbolic
or intangible territory. These also may be less likely to escalate to war, however, as over the
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course of pursuing a conflict, the states find a way to divide the stakes. It is conceivable that
it may be less costly to find a way to divide the material aspects of territory than to go to
war over it.
If some states value the material qualities of territory more than the symbolic aspects, or vice
versa, it is possible that two states contesting territory may place di↵erent value upon it. The
most hostile territorial conflicts may be those fought between democracies for whom territory
has intangible value and autocracies who value the tangible aspects of it. The negotiation
over the issue may be very di cult because both states find themselves in a scenario in which
their domestic audience demands the good. When an autocracy is attempting to negotiate
over the tangible (potentially divisible) aspects of disputed land, but a democratic state is
holding a hard-line position over the intangible (and potentially indivisible) aspects of it,
negotiation may become more di cult. In other words, mixed regime dyads may have issue
incongruity, and thus conflicts over that issue may be more likely.
War may also occur between democracies and autocracies over tangible territory, although
it seems less likely than over intangible territory. Autocrats may indeed be more willing to
gamble for victory through conflict (Huth and Allee, 2002) because they might believe that
the democracy lacks enough resolve (similar logic to Fearon (1995)). A democracy may be
more willing to compromise on such territory, however, because it may not carry with it the
public demand that symbolic land would. This should lead to more negotiation and a greater
likelihood of a settlement over the issue, at least compared to contested territory that holds
symbolic value for the democratic state.
38
2.4 The Internal Politics of Interstate Rivalry
The rivalry context (Diehl and Goertz, 2000; Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson, 2008) reflects
a long-term dyadic engagement and is the most dangerous state-to-state relationship. The
most enduring rivalries can come to dominate the foreign policy-making process; the relation-
ship with the Soviet Union was paramount in American foreign policy-making throughout the
second half of the twentieth century. As noted before, however, very few researchers explicitly
attempt to link domestic political processes to rivalry dynamics Colaresi (2004; 2005). Draw-
ing from the logic elaborated above, I am able to draw out implications for rival dynamics
from the interaction of issues and institutions.
Rivalries can arise over a number of di↵erent conflict issues. Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson
(2008) classify strategic rivalries within two major types: hierarchical and spatial. Hierarchi-
cal rivals are concerned largely with their relative power distribution and their place in the
international system. The clearest example of such a rivalry is the Cold War rivalry between
the United States and Soviet Union. A spatial rivalry chiefly concerns competition over ter-
ritory between rivals. A prime example of such a rivalry is the competition between India and
Pakistan over the Kashmir region. Both types of rivalries can be especially contentious and
violent. The key di↵erence is the issues at stake.
Klein, Goertz and Diehl (2006) classify rivalries according to the number of conflicts they
have, rather than the chief issues at stake. Their dispute-density approach codes rivals as
isolated conflicts or rivalry.13 Contentious issues have a way of bleeding over into other arenas
in the rivalry context, so even minor issues may take on greater importance. It is expected that
this type of issue contamination will be more extreme as the rivalry endures. Furthermore,
according to (Tir and Diehl, 2002), most rivalries have some territorial component. Vasquez
13This classification requires three or more militarized disputes within a fifteen year period.
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(1996) contends that territorial conflict between rivals is what drives them to war.
Neither of these major conceptualizations of rivalry classify rivalries according to domestic
politics. The strategic rivalry approach, by breaking down by issues of contention, potentially
o↵ers an avenue of theoretical integration with the issue/domestic politics logic described
above. The dispute density approach, however, perhaps o↵ers an idea of how intense the
rivalry context has become for policy makers, in terms of how much fighting occurs between
states. Employing a framework that takes into account the view of policy-makers is important
for analyzing when rivalries escalate.
When considering how the rivalry context conditions leader behavior with respect to domestic
politics, the most useful concept from the rivalry literature is outbidding (Colaresi, 2005).
Colaresi describes a process through which domestic politics leads rivals to escalate conflicts.
Outbidding occurs when competing domestic factions attempt to gain domestic support for
their leadership (or overturning of leadership) by advocating more hard-line against a rival
state. Goddard (2006) describes this process as key for understanding how contested territory
can become indivisible. It also can explain how issue competition can evolve into rivalries, thus
becoming intractable over a very long period of time. I thus try to explain when outbidding
occurs within di↵erent regime types involved in rivalry. In doing so, I focus on two major
outcomes: the development of a rivalry and the escalation of rivalries by individual states.
For my purposes, the key is understanding which domestic institutional contexts lead to the
kind of domestic outbidding that produces escalatory behavior within rivalry. In democratic
states, I should expect to see the kind of outbidding that might lead to rival escalation to
occur when governments are most sensitive to public opinion, during election periods. A
democracy may become hostile against a rival in an attempt to shore up hardline support.
For autocratic states, escalatory behaviors against the rival are most likely when the elite is
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at risk, during periods of domestic unrest.
I also anticipate that disputes between rivals are the most escalatory when one state is
democratic and the other is autocratic. Democratic states who are locked in to hardline
positions are much less likely to settle a contentious issue against an autocratic state than a
democratic state. Furthermore, when rivals are most domestically sensitive (either elections
for democratic states or periods of unrest for autocracies), the opposing state may attempt
to take advantage of the other’s domestic weakness.
2.5 Territorial Conflict, Rivalry, and Domestic Repression
The above abstract discussion, as well as the more focused explorations of territorial com-
petition and rivalry, focus on the interaction of external threat and domestic politics and
how they make certain foreign policy choices more or less likely. How do these factors in
turn alter the government’s calculations with respect to domestic policies regarding political
repression? Political repression, in the form of human rights abuses to physical integrity.14
Explanations of political repression tend to use an additive approach applied to all states,
generating expectations with respect to structural correlates of abuse, such as economic
development or democratic institutions (Poe and Tate, 1994; Davenport, 2007). This expla-
nation focuses only on how external threat alters the propensity to repress by states. Similar
to the explanation of conflict escalation above, the key interaction for my explanation is how
domestic political considerations a↵ect the handling of conflict, but in this section, I focus
on a domestic policy output: the abuse of human rights by governments–political repression.
14These represent a specific kind of politically motivated human rights abuse that includes the practices of
unlawful and political imprisonment, the use of torture, and politically motivated murder by the government
against its own citizens (Poe and Tate, 1994).
41
Poe and Tate (1994) explain the decision to repress as a function of a government’s domestic
strength relative to the amount of threat that exists to its rule. The politically stronger a
government is, relative to the amount of political threat it experiences, the less likely it will be
to use repression as a tool to maintain o ce. Democratic governments, who rely on popular
support to maintain o ce, are less likely to be repressive because it risks alienating voters
and makes governments weaker politically. Furthermore, the opposition is regulated through
institutions, so both the leadership and opposition can adequately check each other without
resorting to violence or repression (Davenport, 2007). In construct, autocratic governments
employ repression as a way of keeping potential opposition from arising within the general
public. Repression protects the interests of the elite, the key constituency for dictatorships.
In terms of the public and private good distinction discussed above, domestic security via the
rule of law (without repression) is a public good for democracies, while domestic security via
repression is a private good for the elite in autocratic regimes. Thus, in general, we expect
that democracies will use very little repression, year in and year out, while autocratic systems
maintain a higher level of repression in the operation of the state. This is hardly a profound
conclusion, and has always had strong empirical support (Davenport and Armstrong, 2004;
Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005).
External conflict can act as an exogenous shock to the repressive system in place during
peacetime. Autocratic states involved in an international conflict may now be in a position
where they must pour military resources, that might ordinarily be used for domestic repression,
into fighting abroad. These leaders may face a dilemma between repression at home and
winning the conflict. If the conflict is salient or dangerous enough, this may mean that an
opening up of the system becomes more likely and repression likely to decrease.
When involved in an international conflict, democratic states must provide the public good of
security both at home and abroad. Especially if the conflict is salient to the public, democratic
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citzenries may feel they have more at stake in winning the conflict–that it is tied to their own
security. In order to feel more secure, such publics will become more supportive of the use
of repression domestically. This expectation has supported with survey research that finds
that democratic publics are likely to become more intolerant during periods of external threat
(Hutchison and Gibler, 2007). Other research indicates that democratic states embroiled
in civil wars may seek to gain support by acting more harshly toward rebels (Heger and
Salehyan, 2007).
For democracies, conflicts over higher salience issues are those in which threats a↵ect the
general public. Higher salience not only makes conflict engagement more likely, but also
increases in repressive behavior domestically. The reason for these is the mechanism of
public demand/pressure. Conflicts salient to the general public are most important because
they generate the greatest insecurity for the electorate. Providing the security of its subjects
is the first responsibility of government, and to the general public the first responsibility of a
democracy. Thus, anything that is perceived to be a hindrance to the provision of that security
can become part of the threat presented by the external conflict itself. Therefore, elements of
the general public may become more willing to accept increases in repression during conflicts.
The targets of such repression are most likely to be potential fifth columns–groups related
to the opposing state, vocal or extreme opposition, or protest groups. Repression is thus
seen as a policy tool to provide security to the general public in times of external crises. It
seems most likely to be used only in the most salient of conflicts. It does not seem likely that
there would be such an increase in repression that the major opposition party (or parties) are
targeted, because they are elements of the public that the government must protect as well.
Of the two types of conflicts I examine, territorial and rival, I expect that territorial conflicts
will be most likely to lead to changes in repressive behaviors. Territorial conflicts are the most
war prone and potentially domestically salient (Vasquez, 1993; Hensel and Mitchell, 2005).
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Rival conflicts, however, are frequent and have a consistent amount of hostility associated
with them over time (Diehl and Goertz, 2000; Goertz, Jones and Diehl, 2005). On account
of this consistency, rival conflicts may not present as much of an alteration of domestic
policies as territorial conflicts.
2.6 Expectations and Refutations
This section outlines how three empirical chapters are constructed and designed. Chapter 3
examines the escalation of militarized conflict in the context of contested territory. Chapter
4 the dynamics of conflict escalation in the context of rivalry. Chapter 5 tests how the threat
environments of territorial and rival conflicts a↵ect repression dynamics.
The major argument of the theory is that states are more likely to choose violent policies
when confronted with high salience issues, and that domestic political considerations are
instrumental in determining the salience of external threat. Democratic states will find threats
to the general public more salient than threats that would e↵ect primarily elite interests.
Autocratic states, who maintain elite support through private good distribution, will find
threats to economic interests the most salient. From this framework of expectations about
threat salience and domestic politics, I explore the threat contexts of territorial competition
and interstate rivalry.
In the context of territorial competition, I make a series of empirical predictions. Some of
these are in line with prior work in research on domestic politics and issue conflict. Monadi-
cally, I expect that democratic states will find threats to “publically” valuable territory, which I
envision as symbolically or intangibly valuable, as more salient and are therefore more likely to
escalate such conflicts. Autocratic states are most responsive to “privately” valued territory,
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such as resource rich land.
The empirical reality is that all conflicts work in dyadic contexts and not monadic. Therefore,
some caveats must be introduced. From the research on the democratic peace and territorial
conflict (Mitchell and Prins, 1999; Huth and Allee, 2002; Gibler, 2007), jointly democratic
dyads are unlikely to go to conflict or war over territory of any kind. Therefore, the dynamics
described above about democracies are expected when facing an autocratic state. Thus, if
there is evidence that when democracies have a “public claim” escalating against an autocratic
state and conflict is more likely, then there is support for my theory. If mixed dyads are not
more likely to escalate MIDs when the democratic state has a publicly valued claim, then I
will accept that as evidence against my explanation.
I expect that once violence has begun, democracies find it more di cult to back down because
of domestic political considerations. The expectation is that mixed regime dyads fighting over
territory are more likely to escalate to war, in part because of the domestic processes in the
democratic state, but also because of issue incongruity between democracies and autocracies
when fighting over territory. This expectation is not as clear-cut as the others. I certainly
expect these dynamics to exist if my expectations on territorial claims are also confirmed,
but other dynamics could also be at work to produce this outcome. Therefore, evidence on
this claim does not represent any kind of critical test for the explanation, but would provide
some supplemental evidence to support the explanation’s take that democratic processes can
drive escalation to war when it is fought over a high salience issue.
With rivalry, I now expand expectations from conflicts on one issue to one in a dangerous
context that might encompass many issues. The rivalry context allows me to account for
dynamics of domestic politics to a↵ect the likelihood of conflict. Thus, I try to answer “when”
questions as well as “why” questions. The ideas of “public” and “private” sensitivities to
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external threat are expanded in this context. The focus on election timing for democracies is
to show when outbidding might peak, demonstrating a strong publicly driven sensitivity to the
rival threat. For autocracies, periods of domestic unrest will make leaders the most vulnerable,
because they are targeted specifically against the elite leadership. If neither elections nor
unrest lead to escalation between rivals, then my explanation will be clearly lacking.
Finally, for the hypotheses on repression, I expect democratic states to increase repression
during salient conflicts and for autocratic states to either maintain or decrease repression.
If democratic states do not increase their repression during some conflicts, then the expla-
nation for repression I present will fall short. Public pressure to allow for an increase in
repression under periods of threat is the key factor, and without it, this explanation based on
the interaction of conflict and regime type may not apply to human rights. If democracies
and autocracies both significantly increase repression during salient international conflicts,
then this explanation will also prove unsatisfactory. Such a result indicates that the more
straightforward relationship explained by a “strength/threat” approach is more correct (Poe
and Tate, 1994). It could also indicate that international conflict simply weakens all institu-
tions’ abilities to prevent repressive behavior (Davenport, 2007). As my explanation is about
the conditionality of threat and regime type, democratic and autocratic states should display
di↵erent repressive dynamics during some conflicts in order for my theory to be correct.
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Chapter 3
Territorial Salience, Regime Type, and
Conflict Escalation
Territorial disputes are more dangerous than those conflicts over other issues; the former
are more likely to involve violence and escalate to war. This relationship been repeatedly
a rmed by international conflict research over the last thirty years (for overviews, see Tir
and Vasquez (2010) or Hensel (2012)). Although such findings have been among the most
enduring and important in international conflict research, the impact of territorial issues on
conflict behavior is not as dramatic as joint democracy, and we know considerably less about
the causal logics involved. The presence of joint democracy is a virtual su cient condition
for peace, whereas territorial disputes only have a probabilistic impact on the likelihood of
war; territorial disputes are neither guarantees of war nor are their absence su cient for
peace. The democratic peace literature is also more highly developed in terms of theoretical
explanations (see Chan (2010)), even as there might be limited empirical support for some
of them (Lektzian and Souva, 2009).
In Chapter 2, I explained how domestic political arrangements can influence evaluations of
external threat in a general and abstract way. This chapter seeks to make this explanation
more concrete by examining a specific issue threat: territorial competition. I begin with the
observation that although territorial disputes have a significant impact on conflict, certain
territorial disputes are more hazardous than others. This is frequently obscured in research
that includes only a dichotomous variable (territorial dispute: yes/no); such a variable is
almost always statistically significant, but there is no attempt to discern which subset(s) of
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territorial disputes is driving the relationship. To the extent that this has been addressed,
the focus has largely been on the salience of the di↵erent territorial disputes, focusing on the
tangible and intangible characteristics of the territories in question (e.g., Goertz and Diehl
(1992);Huth (1996);Newman (1999);Hensel and Mitchell (2005)). Building on the general
argument developed in Chapter 2, I argue that domestic political dynamics have an important
role in driving states to escalate conflicts over territory. Specifically, regime type plays a
crucial role because di↵erent leader selection mechanisms alter the priorities of those leaders
once in o ce. Using a theoretical logic incorporating outbidding, and leaders’ selectorates, I
argue that territorial disputes between democratic and autocratic states should involve more
serious conflict than territorial disputes between institutionally similar dyads. I test several
propositions by looking at the escalation of territorial claims to di↵erent levels of conflict, as
well as the escalation of conflict to war over territory in the period from 1816-2001.
This chapter distinguishes between di↵erent kinds of territorial disputes, and thereby assists in
unpacking when and how territorial disputes are dangerous. Territorial competition, because it
is so conflict and war prone, is a fitting empirical domain to first explore the implications of my
explanation. Furthermore, the results here might encourage scholars to move away from the
undi↵erentiated treatments of territorial issues in research design and thereby better reflect
the improved theorizing and complex character of territorial issues in conflict dynamics. This
involves greater attention to the characteristics of territory (such as correlates of its salience),
but also on how territory and its characteristics interact with the contextual conditions of the
dispute. Finally, this chapter contributes to the growing literature of the impact of di↵erent
regime types on international conflict behavior (e.g., Peceny, Beer and Sanchez-Terry (2002);
Debs and Goemans (2010)).
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3.1 Territory, Domestic Politics, and International Conflict
The Steps to War theory (Vasquez, 1993; Senese and Vasquez, 2008) describes a path to
war in which territory is the underlying cause. Other empirical work has territory among the
key factors associated with the onset of violent conflict and its escalation to war (Tir and
Vasquez, 2010). As noted above, few works distinguish between di↵erent kinds of territorial
disputes. Highly salient territorial disputes are thought to be present the greatest risks, but
determining salience can easily become tautological if the coterminous willingness to use
military force is used as a surrogate indicator of salience. A few studies have focused on
territorial characteristics as indicative of salience; these include its strategic location, the size
and characteristics of the population living there, and other attributes that can be tangible
or intangible (Goertz and Diehl, 1992; Huth, 1996; Hensel and Mitchell, 2005).
The role of domestic politics in most territorial treatments of conflict and war, including
those related to salience, is implicit, but not specifically elaborated. Vasquez (1993) notes
that domestic mobilization is essential for states to fight wars over territory, but he does not
specify the conditions for such mobilization. Furthermore, he argues that repeated disputes
over territory permit hard-line domestic elements (e.g., political parties, military, and the like)
to gain more influence over domestic political processes, making wars more likely as disputes
recur. The specific mechanisms through which hard-line elements become entrenched in
power domestically and at which point we might expect escalation of conflicts as a result,
however, is not fully developed. Analyses of territorial salience rely on the unstated assumption
that domestic audiences are more interested in, and will hold leaders more accountable for,
conflicts over pieces of land that are more valuable, whether for their intrinsic or symbolic
(e.g., Jerusalem, Kashmir) worth. Nevertheless, such ideas are underdeveloped theoretically
and not tested empirically in any case.
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To incorporate domestic politics properly in the narrative about territory and militarized con-
flict, as well as to connect territory specifically to the general explanation presented in the
previous chapter, I build on two key ideas in the field: the selectorate and outbidding. The
selectorate theory Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999; 2003) began as a way to explain how
states with di↵erent regime types behaved in war. Broadly, democracies have large domestic
winning coalitions made up of multiple segments of the general public, and therefore they rely
on the provision of public goods to stay in power. Because they depend on small coalitions
made up of elites, autocracies rely more on private goods distribution in order to stay in o ce
(for a critique of this simple distinction and the attendant measures, see Kennedy (2009)).
Outbidding occurs when groups compete over the legitimacy of a stance on a relevant issue,
in this case, contested territory. Colaresi (2005), who focuses on rival outbidding, contends
that domestic players within rival states compete over the rivalry as an issue space, simi-
lar to other domestic political issues. Goddard (2010) (see also Goddard (2006)) uses the
concept of outbidding to explain why it becomes di cult for political actors to compromise
over territory. Focusing on the cases of Northern Ireland and Jerusalem, she explains that
political leaders are elected in part because of their hard line rhetoric over disputed terri-
tory (outbidding). Territory can become indivisible over time, due in larger part to how
actors legitimize themselves to their key audience with respect to a territorial claim (see also
(Hassner, 2006/2007)). There are a couple of key ideas to take from Goddard’s argument.
First, not all positions on a territorial claim are legitimate. Stances must resonate with a
large enough coalition of actors (or networks) within a constituency, and actors must be
esteemed within the network. Once a legitimation strategy is successful, the territorial claim
may be repeatedly framed in this way. If a country chooses a hard line on a claim, it becomes
di cult to back down from such a stance, otherwise a leader risks losing her own legitimacy
with the key audience. This can make negotiation over territorial claims intractable for long
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periods, especially if both states focus on di↵erent aspects of territory to make their claims
resonate domestically.
One limitation of Colaresi’s work is that he implies that states are similar with respect to this
type of behavior: that is, autocrats are just as likely as democrats to engage in outbidding,
ceteris paribus. I believe that democracies and autocracies will behave di↵erently in the
context of disputed territory precisely because of the di↵erences in the outbidding process.
Goddard’s work is based only two cases and does not bring in the domestic institutional
context in which leaders operate.
Domestic political arrangements may influence the legitimation strategies that states choose
when dealing with disputed territory. Building on the theoretical development of Chapter 2, I
argue that democracies will orient themselves toward the “public good” aspects of disputed
territory, while autocratic states will orient themselves toward the private good aspects of it.
Given democratic dependence on the general public’s support, legitimate claims on disputed
territory are more likely to be ones regarded as having the public’s interest in mind. I expect
that this will mean territorial claims that are seen as legitimate to the general public are one’s
that correspond to some national characteristic, such as territorial claims based on national
identity, symbolic heritage, or national security in the broadest sense. It may be easier to
mobilize the general public to support a hard line claim when the nation as a whole is at
stake, rather than the particular intrinsic characteristics of the land itself. Autocratic states,
on the other hand, may focus upon di↵erent kinds of territory for their claims. A piece of
land that is rich in resource value, for instance, it may appeal to the autocratic elite that
keeps a leader in power. A more appropriate legitimation strategy for contested territory may
then be to appeal to the elite’s financial interests.
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3.2 Monadic Motivations and Dyadic Conflict
With respect to conflict, democracies are likely to be punished for making false threats,
losing a conflict, or going to a war with a low level of public support. Thus, Bueno de
Mesquita et al. (1999) predict that democracies will frame war e↵orts as benefitting society
as a whole and try harder to win conflicts by pouring in more resources and showing more
determination. They might also be more selective in initiating conflicts, with an eye to
choosing those confrontations in which the chances of success are greater (or at least the
risks of failure less); this logic has been used to account for democratic success in wars (Reiter
and Stam, 2002).
Territorial disputes can involve a public good issue that is a central part of domestic politics
for democratic states; for example, the status of Cyprus is a key political issue in both Greece
and Turkey. Leaders who make concessions, or even o↵er compromises, are vulnerable to
outbidding from hardliners and their political coalition is at risk for fragmentation. Prime
Minister Olmert of Israel su↵ered this fate following his willingness to negotiate with the
Palestinians over withdrawal from occupied territories. The symbolic value of territory en-
hances the prospects for outbidding because backing down or making compromises might be
viewed as representing concessions to national heritage, a betrayal of ethnic brethren, and
the like. It becomes much harder to take a coherent middle position in such situations, and
thus territory is not viewed as divisible. Thus, I anticipate, ceteris paribus, that a democratic
state will negotiate harder and longer, be more willing to escalate a confrontation, and go to
war over a territorial dispute.
On the other hand, autocracies do not necessarily gain resources to distribute privately by
fighting in a war, and therefore might not try as hard to win. Nevertheless, Bueno de
Mesquita et al. (2003, 413) contend that autocracies are more likely to seek territorial gains
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in international conflicts. Pressure from elites for private gain opportunities that flow from
the resources that territory encompasses prompt leaders to start conflicts according to this
argument. A major flaw, however, is that territory is always said to have material and divisible
value to states. Territorial acquisition only provides private goods if there is some material
value attached to it and such value (or proceeds from the value) can be easily distributed
to the governments winning coalition; oil or diamonds are obvious examples. Nevertheless,
territorial theories of conflict not only focus on territory’s symbolic value (Vasquez, 1993), but
also note that these qualities might be more escalatory because the stakes are less divisible
(Hensel and Mitchell, 2005). Most territorial claims do not necessarily center on land with
these resources (Huth and Allee, 2002). Over modern history, however, fewer conflicts have
been over resources and other sources of wealth contained therein (Holsti, 1991). The decline
in terra nullius and the death of colonialism has meant that states are less inclined to fight for
land with tangible value. Furthermore, trade (licit and illicit) is a substitute source of acquiring
material wealth, and authoritarian leaders therefore have alternative paths to conquest in
deriving spoils. Furthermore, authoritarian leaders face fewer leadership challenges (at least
on a regularized basis) than democratic ones, and have less need to engage in outbidding on
territorial disputes. They also don’t necessarily require the political legitimacy or approval that
comes with nationalist appeals and uncompromising positions on territorial conflicts. This is
not to imply that they avoid territorial confrontations. Yet, the costs of losing or backing
down in a territorial confrontation are limited for an autocratic state, as their leadership
tenure would not be jeopardized.
With respect to dyadic characteristics, two democratic states might be expected to be the
least hostile in territorial disputes. First, pairs of democratic states largely settled their
borders decades ago (see Latin America) and there is little territorial basis for their conflict
(Gibler, 2007; Owsiak, 2012). It is unlikely that such outbidding processes could escalate a
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democratic-democratic dyad over territory. Indeed, there are few democratic dyad rivalries
(Hensel, Goertz and Diehl, 2000; Conrad and Souva, 2011) and therefore few opportunities
to exploit such enemies for domestic political gain (Mitchell and Prins, 2004). A recent study,
however, found no reduction in territorial conflict, in the context of a rivalry, between a pair
of democratic states (Lektzian, Prins and Souva, 2012).
Of the remaining two combinations, I expect that territorial disputes between democratic
and autocratic states to be the most likely to escalate to war. This is consistent with a
general finding that political dissimilarity between states might be associated with greater
conflict-proneness (Quackenbush and Rudy, 2009). First, that democratic states and au-
tocratic states value disputed territory for di↵erent reasons might make negotiations more
di cult. Furthermore, when facing o↵ against an authoritarian state, a democratic leader-
ship is expected to press its country’s claims, motivated by the domestic political gains that
might result as well as fearful of the audience costs that result from backing down. Facing a
dissimilar state, there is no expectation that disagreements will be settled peacefully. Leaders
are also vulnerable to critiques from hardliners whenever standing down in the face of an
authoritarian threat. Mixed regime dyads are therefore the ones most likely to go to war
and experience multiple militarized disputes (Peceny, Beer and Sanchez-Terry, 2002). One of
the most well-known examples of this kind of mixed regime competition is the longstanding
Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, who have been, for most of its life span, a mixed
dyad rivalry whose primary issue is territorial. This dyad has had four wars in its lifetime and
been well-known for its intensity (see Paul (2005)).
In jointly autocratic dyads, territorial conflicts should be less likely to escalate to war. Be-
cause maintaining private good distribution is preferred to putting too many resources into
a conflict (even at the risk of losing that conflict), two authoritarian states should shy away
from escalation, be more willing to back down, and be more acceptant of stalemate out-
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comes. Authoritarian leaders might also be less likely to lose their o ces as a result of such
confrontations and therefore under such conditions should be more willing to make conces-
sions in the dispute (Debs and Goemans, 2010). Expending resources (financial and others)
for the conflict takes away potential tools to reward or pacify those in the authoritarian lead-
ers’ coalitions. Such incentives might explain, in part, why scholars have found evidence
that authoritarian dyads are less conflict prone (Werner, 2000; Souva, 2004; Bennett, 2006).
Considering only the institutional makeup of states, I develop the initial, baseline hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1 Territorial disputes between institutionally mixed dyads are more likely to es-
calate to war than disputes among institutionally similar dyads.
The first hypothesis represents an initial modification of the traditional expectations about the
conflict propensity of territorial disputes. This chapter seeks to unpack further the relationship
between territory and conflict by making distinctions between di↵erent kinds of territory, and
in particular their interactive e↵ects. I now turn to unpack further the relationship between
territory and war by making distinctions between di↵erent kinds of territory, and in particular
their interactive e↵ects with regime type.
First, I draw a distinction between the public/private values that a disputed territory might
have for the antagonists. Such a distinction is important for my argument about regime
types, as the behavior of democratic and authoritarian regimes will vary according to the
kinds of goods represented by the territory in dispute. Hensel and Mitchell (2005) envision
territorial claims as being intangibly or tangibly salient. Tangible salience includes whether
or not a territory includes resource wealth, has strategic value, or is home to a permanent
population; generally these are material aspects that are divisible and might be considered as
involving private goods. Disputed oil rich territory could be an example. In contrast, when a
country makes a homeland claim, an identity claim (whether ethnic, religious, or linguistic),
or has held the land in question in the past, the value is intangible, the stakes not divisible,
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and therefore can be said to represent public goods. For example, Israeli claims to all of
Jerusalem are based on that city’s religious and historical value rather than any resource or
economic worth.
I contend that territorial conflicts escalate because of domestic political processes such as
outbidding, and that more intangibly salient territories are most susceptible to outbidding
behaviors by democracies. Democratic states have public forums in which political actors
compete for attention, popularity, and o ce over salient issues. When an externally relevant
issue, such as a territorial claim, is framed to be a threat to the homeland, its people (in
an identity claim), or a country’s historical ties, it will be perceived as highly salient, if not
existential. Because of popular sovereignty, democracies are more likely to engage in conflict
when contested territory exhibits these kinds of intangible salience. As noted above, I expect
that these kinds of outbidding processes over territory with public goods value will occur
most often when territory is contested between a democratic state and an autocratic state.
I expect that the key driving force will be the intangible salience for the democratic state.
Hypothesis 2 Territorial disputes between institutionally mixed dyads are more likely to go
to war when public goods are involved as opposed to private goods.
3.3 Research Design
The above hypotheses focus on whether states escalate their conflicts to war in di↵erent
domestic and issue contexts. The first hypothesis is concerned with the characteristics of
the conflicts in which states fight, and thus I focus on militarized interstate disputes (MIDs)
(N=1,898) as the unit of analysis over the period 1816-2001. Militarized interstate disputes
are conflicts between states that range from the threat of the use of force, all the way up
to war (which is coded as a conflict that reaches 1,000 battle deaths) (Ghosn, Palmer and
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Bremer, 2004). All dispute-level data for this chapter was taken from the dyadic interac-
tions dataset employed by Senese and Vasquez (2005). My second hypothesis hypothesis is
concerned with the characteristics of the territory over which states compete. After account-
ing for some missing data on the independent variables, my data for that test covers 5,443
territorial-claim years, from the Issue Correlates of War dataset, which contains data for
directed dyadic (challenger-target) territorial claims in the Western Hemisphere and Western
Europe from 1816-2001 (Hensel and Mitchell, 2005).
Dependent Variables and Methods for Testing. The dependent variable for the first hypoth-
esis is the onset of war. Wars are identified using the Correlates of War criteria of 1,000
or more battle related fatalities (Sarkees and Wayman, 2010). In addition, I also test for
whether or not a dyad escalates to war within five years of a particular MID. This dependent
variable is included because often territorial conflicts repeat before ultimately escalating to
war (Vasquez, 1993; Senese and Vasquez, 2008).
For the second hypothesis, I focus on the the escalation of claims to a particular level of
conflict within a given territorial claim-year, taken from the Hensel and Mitchell (2005)
data. Hensel and Mitchell (2005) employ three di↵erent dependent variables for conflict:
onset of an MID, onset of a fatal MID, and onset of war. This allows me to test whether
the characteristics of the claim, the regime combination, or an interactive e↵ect leads to
di↵erent levels of hostility in conflicts when territory is contested.
Because all of my dependent variables are binary, I employ logit analyses for all tests in this
chapter. To account for temporal dependence in the claims analysis, I cluster the standard
errors on the claim dyad.
Independent Variables. The foci of the analyses are so-called mixed institutional dyads, con-
sisting of one democracy and one non-democratic state. For the dispute level analysis,
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distinctions between regime types are determined by reference to the Polity IV data set
(Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr, 2010), in which states are scored on a -10 - +10 democracy-
autocracy scale. Democratic states are designated as those scoring greater than or equal to
+6, with all others coded as non-democracies. For the claims level analysis, because I am
comparing results to that of Hensel and Mitchell (2005), I follow their conventions, and code
democracies as a 6 or higher on Polity’s democracy scale (which is a 0-10 score, as opposed
the the democracy-autocracy scale), where mixed dyads only have one democracy.1
Territorial issues in militarized disputes are key elements in the analyses. The MID data
(Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer, 2004) codes disputes as involving territory, policy, regime or
other issues. In order to test my hypotheses, I interact whether or not the MID is territorial
with whether or not a dyad is a mixed regime dyad.
The final analysis is focused on the role that the perceived value of a territorial claim plays
in conflict escalation. I predict that the public good aspects of territory are likely to lead
to more hostility in mixed dyads because of outbidding processes in democracies. In order
to capture this, I employ the intangible salience measure provided by Hensel and Mitchell
(2005). I record the intangible salience level of the territorial claim for democratic states, in
order to gauge the impact it has on the likelihood of them going to war against autocratic
states. Hensel and Mitchell capture the intangible salience levels of each state in the claim.
The monadic measure is on a 0-3 scale, indicating how many of the following elements
are part of the territorial claim for the state involved: a homeland claim, an identity claim
(whether ethnic, religious, or linguistic), or the territory held by that state at some time in
the past, respectively. These qualities, I argue, are more susceptible to the symbolic politics
of outbidding. If the claim dyad has two democracies, then the intangible salience of the
1I have also attempted to use the combined democracy-autocracy scale for the claims analysis, but that
resulted in a large loss of observations.
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challenger state is recorded. The intangible salience of jointly autocratic dyads is scored
a zero. Because my hypothesis is focused on public goods in mixed dyads, I interact this
variable of the intangible salience of democratic states with the dummy variable for whether
a dyad is institutionally mixed. A positive and significant coe cient on this variable indicates
that as the public orientation of a territorial claim increases, the likelihood that a mixed dyad
will engage in conflict also increases.
Control Variables. For the analyses of militarized disputes, I include relevant control variables
found to be related to territorial conflict in previous studies. In the analysis of militarized
disputes, I control for contiguity, which is a dummy variable coded as 1 if the two states share
a land border and zero otherwise. Contiguity is thought to be a confounding variable for
territorial issues (Senese, 2005), and therefore I need to account for the e↵ects of proximity
separate from those of territorial claims. I also include a control for the power distribution
between dyads, taken from the Correlates of War CINC scores (Singer, 1987), considering
the capability ratio of the weaker state to the stronger state in the dyad for both sets of
analysis. In the analysis on MID escalation to war, I also control for whether a MID was
fought over a “regime” issue. I do this to provide a issue contrast to territory, rather than a
simple territorial vs. non-territorial distinction. This allows me to better gauge by how much
territorial conflicts are more war prone than other types of conflicts. Because I am testing
the e↵ects of mixed regime dyads vs. similar regime dyads, the reference category on regime
type for all dispute level analysis is similar regime dyads.2 In the claims level analysis, I also
control for joint democracy, which is coded as both states reaching 6 or higher on Polity’s
democracy scale, because I also test the e↵ects of intangible salience for democracies. For
2I have attempted to control for joint democracy as well in the dispute level analysis, but that led to joint
democracy being dropped as a perfect predictor and a loss of observations. Controlling for joint autocracy led
to di culty in calculating robust standard errors. Regardless of which model was tested or whether robust
standard errors are used, the results on the key independent variable, the interaction between territorial MIDs
and mixed regime dyads, remains positive and statistically significant.
59
those analyses, then, the reference category is joint autocracies. All data was taken from the
dyadic interactions replication data used by Senese and Vasquez (2005), for the MID level
analysis, or through the Issue Correlates of War Data (Hensel and Mitchell, 2005), used for
the claims level analysis.
For the analysis of territorial claims, I also control for the tangible salience of a claim on
a 0-6 scale indicating how many of the following elements are part of the territorial claim
for the each of the two states involved: resource wealth, permanent population, or strategic
value respectively (Hensel and Mitchell 2005). I further control for the intangible salience of
the territorial claim (as opposed to just the democratic state), which is also a 0-6 scale; this
is measured as above but now for both states in the dyad. I do so in order to control for
the possibility, which is counter to the prediction, that the intangible salience of both states,
regardless of whether they are democratic, may drive a claim to go to war.
3.4 Empirical Results
In the first set of analyses, I consider the likelihood of war from a given dispute as well
as the likelihood of war within five years of a given dispute as distinguished by the regime
makeup of the dyad and the issues at hand.3 Table 3.1 displays logit results on war of MIDs
from 1816-2001. Institutionally mixed dyads are not necessarily more war prone than similar
regime dyads (the reference category) across all disputes. The first and third columns, which
displays the analysis without the interaction term, reveals that territorial MIDs are more war-
prone overall, like many previous studies. If one were to stop with these models, we would
know that territory leads to war, but we would be no closer to understanding which territorial
disputes are the most dangerous. Furthermore, we would have an incomplete understanding
3All analyses performed using STATA, version 11.2.
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of the potential interaction between domestic politics and territorial conflict. Based only on
models 1 and 3, one might interpret that the domestic di↵erences between states matter very
little when territorial conflicts are concerned. Therefore, well-known territorial wars between
democracies and autocracies, such as the Falklands War or the wars between Israel and its
Arab neighbors might be explained solely by the presence of contested territory and not from
any domestic political pressure that those states experienced. As the interaction models
(models 2 and 4) show, however, this interpretation would be incomplete, if not misleading.
Table 3.1: Logit of Mixed Regime Dyads and Territory on War
(1) (2) (3) (4)
War War War/5yrs War/5 yrs
Mixed Regime Dyad 0.097 -0.477* 0.242* -0.441**
(0.177) (0.288) (0.131) (0.192)
Territorial MID 1.105*** 0.688*** 1.017*** 0.395**
(0.197) (0.250) (0.136) (0.187)
Territory X Mixed 0.939*** 1.285***
(0.363) (0.261)
Regime 0.114 0.103 -0.220 -0.254
(0.405) (0.403) (0.301) (0.300)
Contiguity 1.347*** 1.313*** 0.511*** 0.472***
(0.316) (0.314) (0.166) (0.168)
Peace Years 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.002 0.003
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant -4.295*** -4.029*** -2.602*** -2.255***
(0.342) (0.342) (0.195) (0.192)
Observations 1,898 1,898 1,898 1,898
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p| < |0.01, ** p| < |0.05, * p| < |0.1
The second and fourth columns contain the more theoretically relevant analyses. As expected,
when institutionally mixed dyads fight over territory, war becomes more likely, especially if
one look five years out from the current MID. The di↵erence between when mixed dyads are
fighting over territory compared to other dyads fighting over a non-territorial issue is dramatic.
Model 4 shows that when such dyads fight over territory they are significantly more likely to
do so. This suggests, in line with the theoretical logic, that it is not only domestic factors,
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or only territory, but also the interaction between the two that contributes to states fighting
wars. Although outbidding processes might occur in any issue context, the results (particularly
in model 4) suggest that territory is an issue arena in which these processes might lead more
di cult negotiations such that war becomes likely between democratic and autocratic states.
Table 3.2 displays the predicted probabilities generated from models 2 and 4 in Table 3.1.
First, war is an unlikely phenomenon, even during militarized conflict. Mixed regime dyads
on their own, with no territorial dispute, are less likely to fight wars either from the present
MID or within five years of it. Territorial conflicts for all states are significantly more likely to
go to war, both from the present MID or within five years. When territorial MIDs are fought
between mixed regime dyads, the increase in the likelihood of war is greatly increased over
the other categories. When such dyads fight over territory, as compared to non-mixed dyads
fighting non-territorial MIDs, they increase their chances of going to war in the current MID
by roughly 204 percent. The likelihood of a mixed dyad going to war over territory within
five years of the current MID is a little more than 1 in 4, which is 177% greater than for
non-territorial MIDs fought by similar regime dyads.
Table 3.2: Predicted Probabilities on War
War %   from Base War/5 yrs %   from Base
Base 0.0214 0.0982
Mixed Regime Only 0.0134 -37% 0.0656 -33%
Territory Only 0.0424 +98% 0.1394 +42%
Terr. X Mixed 0.0650 +204% 0.2718 +177%
Predicted probabilities generated from Models 2 and 4, Table 3.1. Base model is a zero on all variables,
except for peace years, which is held at its mean. Probabilities calculated using the CLARIFY package in
STATA (King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000).
The above results establish a general relationship between mixed dyads and territorial conflict
consistent with the explanation. I now move to consider the impact of di↵erent kinds of
territorial value on that relationship. The findings in Table 3.2 show that the territorial
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orientation of democratic and autocratic states might drive such dyads to war. My theory
goes further to explain that it is not only the domestic processes that escalatory conflict more
likely, but also the kind of territory in dispute. Outbidding processes in democratic states are
more likely to lead to escalatory outcomes when the territory in dispute is most in line with
a “public good” orientation, such as when it has a symbolic or homeland tie. I test this logic
in a series of models for di↵erent levels of conflict escalation. These results are displayed in
Table 3.3. The hypothesis predicts that more escalatory conflicts become more likely when
democratic states in institutionally mixed dyads are competing over more intangibly salient
territory.
Table 3.3: Salience of Territorial Claims and Conflict Onset
MID Fatal MID War
Tangible Salience (claim) 0.363*** 0.311*** 0.282**
(0.071) (0.109) (0.125)
Intangible Salience (democracies) -0.382 -0.045 -1.313
(0.455) (0.598) (0.859)
Capability Ratio 1.217*** 0.257 -0.475
(0.382) (0.612) (1.063)
Joint Democracy -0.306 -1.029 0.227
(0.868) (1.195) (1.796)
Mixed Regime Dyad -0.022 -2.525* -3.042
(0.664) (1.405) (2.083)
Mixed X Dem. Intan. Sal. 0.081 1.025 2.617***
(0.367) (0.765) (0.925)
Intangible Salience (claim) -0.036 0.212 0.237
(0.230) (0.246) (0.416)
Constant -4.653*** -6.401*** -6.810***
(0.814) (0.951) (1.387)
Observations 5,443 5,443 5,443
Standard errors clustered on dyad in parentheses. *** p| < |0.01, ** p| < |0.05, * p| < |0.1
In Table 3.3, the most theoretically relevant variable is the interaction term of intangible
salience and the democratic state in an institutionally mixed dyad. For the onset of militarized
disputes or fatal conflicts, the intangible salience of a territorial claim for democratic states
has no statistical impact. If democracies in mixed dyads have claims with high intangible
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salience, however, war becomes much more likely. This finding conforms to my theoretical
explanation. High levels of intangible salience in democratic states prevent governments
from backing down, thus driving dyads to war. Substantively, the interaction coe cient in
Table 3.3, Model 3 leads to an over four times increase (from 0.005 probability to 0.0265
probability) in the likelihood of going to war, from a mixed dyad in which the democracy
has no intangible salience to full intangible salience for the democratic state. Compared to
a base model of similar dyads with a mean level of intangible salience for the claim, but no
salience for a democratic state, the mixed dyads with high democratic intangible salience are
over sixteen times more likely to go to war (an increase from 0.0015 probability to 0.0265
probability). This finding suggests that despite the presence of disputed territory, democratic
states are more likely to respond and escalate conflicts when more publicly oriented issues
are at stake. An example in the data of this kind of war includes the Falklands war between
Argentina and the United Kingdom. The Falklands islands have an identity and historical tie
to the U.K., according to the data, as most of its inhabitants are of British descent. Oakes
(2006) notes that the Argentinian military regime did not count on British resolve when
launching the conflict, which escalated to war. Furthermore, domestic motivations may
have played a role, as Lai and Reiter (2005) note that the Thatcher government received
a domestic boost in support following the British victory. A Thatcher government, which
was experiencing domestic unpopularity at the time, when confronted over territory that had
intangible salience, responding strongly and swiftly against an invasion by Argentinian forces
(which was experiencing domestic problems of its own) conforms well to my argument. In this
case, a democratic state experiencing outbidding at home, when confronted over intangibly
salient territory, responded by swiftly escalating the conflict.
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3.5 Summary and Conclusions
I took as a starting point that some territorial disputes were more dangerous than others. I
sought to account for this variation by reference to the domestic political incentives facing
leaders in territorial disputes, most notably the di↵erences between democratic and author-
itarian leaders, and kinds of values attached to territory by those regimes. Drawing insights
from the ideas of outbidding and a selectorate, I argued that those territorial disputes involv-
ing a democratic pitted against an authoritarian state (mixed dyads) were more dangerous
than others, and thereby would account for much of the relationship between territory and
violent conflict. Consistent with the theory developed in Chapter 2, I extended this point
by arguing that the mixed dyad relationship was a function largely of cases in which the
authoritarian state and the conflict was over a territory that the democratic state regarded
as having intangible salience.
The findings generally supported my expectations. When mixed dyads fight over the territory,
the likelihood of escalation to war is great. This interactive e↵ect is not evident if one includes
only regime type and territorial issue variables in the equation, as most conventional studies
do. In addition, the public goods value of the territory for democracies was the driving force
for escalation of territorial claims. Previous research has indicated that territorial disputes
are more likely to escalate to war than confrontations over other issues. By analyzing the
predicted likelihood of war, this combination of mixed dyads and territorial conflict is much
more likely to go to war than territory on its own. To understand which territorial disputes
are most dangerous, one must account for the domestic political contexts of the competing
states and the salience attached to the territory in dispute.
A next step for this project concerning the role of domestic politics of territorial conflict
is to examine the di↵erences within democratic and autocratic states. This chapter has
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taken a binary approach to regime types, and the findings presented are a useful first step.
Nevertheless, future iterations of this project should more fully explore how variation within a
state’s selectorate a↵ects motivations of states with respect to contested territory. Especially
within autocratic states, there is wide variation among them in terms of coalition size.
Empirically, Peceny and Butler (2004) found that single party regimes, which presumably have
larger selectorates, are generally less conflict prone. This is suggestive that the relationships
uncovered above could be moderated or exacerbated depending on the kind of authoritarian
regime involved. Specifically, I believe that the autocratic states most likely to go to war
against democracies are those with smaller selectorates, such as military regimes or personalist
dictatorships. Such states are the most likely focus on how territorial gain may improve their
private good distribution to the elite, in line with the logic developed by Bueno de Mesquita
and his coauthors (2003).
Autocracies with larger selectorates should be more likely to incorporate a mixture of public
and private good distribution in order to maintain o ce. The larger the coalition, the smaller
the portion of private goods can be distributed. Thus, the potential payo↵ of territorial revi-
sion to enhance private good distribution seems unlikely to be very useful for larger coalition
autocracies. Single party regimes have a much larger winning coalition than do personalist
autocracies (such as monarchies or civilian dictatorships) or military regimes. Indeed, Peceny
and Beer (2003) find that personalist and military regimes are most likely to initiate milita-
rized interstate disputes against democracies, consistent with my predictions about escalation
to war.
Among the personalist dictatorships and military regimes, the former are, I believe, less likely
to seek to escalate territorial conflict to war. Military regimes may also have an elite that may
be largely based within the military establishment. Thus, some of the private goods that are
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distributed to maintain o ce are defense-related. In the context of territorial conflicts and in
periods of rivalry, such regimes may ramp up military spending, justified by the rivalry, while
simultaneously providing the private good distribution to maintain political support from their
key constituencies. Such states may be more willing to escalate conflicts to the point of war,
because there is less of a chance that it would be as costly domestically. The use of military
force as a preferred policy option to resolve disputes might also be greater in military regimes,
given the backgrounds and policy orientations of key decision makers. Again, the example
of Argentina and the Falklands War seems to conform to this line of reasoning. Personalist
regimes, on the other hand, may not have the ability to use military force and spending as a
way to pay o↵ the elite. Furthermore, to do so would take away from domestic private good
distribution. This may make wars over territory, even if the targeted land is resource rich, an
unattractive option or at least one with limited domestic political payo↵s.
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Chapter 4
Domestic Politics and Rivalry Escalation
What role does domestic politics play in the escalation of conflicts by rivals? Rivalry is
a context in which two states compete militarily over a long period of time (Diehl and
Goertz, 2000). Because the two states fight repeatedly over multiple issues, the bones of
contention are not necessarily specific issues, such as territory, but the actors themselves
(Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson, 2008). Furthermore, because conflicts between rivals are
many and repeat over short periods of time, research has focused less on why they fight,
but when and under what conditions they will fight or go to war. This chapter is concerned
with what role domestic political characteristics play in the decision to engage in more hostile
conflicts and escalate those conflicts to war. The hypotheses developed are anchored in
the logic, developed in Chapter 2, of public and private good demands that are placed on
democratic and autocratic leaders. Because their leaders’ tenure in o ce is determined by
public support through elections, democracies are more willing to engage in conflict when the
general public feels threatened. Autocratic states, on the other hand, rely on the support of
the elite and war should be more likely when the regime feels threatened from within. The
escalation of conflicts is more likely when rival states feel threatened domestically not only
because the states themselves are domestically vulnerable, but also because their rivals seek
such opportunities to gain an advantage in pursuit of the rivalry.
This chapter argues that domestic political concerns can drive rivals to war. The basic
argument for why democratic and autocratic states escalate conflicts is that their domestic
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political arrangements make certain conflict contexts more salient than others. Chapter 2
establishes this abstractly, that when democratic states are involved with an external threat
over “public goods” issues or contexts, they are more willing to escalate a conflict. Autocratic
states are more likely to find external threats salient when private goods issues are on the line,
or when elites are particularly challenged. This logic can be applied to specific issue areas, such
as territory as shown in Chapter 3. It can also be applied more broadly, beyond the specificity
of an particular issue, to the threatening context of interstate rivalry. Because rivalry is a
context that is especially war prone (Diehl and Goertz, 2000), a conflict over any issue may
escalate, although conflicts within individual rivalries tend to have similar severity levels over
time (Goertz, Jones and Diehl, 2005). On account of this, it is useful to understand when
conflicts between rivals are most likely to escalate into war or produce more severe conflicts.
Building on the logic presented in Chapter 2, as well as the rival outbidding concept developed
by Colaresi (2005), I develop three expectations. First is that mixed dyadic rivals experience
the most severe conflicts and are most likely to go to war. Second is that mixed rivalries will
have more severe conflicts or be more likely to go to war during a year when a democratic
state is experiencing an election. The third hypothesis is that when autocratic states are
experiencing domestic unrest, rival conflicts are more severe and more likely to escalate to
war. These hypotheses are tested using the Klein, Goertz and Diehl (2006) sample of dyadic
rivals from 1816-2001. The chapter concludes with a discussion on how more precise data
and research design might yield a better understanding of the relationship between interstate
rivalry and domestic political concerns.
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4.1 Mixed Regime Rivalries, Elections, and Domestic
Unrest
Some research has focused on what di↵erentiates rival conflicts that escalate to war from
those that do not (Vasquez, 1996), but little focus has been placed on the role of the domestic
political events and the escalation to war. One notable exception is developed by Colaresi
(2005). His theory employs the concept of rival outbidding to explain when rival states might
escalate conflicts against each other. Outbidding occurs when competing domestic factions
attempt to gain domestic support for their leadership by becoming more hard-line against
a rival state. With frequent outbidding, and when the stakes of a rival competition are at
their highest, escalation is expected. Although all states have domestic competition in which
outbidding may occur, the form that outbidding takes and the context in which it is mostly
likely to develop may be conditional upon domestic political arrangements or institutions.
Specifically, the form outbidding takes may di↵er depending on whether a state is democratic
or autocratic. For democratic states, elections are an institution that can normalize outbid-
ding. Because elections are the primary method of removing leaders from o ce, it may be
during election periods that outbidding occurs at its highest levels. For autocratic states,
elections are not the primary method of replacing leaders. Chiozza and Goemans (2011)
build a theory of the di↵erences between democratic and autocratic leaders in international
conflict. They explain that the method of leadership removal is particularly important for
understanding conflict decisions. They note that when democratic leaders lose or step down
from o ce, they tend to have a comfortable retirement. Autocratic leaders, on the other
hand, face more dire prospects after leaving o ce. Chiozza and Goemans (2011) further
note that autocratic leaders, once deposed, often face retirement prospects of jail, exile, or
death. Given such prospects, autocratic leaders might be more willing to risk survival of
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their o ce on risky policies such as war, because so often it is tied to the leader’s personal
survival. If they feel that the best option to staying in o ce is to risk an international con-
flict, autocrats are more likely to do so, because the prospects of life outside of o ce are so
grim. Furthermore, if they feel that victory in war is required, they are more willing to risk
escalating a conflict to war in order to try and achieve victory. Because democratic leaders
do not face such dire post-o ce prospects, they are less willing to take such a dangerous
gamble, according to the argument by Chiozza and Goemans (2011).
Outbidding processes in autocratic states might occur at irregular times for di↵erent reasons.
When an autocratic state experiences domestic unrest, whether in the form of riots, demon-
strations, or coup attempts, the elite coalition around which a leader builds his or her support
feels threatened. Under those conditions, extending the logic of political survival (Bueno de
Mesquita et al., 2003), the leader will feel his or her tenure in o ce or life is at risk. Thus,
such leaders may be more willing to risk escalating a conflict to shore up domestic support.1
For democratic states, such outbidding incentives are most likely to occur when they are also
the most sensitive, which is during election periods.
The argument above outlines monadic incentives for why certain periods of time might be
more politically sensitive for leaders in democratic or autocratic states. Nevertheless, rivalry
is between two states. Any war or escalatory conflict between them may occur with possibly
two outbidding processes occurring simultaneously. It is helpful to think broadly about which
combination of domestic regime types should be the most likely to have wars during rivalry,
and then discuss which specific domestic processes might contribute to war. As with wars
over territory, outlined in the previous chapter, I expect that mixed regime dyads are likely
1This has been referred to as “diversionary” behavior. I am not attempting to engage the debate as to
whether diversionary conflict behavior exists, but am putting forth an argument that at certain times, domestic
vulnerabilities make escalatory conflicts between rivals more likely. I am not making predictions on which state
starts such conflicts, which explanations of diversionary conflict often do.
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to have the most escalatory behavior. Jointly democratic dyads are much less likely to
experience militarized rivalry, for reasons relating to the democratic peace (Diehl and Goertz,
2000; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). Jointly autocratic dyads within rivalry will likely
have a higher probability of war than jointly democratic dyads, but there may be reasons
for that lower likelihood. Peceny, Beer and Sanchez-Terry (2002) and Peceny and Butler
(2004) describe a possible autocratic peace. Extending the logic of private good incentives
related to conflict developed in Chapters 2 and 3, it may be that autocratic states may
risk low-level conflicts against one another, but not a full-scale war. I believe that mixed
regime dyads, with one democratic state and one autocratic state, will be the most war
prone. In Chapter 3, I contended that the divergent incentives democracies and autocracies
have with respect to territory might make negotiating over territory more di cult. Essentially,
democracies value the public aspects of territory and autocrats the private aspects of territory
such that when the two states contested the issue, war was more likely. As with territory, this
mutual misunderstanding of the other’s motivations may spill over into multiple issue areas
as in rivalry (Dreyer, 2010),2 potentially making these rivalries more escalatory than those of
jointly autocratic dyads. Some of the most well-known rivalries in history are of this mixed
regime type, such as the US-USSR or the rivalries between Israel and its Arab neighbors.
Hypothesis 3 Mixed regime rivals will have more severe conflicts and be more likely to go
to war, compared to institutionally similar dyads.
Building on the monadic incentives based on domestic outbidding, I believe that election
periods in democratic states as well as periods of domestic unrest in autocratic states may
contribute to more escalatory conflicts between mixed regime rival dyads. For democratic
leaders to be especially vulnerable, the conflict context needs to correspond to a “public
goods” incentive. Elections themselves are not a public good per se, but they are when the
2Although Dreyer does not interact issues in rivalry with domestic politics, he does find that more complicated
issue dimensions of rivalry can more war more likely.
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public as a whole evaluates the government, and as a result, leaders are the most vulnerable to
the whims of the public during those periods. During election periods in particular, outbidding
on the rivalry issue is more likely to be tied to the security of the nation as a whole. Autocrats
experiencing domestic unrest may feel especially vulnerable because the elites themselves may
be the target of the unrest. Outbidding on rivalry provides an opportunity for those outside
the ruling coalition to present an issue of security for the state (rivalry) as an issue that
the current leadership is unable to deal with because they are weak domestically, or vice
versa. Thus, leadership and elite competition may outbid on the rivalry, potentially leading
to escalation.
Periods of outbidding represent not only opportunities for leaders to strengthen their own
domestic position by pursuing a hard line, but also an opportunity for the rival state to
exploit the domestic weaknesses of its opponent. As a result, and because the rivalry context
is just as much about trying to seek advantage in the relationship as it is about winning over
a particular issue or gaining domestic support, it is di cult to distinguish theoretically which
rival might initiate such conflicts. It could be a state experiencing domestic outbidding, or it
might be its rival seeking to take advantage. Theoretically, I do not distinguish between which
rival initiates conflicts. Furthermore, rival dynamics may also be dominated by reciprocity
(McGinnis and Williams, 1989; Goldstein, 1991). This dynamic is such that rivals escalate
based on how the other rival behaves and much of the hostility within rivalry can be explained
mostly by this tit-for-tat, back and forth, behavior by the rival states. Because reciprocal
processes are ongoing concurrently with outbidding, it is di cult to distinguish conceptually
or empirically who initiates conflicts based on domestic outbidding. Thus, I contend that
either state may choose to try and escalate a conflict based on either state’s domestic
vulnerabilities, and that reciprocal processes may then take over, leading states down the
path to more severe conflicts and war. Tremblay and Schofield (2005, 233-34) point out an
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example from the India-Pakistan rivalry. They point out that although India actually launched
the 1971 war against Pakistan, it was taking advantage of unrest within Pakistan’s autocratic
regime. The military government in Pakistan reacted to a legislative election that did not go
its way with a crackdown, and the authors note that this presented an opportunity for Indian
intervention.
Hypothesis 4 Conflicts fought during election periods for democratic states will lead to more
severe conflicts and are more likely to go to war, especially in mixed regime dyads.
Hypothesis 5 Conflicts fought during periods of domestic unrest for autocratic states will
lead to more severe conflicts and are more likely to go to war, especially in mixed regime
dyads.
4.2 Research Design
The hypotheses in this chapter posits that conflicts between rivals are more escalatory (more
severe or war prone) when rival states experience periods of domestic vulnerability. The
domain of these tests are annual disputes between 615 dyads and 225 interstate rivals from
1816-2001, as defined by Klein, Goertz and Diehl (2006). The Klein, Goertz and Diehl
(2006) data contains information on severity and escalation to war for militarized interstate
disputes3 between all dyads that have experienced at least one dispute. Because of this, I
analyze the e↵ects of domestic political events on two samples, one that includes all conflict
dyads and the other that includes only rival dyads. I further restrict each of these samples
in the analysis to include only mixed regime dyads, because my theory emphasizes these
dyads throughout this project. I do so to understand if the domestic factors I predict will
influence conflict (elections and unrest) have a di↵erential e↵ect within mixed dyads vs. the
3Militarized interstate disputes are conflicts between states in which the actions range from threats of the
use of force all the way up to a full-blown war of 1,000 or more battle deaths (Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer, 2004).
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full sample of dyads or full sample of rivals. Rival dyads are pairs of states (dyads) that
have experienced three or more militarized interstate disputes. The unit of analysis is the
annual MID. I chose to include the most severe annual MID between states because the key
independent variables, periods of autocratic unrest, and election years for democracies are
made available in a cross-national, time-series format. The analyses first include all annual
disputes (N=1,525 for the full sample, 1,085 for the rival sample), but I also run tests only
on mixed regime dyads (N=722 for the full sample, 530 for the rival sample).
Dependent Variables. The dependent variables for this chapter are dispute severity and war
onset. Dispute severity is measured on a 0-200 scale reflecting a combination of the levels
of military force (e.g., show of force vs. actual use of military action) and fatalities for each
rival (Diehl and Goertz, 2000). At the top end of the severity scale are wars, identified
using the Correlates of War criteria of 1,000 or more battle related fatalities (Sarkees and
Wayman, 2010). After accounting for missing data on the independent variables, the data
includes 65 observations of war, with 43 between rivals. The average severity of a dispute
is 49.87 for the full sample, and 52.95 for rivals. Because severity is measured as a scale,
I employ OLS regression, and because war is a binary variable, I employ logit analysis. All
analyses have standard errors clustered on the rival period, in order to account for non-
independence among observations.
Independent Variables and Controls. The key independent variables are whether or not a rival
dyad is a mixed regime dyad, elections in democracies, and unrest in autocracies. Similar
to the prior chapter, mixed regime dyads are coded as one democratic state and one au-
tocratic state. Democracy is coded as a 1 if the state reaches a 6 or higher on the Polity
scale(Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr, 2010), with a state having anything less than a 6 being
coded as autocratic.4
4There are discrepancies between the country codings in the Correlates of War coding (which the rivalry
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The other two independent variables are whether a democratic state experienced a national
election that year, and the amount of domestic unrest experienced by an autocratic state the
year of a conflict. Both of these variables are drawn from the Cross-National Times Series
dataset (Banks, 2011a).5 The CNTS data include a variable for the number of votes cast in
states when there is a national election. From this variable, I generated a dummy variable for
whether or not a state experienced an election. No variable in the CNTS data distinguishes
between whether the election is for a country’s chief executive or for the legislature. Although
this is slightly problematic, making such a distinction would arbitrarily introduce an empirical
distinction between presidential and parliamentary systems, whereas my theoretical approach
does not do so.6 Because so many democratic states use legislative elections to then in turn
determine their chief executive, I chose to code any national election.
The final independent variable is the amount of unrest experienced by an autocratic state in
a given year. The CNTS dataset provides a number of variables that may fit this concept.
It includes data on the number of assassination attempts, coups, riots, anti-government
demonstrations, as well as purges. My theory does not attempt to distinguish between any
one of these forms of domestic unrest, and any one of these behaviors may threaten the
ruling elite in some form or fashion. Because of this, I employ the weighted conflict index
provided by the CNTS data. This variable assigns a weight to each type of unrest, producing
a continuous variable with a very large range.7 The index ranges from 0 to 26187. Because of
data uses) and the Polity data. I have attempted to correct for this discrepancy to conform the polity codes
to COW codes where the polity codes did not match the COW codes in the rivalry master dataset, but there
may still be some observations left as missing due to the discrepancies.
5The CNTS data does not have the same country codes as the Correlates of War data. I attempted to
manually reassign country codes in the CNTS to conform to COW country codes before merging the data, but
there may yet be some errors in my recoding that led to some observations being left as missing.
6In future iterations of this project, I would like to be able to distinguish between whether the election was
for a chief executive or not.
7From the CNTS user’s manual (Banks, 2011b): “As of October 2007 the values entered were: Assassina-
tions (25), Strikes (20), Guerrilla Warfare (100), Government Crises (20), Purges (20), Riots (25), Revolutions
(150), and Anti-Government Demonstrations (10).”
76
this variance, I took the natural log of the variable in order to derive more easily interpretable
results and to suppress potential outliers.8
Because my theory emphasizes elections for democracies and unrest for autocracies, elections
are only included for democracies and unrest is only coded for autocracies. Furthermore,
because the variables are measures on a country-year basis, they had to be transformed
into dyadic variables. In order to accomplish this, I generated dyadic variables based on the
following rules. For elections, jointly democratic dyads receive a 1 if either state experiences
an election in a given year, for mixed dyads, it is coded a 1 only if the democratic state has an
election. For jointly autocratic dyads, the variable for elections is always zero. For autocratic
unrest in mixed regime dyads, only the value of weighted conflict is included for the autocratic
state. For joint democracies, the value is always zero. Finally, for jointly autocratic dyads,
the variables takes on the maximum value of either state in the dyad. I chose the maximum
amount of unrest, because my theory expects that as unrest increases in an autocratic state
in the dyad, more hostile conflicts should be more likely. Thus, the maximum amount of
unrest is more theoretically sound than a weak-link specification or an average. Finally, I
interact both democratic elections and autocratic unrest with whether a dyad was a mixed
regime dyad, to explore further the implications of the first hypothesis in this chapter that
mixed regime dyads are the most war prone of rivals.
Finally, I include only a few control variable for the analyses. I control for jointly autocratic
dyads, in order to di↵erentiate the e↵ects of similar dyads and mixed regime dyads, as well
as to distinguish between the di↵erences in joint autocracies and joint democracies. Further-
more, because my independent variables have implications for both joint autocracies and joint
democracies, including these variables as controls is prudent. Jointly democratic dyads rep-
8In order to preserve the zero values, I added 1 to the entire variable before taking the natural log. That
way all variables with a value of 1 have a logged value of 0. I did this to avoid losing observations while gaining
interpretability.
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resent the reference category for all analyses. I also include the ratio of each state’s military
capabilities. This is calculated by taking the CINC score of the higher capability as a fraction
of the capabilities for the entire dyad (Singer, 1987). I do this to control for the power
balance between the dyad. For the severity analyses, I include a variable to represent the
basic rivalry level for states (Diehl and Goertz, 2000). I calculated this by taking the average
severity score all MIDs fought by a dyad over their rivalry’s history. I chose to not include
more control variables because these tests represent a first attempt at establishing whether
domestic political events a↵ect rival escalation. Including only a few control variables also
follows more recent methodological guidelines (Achen, 2002; Ray, 2005). Thus, the tests
provide the simplest models possible. Other potential control variables that might be included
in a future version of these tests would be the issue at stake in the conflict, alliance patterns,
and the history of war in the rivalry itself.
4.3 Empirical Results
The results of this chapter only provide very modest support for the hypotheses. Table 4.1
presents the results for conflict severity for both rival and non-rival states. I employ simple
OLS regression models on dispute severity.9 The first two columns present tests on the
sample of all annual rival MIDs, while the third column presents results on the sample of mixed
regime dyadic disputes only. The first column presents a purely additive model, examining
the individual e↵ects of mixed regimes, democratic elections, and autocratic unrest, while
controlling for the e↵ects of the other independent variables. The second column presents a
multiplicative model that interacts mixed regime dyads with elections and unrest. The third
column presents the e↵ects of of elections and unrest on only the mixed dyadic sample, which
is another way of testing for interactive e↵ects.
9All analyses performed using STATA, version 11.2.
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Table 4.1: OLS on Dispute Severity
(1) (2) (3)
All Dyads All Dyads Mixed Regime Dyads
Mixed Regime Dyad -5.289 -10.502**
(3.320) (4.758)
Election (in democracies) -0.391 -9.700* 2.448
(3.183) (5.212) (3.789)
Mixed X Election 12.132*
(6.551)
Joint Autocracy -3.426 -7.065
(3.576) (5.389)
Domestic Unrest (ln, in autocracies) 0.943*** 0.865 1.035**
(0.332) (0.644) (0.413)
Mixed X Unrest 0.153
(0.792)
Capability Ratio -1.044 -1.466 -6.179
(4.784) (4.798) (8.071)
Basic Rivalry Level 0.983*** 0.981*** 0.955***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.025)
Constant 2.223 6.814 1.251
(4.438) (5.035) (7.455)
Observations 1,525 1,525 722
R-squared 0.443 0.444 0.434
Standard errors clustered on rivalry in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Only some of the theoretical variables perform as expected, albeit with some caveats. Model
1 of Table 4.1 presents the additive model, without any interactions terms. Mixed regime
dyads do not appear to have more severe MIDs than dyads with similar regimes. Elections in
democracies also do not appear to have an impact on the severity of conflicts. Supportive
of my theoretical expectations, domestic unrest in autocratic states does appear to have a
significant impact on the severity of MIDs. This variable is the natural log of the weighted
sum of unrest events. For every logged unit increase in unrest events, the severity of a
particular MID increases almost one unit.
When one examines the multiplicative and split sample models, however, the interpretation
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of domestic political events and regime type changes somewhat. Mixed regime dyads appear
to have significantly less severe MIDs than even jointly democratic dyads, according to Model
2. Of course, this model includes interaction terms that interact mixed dyads with elections
in democracies and the level of unrest in autocracies. Accordingly, the coe cient on the
variable for mixed regime dyads shows the severity of mixed dyads when there is no unrest
in the autocratic state and no election in the democratic state. Nevertheless, only the
coe cients on the interaction term for democratic elections and mixed dyads indicate that
these domestic political events cause mixed regime dyads to have any more severe MIDs than
similar regime dyads. Although that coe cient is significant, it does not hold in Model 3.
In Model 3, Table 4.1, I present the results for mixed regime dyads. My theoretical chapter
as well as the expectations of this chapter suggested that when mixed regime dyads fight,
domestic pressures might be especially high. Although elections for democratic states is not
statistically significant, the coe cient on autocratic unrest is positive and significant. This
shows that for every logged unit increase in domestic unrest, there is about a point increase
in severity of a MID in a mixed regime dyad. At least within mixed dyad sample, there is
some indication that domestic unrest in autocratic states may contribute to the severity of
international conflict.
Finally, with respect to the control variables, the coe cient on basic rivalry level shows an
almost one to one relationship between expected severity (based on the average severity of
all MIDs in the rival’s lifespan) and actual severity, which is not surprising. Jointly autocratic
disputes are not likely to have more severe MIDs than the reference category, while capability
ratio also has no significant e↵ect. This trend holds across all models.
In Table 4.2, I display the same models as for Table 4.1, but in this case, I apply them only to
the sample of rival states. Model 4 displays the additive model on the full rival sample, Model
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displays the interaction model, and Model 6 displays the results restricted to the sample of
mixed regime rival dyads.
Table 4.2: OLS on Dispute Severity: Rival Dyads
(4) (5) (6)
All Rival Dyads All Rival Dyads Mixed Rivals
Mixed Regime Dyad -7.273 -14.854**
(5.069) (7.082)
Election (in democracies) -0.120 -13.912* 3.763
(4.495) (7.989) (5.169)
Mixed X Election 17.596*
(9.700)
Joint Autocracy -4.826 -11.057
(5.523) (8.132)
Domestic Unrest (ln, in autocracies) 1.403*** 1.372 1.427**
(0.464) (0.946) (0.567)
Mixed X Domestic Unrest 0.073
(1.147)
Capability Ratio -1.880 -2.750 -6.641
(7.184) (7.117) (11.321)
Basic Rivalry Level 0.977*** 0.969*** 0.943***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.044)
Constant 2.890 10.476 0.046
(6.633) (7.865) (10.616)
Observations 1,085 1,085 530
R-squared 0.272 0.274 0.276
Standard errors clustered on the rivalry in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In all, Table 4.2 displays results similar to Table 4.1. First, mixed regime rival dyads do
not have significantly more severe MIDs than similar regime rival dyads, with one caveat.
In Model 5, the interaction term between mixed regime dyads and elections is statistically
significant at the 0.10 level. This is supportive of my argument. I am hesitant to draw any
firm inference from this particular model, however, because the finding does not hold in the
samples restricted to just mixed dyads. Again, like in Table 4.1, the strongest finding is
that autocratic unrest does lead to more severe conflicts. In Model 5, the interaction term
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between mixed dyads and unrest is not significant, but in Model 6 the variable is significant
within mixed dyads. This means that domestic unrest does lead to more severe MIDs for
mixed regime rivals, but that these MIDs are not more severe than those fought between
jointly autocratic dyads experiencing domestic unrest. At best, the results on dispute severity
only show very modest support for my arguments regarding either elections or unrest.
In Tables 4.3 and 4.4, I display the logit results for the escalation of MIDs to war. Table 4.3
displays the results for the full sample of dyads, while Table 4.4 displays the results for the
rival sample. Overall, these results are similar to those for dispute severity. First, the results
displayed in Table 4.3 show that mixed regime dyads are no more likely to go to war than
similar regime dyads. Elections in democratic states do appear to make war more likely, but
I should note that this finding does not hold if the standard errors are not clustered.10 In
Table 4.3, there is a finding that increasing domestic unrest in autocratic states makes MIDs
more likely to go to war. This finding occurs in the additive model (Model 7), but not the
interaction model (Model 8). When the sample is restricted to just the mixed regime dyads,
the coe cient on unrest is again statistically significant. This means to me that unrest may
contribute to mixed dyads going to war, but it will make them no more likely to go to war
than similar regime dyads (as shown by Model 8).
Table 4.4 displays results of the same models as Table 4.3, but restricted on the sample of
just rival dyads. The results on rivals are consistent with those for the full sample. Again,
elections appear to have an e↵ect, but this finding is sensitive to modeling choices (see
10I did test these models without clustered standard errors as well. If one does not include robust standard
errors, the significant findings on elections for war drop out. Furthermore, the significance of domestic unrest
in Model 12 is only significant in a one-tailed test. Given the stark contrast between the non-clustered models
and the ones presented in Tables 4.3 and 4.4, I am skeptical of any significance. Clustering the standard
errors is more theoretically appropriate, given the non-independence of repeated conflicts. Preferring to take
a conservative approach to hypothesis testing, I do not make any firm inferences regarding elections based on
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 Doing so yields the most consistent results across the models, even though they are largely
made up of null findings. In future developments of this project, I may look into this issue further.
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Table 4.3: Logit on Escalation to War: All Dyads
(7) (8) (9)
All Dyads All Dyads Mixed Dyads
Mixed Regime Dyad 1.346 0.440
(1.072) (1.087)
Election (in democracies) 0.023 -12.114*** 0.175
(0.423) (0.971) (0.428)
Mixed X Election 12.235***
(1.042)
Joint Autocracy 1.156 1.018
(1.110) (1.139)
Domestic Unrest (ln, in autocracies) 0.129*** 0.061 0.175***
(0.048) (0.081) (0.057)
Mixed X Domestic Unrest 0.108
(0.099)
Capability Ratio -0.988 -0.975 -2.504**
(0.944) (0.945) (1.142)
Constant -4.319*** -3.707*** -2.133**
(1.127) (1.107) (0.957)
Observations 1,525 1,525 722
Standard errors clustered on rivalry in parentheses
*** p| < |0.01, ** p| < |0.05, * p| < |0.1
footnote 10). Domestic unrest in autocratic states does have the positive relationship to
war as expected. In both the additive model (Model 10) and in the model restricted to just
mixed regime rivals (Model 12), domestic unrest is positive and significant. In order to try
and get a better sense of the relationship between domestic unrest and escalation to war, I
calculated predicted probabilities.
Table 4.5 displays predicted probabilities of the occurrence of war generated from Model 12
in Table 4.4. These show the likelihood that mixed regime dyads will fight a war when the key
independent variables are allowed to vary. The base probability of 0.0220 is calculated from
all variables being held at zero, except for capability ratio, which is held at its mean value. As
expected from my hypothesis, the occurrence of war is more likely when the democratic state
experiences an election, but that finding only holds in analyses employing clustered standard
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Table 4.4: Logit on Escalation to War: Rival Dyads
(10) (11) (12)
All Rival Dyads All Rival Dyads Mixed Rivals
Mixed Regime Dyad 1.171 0.319
(1.116) (1.100)
Election (in democracies) 0.255 -13.275*** 0.462
(0.480) (0.966) (0.487)
Mixed X Election 13.651***
(1.050)
Joint Autocracy 0.863 0.115
(1.169) (1.325)
Domestic Unrest (ln, in autocracies) 0.101** 0.094 0.109**
(0.051) (0.118) (0.055)
Mixed X Unrest 0.011
(0.130)
Capability Ratio -1.277 -1.302 -3.920***
(1.145) (1.130) (1.341)
Constant -3.826*** -3.009*** -0.792
(1.162) (1.135) (0.953)
Observations 1,085 1,085 530
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p| < |0.01, ** p| < |0.05, * p| < |0.1
errors (see footnote 10). When the value for autocratic unrest is increases to its mean value
for the mixed dyad sample, the likelihood of war increases to 0.0359, which is a fifty-two
percent increase in probability. When that value is increased to its maximum value, however,
the likelihood increases to 0.0605, a roughly one hundred seventy-five percent. The finding
for unrest is not consistent across all models. Thus, I am skeptical that any firm inference
should be taken, based on these results. At the most, I believe these findings indicate that
there could be something to the relationship between domestic unrest and conflict escalation,
but that as currently tested, such a relationship is not readily apparent. Furthermore, it is
di cult to infer that there is any large substantive impact of domestic unrest. The likelihood
of war in the base model is very small, and while increasing unrest to its maximum value more
than doubles the likelihood of war, it only increases the likelihood to about 0.06. The more
reliable inference to take from my analysis on the escalation of rivals to war is that there is
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Table 4.5: Predicted Probabilities on War in Mixed Regime Rival Dyads
War %   from Base
Base 0.0220
Election (in Democracy) 0.0334 +52%
Unrest (in Autocracy), Mean Level 0.0359 +63%
Unrest (in Autocracy), 75th Percentile .0480 +118%
Unrest (in Autocracy), Max Level 0.0605 +175%
Predicted probabilities generated from Model 12 , Table 4.4. Base model is a zero on all variables, except for
capability ratio, which is held at its mean. Probabilities calculated using the CLARIFY package in STATA
(King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000).
a null relationship, rather than a clear link between domestic unrest and war.
4.4 Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter, I developed three hypotheses. First, that mixed regime dyads consisting of
one democracy and one autocracy would have more severe conflicts and be more likely to go
to war. Second, that election years in democracies would contribute to more severe disputes
as well as a greater likelihood of war. Finally, I predicted that as domestic unrest increases in
autocratic states more severe disputes and war become more likely. I tested these hypotheses
across 12 statistical models on disputes from 1816-2001, on the full sample of conflict dyads
as well as just rival dyads.
The findings yield only modest support for my predictions. First, there is no indication
that mixed regime dyads will have more severe disputes than similar regime dyads. Second,
elections in democratic states appear to have little to no impact on the rival relationship.
Third, there is mixed evidence to suggest that autocratic unrest does lead to an escalation
of conflict, especially so in mixed regime dyads. This finding on unrest is stronger than for
elections, but substantively small overall. When taken together, these findings only provide
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weak support for my theoretical logic.
It is worth examining the results on elections and unrest both empirically and theoretically.
First, with respect to elections, as Chiozza and Goemans (2011) argue, democratic leaders,
whose prospects for life after losing o ce are much rosier than the post-tenured life of their
autocratic counter parts, are less willing to risk conflicts in an attempt to shore up domestic
political support. They are further less impacted domestically by conflict outcomes. Thus,
conflicts may not be worth the risk, given little chances of major rewards or punishments.
Domestic outbidding may not be as intense from the opposition if there is little chance of
punishing a leader, vis-a-vis the rivalry. As a result, democratic states may not be playing
the same game of domestic political risk that autocrats may be playing. One potential
empirical reason that the election variable does not behave as expected is because it is coded
to include both legislative and executive elections. A large number of democracies elect
their chief executives from legislative elections (in parliamentary regimes), however, others
have separate elections for executives, as in presidential systems. A more careful coding
should attempt to distinguish the two, allowing for a more precise understanding of when
the executives of states, who typically make foreign policy decisions, are most politically
vulnerable.
That domestic unrest in autocratic states has some influence on rival conflict behavior bolsters
the notion that autocracies are particularly sensitive to domestic concerns in making foreign
policy decisions. This idea has been at the theoretical roots of a number of recent studies
(Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Pickering and Kisangani, 2010; Debs and Goemans, 2010;
Chiozza and Goemans, 2011; Weeks, 2012). Drawing again from the theoretical development
of Chiozza and Goemans (2011) and Colaresi (2005), autocratic leaders who experience
unrest run the risk of intense outbidding processes during a rivalry and may be much more
willing to risk an escalatory conflict against a rival. Because their prospects for life out of
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o ce may be dire, such leaders are more risk acceptant of a war. Winning a war against a
rival may turn the tide on the rivalry and secure them at home, while failing to confront a
rival in the wake of domestic outbidding and domestic challenges may raise the likelihood of
death, jail or exile if ousted. The evidence provided here only lends some weak support that
these motivations may be part of the rivalry maintenance process as well. Furthermore, the
findings on unrest in mixed regime dyads suggests that democratic states may wish to take
advantage of such vulnerabilities in their autocratic rivals and escalate conflict to gain an
upper hand in the rivalry as a whole. The findings I have on unrest are only a weak link, and
future work on this question will require more analytical rigor to better test the relationship.
In the future development of this portion of the dissertation project, more empirical precision
is required. Because rivalry is a long term condition states find themselves in, the question
of ‘whether war?’ is less important than ‘when war?’. Thus, a more dynamic approach to
understanding rivalry is required. Some classic studies of superpower rivalry (McGinnis and
Williams, 1989; Goldstein, 1991) employ precise time series analysis of particular rival dyads.
More recent work on macro-conflict dynamics, such as that by Brandt, Colaresi and Freeman
(2008), incorporates not only the dyadic conflict series, which accounts for reciprocity among
rivals, but also the impact of domestic-level influences. Ideally, this project would take the
empirical approach of employing domestic political event time series and regress them on
the series of conflict and cooperation levels within the rivalry. Although this approach to
time series analysis has some drawbacks, specifically it leads to shorter coverage in terms of
years (so an 1816-2001 range is unlikely) as well as smaller cross-sections (they will typically
analyze one conflict dyad or conflict triad), the approaches are much more precise in terms
of time units, typically a week or a month. This approach would gain empirical leverage as
to how the specific timing of domestic political events a↵ects the timing of rival conflict
events. Currently, my approach is to account for the weighted number of unrest events or
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note whether there is an election in given year. The election or unrest may take place after a
conflict has begun, and therefore have no way to influence the onset of a conflict. My current
empirical approach would have no way of distinguishing this. Although the results may not
be generalizable to all rivals across the 19th and 20th centuries, it would do much better in
trying to test the more specific implications of my theoretical approach. This chapter, as
it currently stands, gives some evidence to these implications, particularly with respect to
domestic unrest, but it is analyzed in broad-strokes, where in the future more precision is
required.
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Chapter 5
The Human Rights E↵ects of Interstate
Conflict
In the previous chapters, I have explained that the escalation of international conflict over
territory and in rivalry is influenced by domestic political concerns. My explanation rests on
the interplay between the di↵ering political pressures that democratic and autocratic states
experience and the salience of the issues at stake in conflict. By relying on the support of the
general public to maintain power, democratic governments find issues that are related to the
general public good, such as intangible territory or conflicts during election cycles, are more
salient. On the other hand, autocracies are more likely to respond violently when private good
distribution is threatened, either when the tangible aspects of territory are being contested or
when the regime is experiencing domestic unrest. Chapter 2 explains this dynamic abstractly,
while Chapter 3 tests the argument on territorial conflict and Chapter 4 tests the argument
in the context of international rivalry.
In the opening paragraphs of this dissertation, I alluded to the example of American involve-
ment in World War II. After the United States’ entrance into the war, the government began
systematically repressing Japanese Americans by forcing them to live in internment camps
throughout the continental United States for the duration of the war (Ng, 2002). This
presents an interesting puzzle for human rights research. Why would the United States, a
pillar of the democratic world fighting a war to defend democratic states in Europe against a
fascist invasion from Germany, pursue a policy such as internment at home? Human rights re-
search has long found that democracy, with its emphasis on individual rights, use of elections,
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and institutional checks on executives, is one of the best predictors of fewer human rights
abuses (Davenport and Armstrong, 2004; Davenport, 2007). This leads to the question that
guides this chapter: does involvement in international conflict a↵ect repression dynamics?
In this chapter, I extend the theory of Chapter 2 to focus on a di↵erent arena for violence:
home.
I argue that when democratic states face salient conflicts abroad, the general public feels inse-
cure. In order to provide the public good of security through victory in the conflict, democratic
governments become more willing to repress in order to provide the public with security. As
a result, repression increases. The focus of the repression might be toward potential fifth
columns, such as Japanese Americans during World War II, or it might be focused on other
groups perceived to complicate the conflict e↵ort, such as opposition groups. In contrast,
autocratic states are often very repressive in peace time, often employing the military to carry
out repressive policies. When engaged in an international conflict, as conflicts become more
hostile and approach war, autocratic states may have to devote more military resources into
the conflict, leaving fewer available for repression domestically. As a result, autocratic states
may either only seek to maintain or become less repressive during international conflicts, but
are unlikely to increase repression. Furthermore, democracies and autocracies may focus their
repression on di↵erent types of abuse. While democracies may increase repression, they are
not likely to focus repression on the severest behaviors (e.g. disappearances and killings) but
rather focus on lesser forms (e.g. imprisonment and torture), behaviors which can be carried
out in the context of their legal and bureaucratic repertoire. Autocratic states may decrease
abuse in the these more severe forms because they may not have the military resources to
execute them.
I test these expectations on two human rights datasets, the Political Terror Scale (Gibney
and Dalton, 1996; Wood and Gibney, 2010), from 1977-2001, and the Cingranelli-Richards
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Human Rights Data Cingranelli and Richards(1999; 2010), from 1982-2001, in two types
of conflicts: militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) fought over territory and those disputes
fought between rivals. Similar to the contrast in findings from chapters 3 and 4, I find
support for my argument in territorial conflict and little support for my argument in rival
conflicts. Territorial conflicts are high-stakes competition which are the most likely to go to
war, compared with other issues (Vasquez, 1993; Vasquez and Henehan, 2001). Because
of this, they are the most likely to drive feelings of public insecurity that leads democratic
governments to change their repressive tendencies to become more repressive. Furthermore,
because they are war-prone, they are the most likely to lead autocratic states to push more
resources into the conflict, leaving fewer available for repression. Rival conflicts, on the other
hand, are regular conflicts that have an expected hostility level (Diehl and Goertz, 2000).
Because of this regularity in both the occurrence and severity of conflicts, domestic systems
may adapt to the rivalry process, making changes in repressive behavior less likely.
5.1 Domestic Institutions and Repression Dynamics
In much of the prior quantitative research on human rights, the continuity of policy choices
over time is emphasized. Some research, such as Poe and Tate (1994) and more recently
Wood (2008), emphasizes this continuity when incorporating the autoregressive portion
(lagged dependent variable) of a particular statistical model. They note that repressive
policies are a function of institutional choices and generally continue relatively unchanged.
Empirically, this notion has always received much support, as autoregressive models are the
norm. Although the focus of the empirical modeling has been on the degree to which re-
pressive tendencies change, year to year, much of the prior theorizing does not focus on
repression dynamics or changes over time, so much as the choice to use repression initially
(see Poe (2004) for explicit theorizing along these lines). I contend that a preferable way to
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understand repression during international conflict is to think in terms of repression dynamics.
My focus in this chapter is thus not on whether states repress during interstate conflict, but
rather on how repression changes during such conflicts.
Theories of policy dynamics often note that policies either shift gradually over time or change
rapidly followed by periods of stasis. The latter approach, known as the punctuated equilib-
rium model, has been used to explain domestic policy shifts (Baumgartner and Jones, 1991)
and international rivalry dynamics (Diehl and Goertz, 2000). Essentially, this model posits
that changes in policy (whether they be about domestic outputs or conflict escalation) can
occur suddenly, and shift policies temporarily or permanently. In international relations, this
approach is best known as applied to international rivalry dynamics. Diehl and Goertz (2000)
note that rivalries tend to go through similar levels of hostility, conflict after conflict, and
rivalries tend to endure until some kind of endogenous (such as regime change or civil war)
or exogenous shock (such as a global war) forces the rivals to end their competition.
Repression dynamics work in a similar fashion. Structural factors, such as economic de-
velopment and (primarily) institutional arrangements such as democracy/autocracy, largely
determine the level of repression a state employs. Institutional arrangements are the most
important because they establish and help to maintain the political status quo domestically.
Building on the logic of political survival, the typical amount of repression can be expected to
be a function of domestic institutions. States that depend on a large, publicly-based coalition,
such as democracies, employ very little repression because the protection of human rights is
a public good. Smaller coalition states, such as autocracies, provide security for the elite (a
private good) from those outside the elite through the use of repression (Bueno de Mesquita
et al., 2003).
There are many permutations of this logic when one tries to break down various sizes of the
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selectorate and ratios of winning coalitions. Employing the selectorate theory heuristically, I
draw two major conclusions. First, democratic states, which I believe can be safely claimed
have large selectorates and winning coalitions, should be less repressive in order to provide
the public good of human security to all of its voters. Second, autocratic states, which have
smaller selectorates and winning coalitions, rely on the distribution of private goods. Security
in such states is provided to the elites through the use of repression. From this simple claim,
that democratic states need to rely on public goods and autocrats rely on private goods, I
can derive expectations for whether states might alter their repressive behavior during salient
international conflicts.
Autocratic states depend on the support of an elite class (whether the party, military leader-
ship, or other elites) and maintain o ce through the distribution of private goods to such a
class. Repression is a tool used to secure the elite class from the threats that emerge from
outside the elite. It is part of the authoritarian status quo to maintain some positive level of
repression in order to suppress dissent. By contrast, democratic governments must maintain
the support of a broad coalition from the general public. Personal security is a public good,
both in terms of protecting the nation from external sources of threat, such as conflicts, as
well as protecting the masses domestically. Keeping repression low is a part of this public good
provision. Thus, as the status quo for repression, democratic states should be less repres-
sive compared to their autocratic counterparts. This finding, is of course, well-established
(Davenport and Armstrong, 2004; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005). Bueno de Mesquita
et al. (2003) also find that repression levels decrease as winning coalition size increases.
Thus, consistently, we can expect democracies to repress at low levels, and autocracies to
repress at higher levels.
Given autocratic dependence on elite support, and democratic preferences for public support
through public goods distribution, how does domestic repression change (or not change)
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during interstate conflicts? Key to thinking about whether repressive tendencies shift during
interstate conflicts is the the degree to which conflict alters the domestic political status quo
of a state. Not all conflicts are equally salient to key domestic audiences. I argue that the
salience of a conflict is a function of context and severity, and that shifts will be di↵erent for
democracies and autocracies.
5.1.1 Territorial Conflict and Shifts in Human Rights Abuse
Repression should be fairly consistent, because of domestic structural conditions, and thus
shifts in repression are most likely the result of some factor altering the domestic status quo.
International conflict, which is exogenous to the domestic repressive system, may impact
repression in such a way. To do so, a conflict would need to change the domestic political
considerations with respect to repression, such that states change their typical courses of
action. Such conflicts would need to be domestically salient. Research into the origins
of conflict and war finds that territorial conflict can be particularly escalatory and salient.
This type of international conflict presents challenges to the repressive status quo in both
democracies and autocracies. Furthermore, the severity of territorial conflicts should magnify
the e↵ects of each conflict context.
As described in Chapter 3, territory is a leading cause of conflict and the most war-prone
issue over which states fight (Vasquez, 1993; Vasquez and Henehan, 2001; Senese and
Vasquez, 2008). Furthermore, multiple aspects can be salient to states domestically (Hensel
and Mitchell, 2005). Because contested territory may appeal to both the masses, through
identity ties or symbolism, or to the elite because of its resource wealth, it may be salient for
both democratic and autocratic audiences, but for di↵erent reasons.
The intangible qualities of territory, such as historical ties or symbolic value, make territory
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di cult to divide, but easy to rally the public. When democracies engage in conflicts over
territory, it may therefore be highly salient to the domestic audience of state. Hutchison and
Gibler (2007) examine the e↵ects of external threat on tolerance levels within populations.
Building on in-group/out-group arguments, they find that when states are threatened by other
states over territorial issues, populations become less tolerant of minorities. Territorial threat
is seen as likely to build internal cohesion against groups seen as potential threats. The public
good aspects of territory, such as identity ties or symbolic value, make this kind of in group/out
group dynamic especially likely in democratic states, where popular pressure and support
determine electoral outcomes. Hutchison and Gibler (2007) note that this is consistent with
Vasquez’s (1993) arguments about territorial competition bolstering hardliners.
For understanding the relationship between democratic repression during territorial conflicts,
it is useful to think of domestic security as a public good. When territory is contested, the
state can provide security by winning the conflict. If there are groups that are either seen to be
tied to the opposing state, such as Japanese-Americans during World War II, or groups that
are seen to be a hindrance to the conflict e↵ort, such as war protesters during the Vietnam
conflict in the USA, such groups may be seen as not only a nuisance, but might also be a
considered as a threat to security (broadly construed). It may, therefore, be to the political
advantage of a democratic government to increase repression, even slightly, against such
groups. For example, Greece in 1996, during a territorial conflict against Turkey over Cyprus,
increased the imprisonment of conscientious objectors and Amnesty International reports that
there was also civilian led violence against members of the Turkish minority, with no police
intervention (Amnesty International, 1997, 161-62). Although it seems unreasonable to think
that democracies will increase repression against the entire population, given institutional
pressures to maintain low levels of repression (Davenport, 2007), repression targeted at
segments within the population that appear to impede the conflict e↵ort could bolster the
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public image of domestic security in the face of an external threat, and therefore be a political
benefit to the government. Gibson (1988) suggests that this is an elite driven behavior, in
which elites seek out repression as a policy in the context of an external threat, and the
public may tolerate it. Because of the threat presented by the conflict, the general public
becomes more tolerant of such behaviors, even though it might not be so during peace time.
In these situations, the government can achieve domestic political benefits through the use
of repression to provide security.
Hypothesis 6 (Territory): When democratic states are involved in territorial conflicts, they
become more likely to increase repression.
Dictatorial regimes may also place a high value on contested territory, but potentially for
di↵erent reasons. While democratic states may emphasize the nationalistic or symbolic ori-
entation of contested territory, autocratic states may be more interested in the intrinsic and
tangible (monetary) value of land. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003, 413) contend that
territorial revision is primarily in the interest of autocratic states, as the resource wealth of
captured land may provide very useful private goods provision to gain support of the elite.
Because autocracies focus on policies that benefit the elite, repression is a tool that is often
used as a means of protecting the elite from those outside of it. When attempting to contest
land for its resource wealth, however, states must also spend human and material resources
into the fight. This may leave them with fewer resources to distribute and they may thus
face a dilemma regarding their typical repressive practices.
Wood (2008) examines the e↵ect of economic sanctions on repression levels. Similar to
external conflicts, economic sanctions may act as an exogenous threat to the repressive
status quo. Wood generally finds that sanctions lead to fewer available goods to distribute,
which leads to an increase in repression, especially for autocratic states. Economic sanctions
and interstate conflict, while both exogenous, lead to di↵erent kinds of domestic tradeo↵s.
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Pursuing conflicts abroad or enduring economic sanctions at home can lead to fewer resources
to distribute, they also lead to di↵erent resources being threatened. During periods of salient
or intense interstate conflict, autocracies have to use military forces to fight abroad, which
may also be a common tool for repressive behavior. During periods of sanctions, the military
remains at home. Furthermore, if external conflict is driven by the need to grab land for private
good distribution, the elite may be more supportive of the leader, whereas in sanctions, even
the elite may be less supportive of the leadership. Finally, there may be a rallying e↵ect from
even those outside the elite during periods of conflict. If so, it may be that autocratic states
do not increase repression during salient international conflicts, even over territory. At the
very least, it seems that because repression is a regular way of maintaining order, such states
would probably seek to maintain repression, but not necessarily increase it.
Hypothesis 7 (Territory): When autocratic states are involved in territorial conflicts, repres-
sion will be maintained.
Hypothesis 8 (Territory): When autocratic states are involved in territorial conflicts, be-
comes more likely to decrease repression.
Finally, I expect that the shift in repression for both autocratic and democratic states to be
magnified as the fatalities countries experience increase. For democratic states, an increase in
feelings of public insecurity should increase support for repression as salient conflicts become
more likely to go to war, thus making increased repression more likely as countries experience
more severe conflicts. For autocratic states, more military resources must be used to fight
the conflict and less are available for repression as such conflicts become more severe, leading
to a potential decrease in repression.
Hypothesis 9 (Territory): Shifts in repression are magnified during periods of territorial
conflict as fatalities increase.
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These expectations run counter to the logic of the war-making and state-building literature
(Gibler, 2007; Gibler, 2010; Thies, 2005). That research has pointed out that external
threat leads to state centralization. This should mean that states become more repressive
during periods of conflict over particularly salient or threatening issues. My explanation does
predict that this will occur, but only for democratic states. By contrast, the states that we
should expect to be the most repressive and centralized, autocracies, may actually begin to
decrease repression during territorial conflict. The underlying logic of domestic political gains
presented by shifting repressive strategies is di↵erent in my explanation than in the state
building research. Democratic states use repression for short-term political benefits through
the provision of a public good–security. Autocrats, however (when fighting over territory that
is likely of most interest to the elite), are not likely gaining support by increasing repression.
Instead, they may become resource strapped when in comes to repression, especially as
conflicts increase in severity. Therefore, autocratic states are not likely to increase repression
and may actually decrease it, contrary to what state building theories imply.
5.1.2 The Rivalry Process and Repression
While both types of conflict are domestically salient, territorial and rival conflicts, which
are not mutually exclusive, may have di↵ering e↵ects on repressive dynamics in democracies
and autocracies. Rivalry represents a long-term shift in orientation toward conflict, in which
states view each other as strategic enemies (Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson, 2008) and
adapt their foreign policy making with the long-term in mind. Diehl and Goertz (2000),
who adopt a punctuated equilibrium view of rivalry, note that because future conflict is
expected, rival states develop what is called a “basic rivalry level,” in which the severity
and duration of each particular conflict is relatively similar to prior conflicts. Absent an
endogenous (such as domestic regime change) or exogenous shock (such as a world war),
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rival conflicts become normalized, and states typically maintain similar levels of hostility,
typically low, across conflicts. As described in previous chapters, Colaresi (2005) develops a
theory that domestic political actors drive escalatory action in rivalry based on the concept of
outbidding. When the rival stakes are high and there is a high level of outbidding, escalation
becomes more likely. Thus, when conflicts are at their most severe levels, rival conflicts
should also have high domestic salience. Most of the time, according to Colaresi, domestic
actors seek out rivalry maintenance, rather than escalation. Outbidding can produce domestic
political benefits without escalating the conflict. Thus, most rival conflicts are not likely to
be escalatory, and therefore may not come as much of an exogenous shock to any political
status quo, domestic or international.
Rivalry can encompass several contentious issues, including contested territory, over a long
period of time. Because of the long time horizon in competition, however, rival conflicts
become part of the domestic and international status quo. In line with the punctuated
equilibrium theory of rival dynamics (Diehl and Goertz, 2000), states expect future conflicts
with their rivals; it does not “shock” the repressive system in place. In autocratic states,
the portion of the military devoted to the rival competition may not be used for domestic
repression, and no new resources need be devoted to repression. Thus, there may be little
change in repressive behavior, compared to peace time. Democratic audiences see rival
conflicts in a long-term light as well. Conflicts do not represent new or necessarily grave
threats to public safety and the public is less likely to be tolerant of new increases in repressive
behavior. The in-group/out-group pressure that may drive decreases in tolerance during
territorial conflicts (Hutchison and Gibler, 2007) may not be as stark during rival conflicts.
Given this, most states would likely not expect most rival conflicts to escalate to war, leaving
public feelings of insecurity lower than they might feel during an territorial conflict. Therefore,
it is likely that unless a rival conflict deviates above the basic rivalry level, such conflicts
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should not lead to significant shifts in domestic repression. It may be, however, that similar
dynamics as for territorial conflict occur as conflicts experienced by states escalate, especially
in autocracies since their repression calculation is a function of available military resources.
Hypothesis 10 (Rivalry): States are not likely to significantly alter repression during conflicts
against rivals.
Hypothesis 11 (Rivalry): Shifts in repression are more likely during periods of rival conflict
as fatalities increase.
5.1.3 Territory, Rivalry, and Repressive Choices
The above explanation examines repression as though it is a linear combination of a set
of behaviors. This may be problematic for a comprehensive understanding of repression.
There are several types of repression. Cingranelli and Richards (1999) focus on four sets
of repressive behaviors associated with the repression of physical integrity rights: the use
of imprisonment, torture, disappearances, and political killing. Rather than think of these
behaviors as part of same phenomenon, in which one can put them together on a scale (as
both the Cingranelli and Richards (1999) data do and I do later), one may also examine each
set of behaviors separately. One reason to do this is that it is possible that the behaviors may
be substitutable; that is, one behavior may be preferable by the state to employ at higher
frequency than another in di↵erent situations Conrad and DeMeritt (2011a; 2011b). In this
section, I focus on how the external threats of territorial competition and rivalry a↵ect such
choices. Thus, the focus is less on whether states repress, but how they choose to do so.
The above argument for autocracies, (once salient conflicts become severe, they will maintain
or decrease repression) is counter-intuitive when one considers prior research on the subject.
Because autocracies rely on repression so regularly to maintain domestic order, that they
100
would lessen its use when the state is facing a threat seems odd. It might be, instead, that
rather than use the entire arsenal of repressive tactics, such states shift their practice to
certain forms of repression. Thus, there may be a tightening of their repressive grip in one
arena, but they might also loosen it in another.
For democratic states, I contend that of the four types of repressive behaviors against physical
integrity, the most likely to be employed are imprisonment and torture. Relying on the logic
above, when facing an immediate and potentially existential threat, democratic publics are
likely to rally around the leadership in the name of security. When the public feels insecure,
they are more likely to support some use of repression. Imprisonment and torture can be
accomplished through well-established and developed institutions such as the police force
and judiciaries. Furthermore, while democratic societies might become more supportive of
imprisonment in the name of security, the more gruesome behaviors of disappearances and
killings may not be supported. Therefore, I believe it more likely that democracies will increase
repression by torture and imprisonment.
Hypothesis 12 (Repressive Choices): Democracies are more likely to choose torture or im-
prisonment over disappearances and killing during salient external conflicts.
Autocracies are more likely to use a diverse approach toward repression in general. Because
autocracies likely employ all types of repression at various levels, it is di cult to think of
one type they might systematically prefer certain forms over others. If, as the logic above
suggests, that autocrats may decrease repression during international conflicts because they
become resource-strapped, they may shift away from repression that typically employs the
military as agents and focus instead on maintaining repression that employs di↵erent agents,
such as the police (although specific agents of abuse likely vary by country). Disappearances
and killings seem the most likely to involve the military apparatus, while imprisonment and
torture seem most likely to involve the police. Therefore, it may be likely that autocracies
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while decrease repression at the more violent end of the spectrum (disappearances and killing),
while maintaining the other forms of repression (torture and imprisonment).
Hypothesis 13 (Repressive Choices): When autocracies are involved in international con-
flicts, they are likely to decrease the use of disappearances and killing, but maintain torture
and imprisonment.
5.2 Research Design
In order to test the above hypotheses, I conduct analyses on repression employing two ordinal
measures of physical integrity rights.1 The Political Terror Scale (Gibney and Dalton, 1996;
Wood and Gibney, 2010) (PTS hereafter) is a five point ordinal scale that measures the
scope of repression, with 1 representing the least repressive states, and 5 corresponding to
the most repressive states. The data are coded from two sources, Amnesty International
country reports or U.S. State Department reports. I have chosen to use the AI version of
the data, with State Department codings filling in where the AI data are missing.2 This is a
scope measure, which focuses not on the specific behaviors (torture vs. imprisonment), but
rather the degree to which all of society is a focus for that repression. A state measured at
a 2, for instance in experiencing repression that is rather limited in focus to certain groups,
whereas a 3 or 4 is more severe and widespread. For example, in 2003, the United States,
involved in Afghanistan and starting the Iraq War, and which was known at the time for
increased use of imprisonment, was scored a 2, while Iraq, well-known as very repressive
under the Hussein regime, scored a 5.3 In this study, taking into account missing data on
1Abuses of this right take on the form of unlawful imprisonment, torture, disappearances, and political
murder.
2I have also conducted analyses where I use the State Department coding, replacing the AI values where
the State Department data are missing and the results are substantively similar.
3From http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/countries.php?region=Eurasia&country=Iraq&year=2003 and
http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/countries.php?region=NorthAmerica&country=United%20States&year=2003.
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the independent variables, I examine the PTS scores of 153 countries (3,088 country-years)
from 1977-2001.4
The other measure of repression I employ is the Cingranelli-Richards indicator (CIRI hereafter)
Cingranelli and Richards (1999; 2010). Similar to the PTS, it is an ordinal measure, but with
a broader scale. It ranges from 0-8, with 0 being the most repressive and an 8 being the
least repressive, the opposite of the PTS. CIRI is measured according to event counts of four
repressive behaviors: disappearances, incidents of torture, imprisonments, and murders. If a
state has no repressive events in a particular category, it scores a 2, if they have between 1
and 50 repressive events, it is scored a 1, and if they have more than 50 events in a category
in a year, it scores a 0. In order to test hypotheses 12 and 13 on repressive choices, I
employ the same model on each category. For the analysis of repression as a whole, I employ
the full physical integrity measure. The measure for respect for physical integrity rights is
summed across all 4 categories. In this project, the analysis using CIRI is conducted on 145
countries from 1982-2001, for a total of 2,505 country-years, after accounting for missing
data in the independent variables.5 To make the CIRI results more comparable to the PTS
results, I reversed the CIRI data so that 0 represents the least repressive score and 8 the
most repressive. I similarly reverse the scale for the categorical analysis.
I employ an ordered logit analyses, which estimates the likelihood that states shift into a
di↵erent category from the previous year. Because I am testing across time, I deal with
temporal dependence by clustering the standard errors on each country and include a series
of binary lags for each category in the dependent variable.6
4I replaced missing values from the PTS data I got from the PTS website with the PTS data from the Poe,
Rost and Carey (2006) replication file, from which I obtained the data for control variables and democracy.
Doing so does not alter the results in any substantive way, but did slightly increase my number of observations.
5The number of observations varies when for the components analysis because of variance in the available
data on each component.
6This approach, also employed by Hafner-Burton (2005), Davenport (2007), and Wood (2008) is more
appropriate than a simple lag of the dependent variable, given the categorical data. For the PTS analysis, I
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My independent variables in the analyses are whether a state is involved in territorial conflict
or rival conflict in a given year. These variables are included to gauge the salience of the
conflict for the domestic audience, as some conflicts over some issues are less escalatory or
important than conflicts over other issues (Hensel and Mitchell, 2005; Hensel et al., 2008).
For territorial conflicts, I code whether or not a state was involved in a militarized interstate
dispute over territory in a given year, using the MID 3.10B (participant) data (Ghosn, Palmer
and Bremer, 2004) from the Correlates of War project. The MID participant data codes the
primary revision types, which are categorized as territorial, regime, policy, or “other.” They
only code revision type for the participant that is considered a “revisionist state.” Ghosn,
Palmer and Bremer (2004, 138) note that “Identification of the revisionist state is not based
on judgments regarding the aggressor in the dispute or the state that raised the political
issue under discussion, but is based on the behavior of the states in the related militarized
incidents. Both sides in a dispute can be coded as revisionist states. However, for each state
to qualify as a revisionist state it must openly attempt to challenge the predispute conditions
by (1) making claims to a specific territory, (2) attempting to overthrow a regime, or (3)
changing or not abiding by another states policy (JBS, 178).”7 Thus, the revisionist states
are those for whom territory is clearly at stake in the conflict.8 There are many other states
that might be involved in a particular dispute for whom the territory is not a factor, if they
join in a dispute through alliance ties for example. From the MID participant data, which is
the dataset best arranged to use for a country-level analysis, it is not directly possible to know
which of the other disputants, besides the revisionist, have territory at stake in the conflict.
Thus, territorial MID participation is only coded for revisionists. There are 209 territorial
MID-years in the PTS analysis and 170 in the CIRI analysis.
include 4 extra dummy variables to represent the lagged dependent variable, one representing a category of
the PTS in the previous year, with one of them receiving a 1 and the rest zero. One category is omitted as a
reference category. For the CIRI data, it requires 8 binary lags.
7In the quotation, Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer (2004) are citing Jones, Bremer and Singer (1996).
8Revisionist states also do not mean “Side A” in a conflict. Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer (2004) note that in
the period of 1816-1992, revisionists are Side A in 61% of the MIDs and only 49% of the MIDs from 1993-2001.
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In order to further capture conflict, I include the highest fatality level for any MID in which
state is involved in a given year (territorial, rival, or not). This measure of conflict severity
is an ordinal scale of battle deaths, ranging from 1-6, with 1 being 25 or fewer deaths and 6
having at least 1000 (which is what constitutes a war according to COW measures).9 This
allows me to compare whether the intensity of conflict experienced that year, the issue, or a
combination of the two contributes to an increase in repression.10
My theory contends that the issue is the prime mover when it comes to repression. Conflict
intensity also plays a role in the level of conflict salience. Even a conflict that begins as initially
low-salience might becomes more salient to the domestic audience as conflict experienced
that year intensifies. By controlling for the fatalities of deadliest MID over any issue in a
year, I am controlling for issues in MIDs other than territory or rivalry. In the analysis, when
territorial MID is interacted with fatalities, the lower order term represents all fatal MIDs
(at increasing fatality levels) fought in years in which there was no territorial revision sought.
The same is true for the rival analyses.11
For rival conflicts, I include a dummy variable if a state was involved in a MID against a rival
in a given year. I employ the Klein, Goertz and Diehl (2006) definition of rivalry, which are
states that engage in 3 or more conflicts over a connected set of issues. Similar to territorial
MIDs, I also interact this variable with the Correlates of War fatality variable. There are 746
9The measure works as follows. 0 is no fatalities, 1 is between 1 and 25 battle deaths, 2 is between 25 and
100 deaths, 3 is between 100 and 250, 4 is between 250 and 500, 5 is between 500 and 1000, and 6 is 1000 or
more. Some of these data are coded as “-9” to indicate that there are no accurate estimates of battle deaths.
Not wanting to lose observations on conflict, which are relatively scarce during the time period, I coded all as
0.
10I include fatality levels for the most fatal MID in a given year, regardless of whether the MID is territorial or
rival. By including non-territorial and non-rival fatality levels, I am essentially controlling for non-territorial and
non-rival MIDs at di↵erent levels of severity. This is important for understanding whether or not the fatality
e↵ect is relevant for years in which there was also a territorial or rival conflict or not.
11Fatalities, unlike revision type is not distinguished by whether a state is revisionist or not in the MID 3.10B
(participant) dataset, so all MID participants are coded as having some level of fatalities.
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rival MID-years in the PTS analysis12 and 603 in the CIRI analysis.
Finally, whether or not states alter their repressive strategies during conflicts is also a function
of domestic politics. Key to my explanation is whether or not a state’s government depends
on popular consent to rule, and thus the provision of public goods to maintain that public
support. Therefore, the most appropriate measure of regime type is a dichotomous measure
of whether a state is democratic or not. I employ a binary measure of democracy, scored a 1 if
a state has scored a 6 or higher on the Polity scale (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr, 2010), taken
from the Poe, Rost and Carey (2006) replication file.13 Because I am primarily interested in
the shift in repression, from a year in which there was no conflict compared to conflict years,
I lag whether or not a country was democratic.14 There are 1,349 democratic observations in
the PTS data and 1,749 autocratic observations. In the CIRI data there are 1,167 democratic
country years and 1,338 autocratic country years.
In order to test my hypotheses, which predict that democracies and autocracies have di↵erent
reactions to conflict with respect to repression, I employ interaction terms to examine di↵erent
regime types in and out of territorial and rival conflicts and years with di↵erent severity levels.
In my first set of models, I interact whether a state was involved in a territorial or rival MID
with whether a state was a democracy. Following those analyses, I include a broad set of
12Because rival conflicts encompass multiple issues and involve a large number of repeated conflicts, it is not
surprising that there are more than triple the number of rival conflicts as compared to territorial conflicts.
13Conceptually, this is similar in view to the definitions o↵ered by Przeworski et al. (1996) and Cheibub, Gandhi
and Vreeland (2010), who o↵er a dichotomous measure of democracy. I chose the Polity measure because of its
wide use within conflict research. In a study on the compatibility of democracy measures, wherein the authors
generate a new, unified measure of democracy, Pemstein, Meserve and Melton (2010, 444), note that a 6 on
polity is comparable to the Przeworski et al. (1996) measure. Furthermore, while several human rights articles
use the cuto↵ of 7 or higher on polity (Davenport and Armstrong, 2004; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005), I
chose 6 because it becomes more comparable to conflict research.
14This is common practice among human rights studies that employ ordered logit analysis, both to control
for temporal dependence as well as to account for the continuity of policy-making over time. For example, in
Wood (2008), most of the independent variables are lagged at least one year. The conflict variables can act
as a sudden threat. Because I am primarily interested in the way that conflict a↵ects repressive practices, both
the civil war and interstate conflict variables are not lagged.
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interaction terms to understand the distinct e↵ects that conflict intensity has during the years
of territorial, rival, and non-territorial and non-rival conflicts, as well as the di↵erent e↵ects
in democracies and autocracies. I also interact the democracies in territorial MIDs or rival
MIDs term with the highest fatality level experienced by a state that year. By comparing
these terms to the lower order ones, I can separate the e↵ects of territory or rivalry, the
severity of conflict experienced by states that year, or some combination of the two. The
interaction term generated between territorial or rival conflicts is thus an interaction between
the highest level of fatalities experienced in a year and whether the state had a territorial or
rival conflict, not necessarily the fatality level of the particular territorial or rival MID. Because
my observations are country-year, I want to account for the yearly environment of conflict
severity and issue. If I were to match the fatality level to the particular rival or territorial MID,
then the lower order term on fatalities might have little meaning. The full interaction model
thus includes three two-term interactions and one three term interaction. Because most
of these multiplicative terms (except for fatalities) are binary, they each represent di↵erent
categories of the data. To make interpretation simpler, I also chose to test split sample
models. For these, I split the samples according to whether a country was democratic or
autocratic. In order to make the analysis of repressive choices as simple as possible, I employ
a model with only one interaction term on the CIRI data, based on a best fit from the overall
repression models (see Tables 5.3 and 5.7 below).
As a control, I include the level of GDP (natural log, lagged one year) as well as annual GDP
growth. Economic development has consistently shown an inverse statistical relationship
to repressive behavior, similar to democracy (Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe, Tate and Keith,
1999). Also included are the lagged, natural log of a country’s population, as well as yearly
population growth. Larger countries tend to be more repressive (Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe,
Tate and Keith, 1999). These data were taken from the World Bank development indicators
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(WorldBank, 2004), via the Poe, Rost and Carey (2006) replication file. I also include a
control variable for whether or not a state was involved in a civil war. Civil conflicts are
situations in which the government is repressive, almost by definition, because it requires to
government to engage their own citizens-as-rebels militarily. These data are from the Uppsala
armed conflict dataset (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg and Strand, 2002), from
the Poe, Rost and Carey (2006) replication file. I also control for participation in any MID,
to account for non-fatal conflicts. This variable was taken from the MID 3.10 B (participant)
data (Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer, 2004).
5.3 Empirical Results: Territorial Conflict and Overall
Repression
In Table 5.1, I present the ordered logit results for territorial revisionist conflict and domestic
repression using the Political Terror Scale on the full sample of country years.15 Model 1 has
no interaction terms, displaying only the additive e↵ects of territorial conflict participation
and democracy. Model 2 has minimal interaction terms, testing the e↵ects of territorial MIDs
and democracy. Model 3 presents the full interaction model on the whole sample. If one were
to look only at Models 1 and 2, one could infer that territorial conflict has little influence on
domestic repression. By examining Model 3, however, one could infer that it does influence
conflict, albeit conditionally on MID severity. As years in which democracies fought territorial
MIDs become more deadly, democracies are more likely to increase repression. In Model 3,
the term “Terr. X Fatalities” in this model represent the interactive e↵ect of territorial MIDs
and fatalities for the reference category, autocracies. In line with the theoretical logic, the
results show as fatalities increase in a year in which there was also a territorial MID, autocratic
15All analyses performed using STATA, version 11.2.
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states become more likely to reduce repression. Finally, all control variables perform largely
as expected. Growth in population and GDP are not significant, but GDP per capita and
population are both correlated in the expected directions across all samples and models. Civil
wars, not surprisingly, exhibit a strong positive impact on increases in repression. Participation
in any MID exhibits a positive and significant impact on repression for the full sample. All
lagged dependent variables and constants have been suppressed in the tables for the purposes
of clarity.
In an e↵ort to simplify the interaction modeling, I display models in Table 5.2 for which I split
the samples according to whether or not states are democratic. In Model 4, the democratic
sample, the e↵ects of Model 3, Table 5.1, are mirrored. As fatalities increase during years
in which there are also territorial MIDs, democratic states become more likely to increase
repression. One somewhat unexpected finding from Model 4 is that as fatalities increase
in non-territorial MID-years, increases in repression become less likely, but this finding is
not consistent with the test of the full sample. This indicates that a combination of issue
salience and conflict severity that contribute to repression, and conflict severity alone may not
be crucial. As in the full sample analysis, Model 5, like Model 3, does provide some support for
the idea that as territorial conflicts years have increasing fatalities, autocratic states decrease
repression. On the whole, the results of the significance tests, in both the full and split
sample models, show moderate to strong support for my hypotheses. Democratic states
become more likely to increase repression during years that have territorial conflicts as those
years have more fatalities, while autocratic states become more likely to decrease repression.
The controls perform as they did in Table 5.1, with the exception for democracies involved
in any MID, which no longer has significance.
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 present the same models as Tables 5.1 and 5.2, but employ the Cingranelli-
Richards physical integrity rights scale. The results are similar to the tests of the Political
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Table 5.1: Ordered Logit of Territorial Revision on Repression: Political Terror Scale, 1977-
2001
Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample
(1) (2) (3)
Democracy (t-1) -0.428*** -0.439*** -0.411***
(0.117) (0.123) (0.124)
Territorial Conflict 0.146 0.093 0.423
(0.160) (0.236) (0.286)
Dem. X Terr. 0.126 -0.324
(0.312) (0.365)
MID Fatalities 0.071
(0.102)
Dem. X Fatalities -0.209
(0.129)
Terr. X Fatalities -0.378**
(0.160)
Dem. X Terr. X Fatality 0.650***
(0.223)
Population (ln, t-1) 0.147*** 0.147*** 0.151***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Pop. Growth (t-1) 0.062 0.062 0.063
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
Econ. Development (ln, t-1) -0.239*** -0.239*** -0.240***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Econ. Growth (t-1) 0.002 0.002 0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Civil War 1.283*** 1.278*** 1.311***
(0.166) (0.167) (0.175)
Any MID 0.168* 0.169* 0.163*
(0.097) (0.097) (0.097)
Observations 3,088 3,088 3,088
Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses
*** p| < |0.01, ** p| < |0.05, * p| < |0.1
Terror Scale, with some noteworthy di↵erences. First, the multiplicative e↵ect of territory
and fatalities for democracies does not exist for the CIRI analysis. Democracies are more likely
to increase repression when engaged in conflicts over territory, but the e↵ect is independent
of fatalities. Model 8 shows that autocracies do decrease repression as territorial conflict
years have more fatalities. The control variables perform similarly to those in the the PTS
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Table 5.2: Ordered Logit of Territorial Revision on Repression: Political Terror Scale, 1977-
2001
Democracies Autocracies
(4) (5)
Territorial Conflict 0.036 0.301
(0.284) (0.272)
MID Fatalities -0.238* 0.077
(0.132) (0.106)
Terr. X Fatalities 0.350** -0.353**
(0.177) (0.165)
Population (ln, t-1) 0.223*** 0.155***
(0.066) (0.044)
Pop. Growth (t-1) 0.136 -0.022
(0.086) (0.036)
Econ. Development (ln, t-1) -0.360*** -0.108**
(0.071) (0.053)
Econ. Growth (t-1) -0.001 0.001
(0.014) (0.006)
Civil War 1.639*** 1.217***
(0.505) (0.146)
Any MID 0.004 0.361***
(0.171) (0.113)
Observations 1,339 1,749
Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses
*** p| < |0.01, ** p| < |0.05, * p| < |0.1
models.
Table 5.4 displays the results of the CIRI analysis on the split samples. The key results from
Table 5.3 are echoed here, but only in one-tailed tests. Because my theoretical approach
emphasized the direction of shifts in repression during territorial conflict, with democracies
increasing repression and autocracies decreasing repression, one-tailed tests are adequate.
Furthermore, because they echo the findings from the full sample, these findings still provide
support for my explanation. Again, the controls perform similarly to other tests, but the
coe cient for participation in any MID is not significant for democracies. The results of the
CIRI models show that repressive events are more likely to increase, regardless of conflict
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Table 5.3: Ordered Logit of Territorial Revision on Repression: Cingranelli-Richards Scale,
1982-2001
Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample
(6) (7) (8)
Democracy (t-1) -0.419*** -0.495*** -0.506***
(0.114) (0.116) (0.117)
Territorial Conflict 0.037 -0.378* -0.166
(0.141) (0.203) (0.214)
Dem. X Territory 0.827*** 0.538**
(0.206) (0.232)
MID Fatalities -0.046
(0.063)
Dem. X Fatalities 0.090
(0.132)
Terr. X Fatalities -0.150*
(0.085)
Dem. X Terr. X Fatalities 0.186
(0.142)
Population (ln, t-1) 0.196*** 0.202*** 0.200***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Pop. Growth (t-1) 0.022 0.015 0.016
(0.054) (0.052) (0.053)
Econ. Development (ln, t-1) -0.317*** -0.320*** -0.320***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
Econ. Growth (t-1) 0.002 0.003 0.002
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Civil War 1.375*** 1.357*** 1.374***
(0.190) (0.194) (0.193)
Any MID 0.230** 0.234** 0.241**
(0.094) (0.094) (0.096)
Observations 2,505 2,505 2,505
Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses
*** p| < |0.01, ** p| < |0.05, * p| < |0.1
severity, while the PTS models display the the scope of targeting in repression is more likely to
increase as fatalities increase during years with territorial MIDs for democracies. Autocratic
states on the other hand, are more likely to decrease repression as fatalities increase in years
where they also have a territorial conflict.
Ordered logit coe cients do not directly display any marginal e↵ects of the variables on
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Table 5.4: Ordered Logit of Territorial Revision on Repression: Cingranelli-Richards Scale,
1982-2001
Democracies Autocracies
(9) (10)
Territorial Conflict 0.316+ -0.219
(0.200) (0.233)
MID Fatalities -0.065 -0.028
(0.115) (0.066)
Territory X Fatality 0.128 -1.47+
(0.130) (0.091)
Population (ln, t-1) 0.264*** 0.214***
(0.052) (0.044)
Pop. Growth (t-1) 0.037 -0.035
(0.068) (0.040)
Econ. Development (ln, t-1) -0.485*** -0.181***
(0.062) (0.052)
Econ. Growth (t-1) 0.013 -0.001
(0.013) (0.011)
Civil War 1.852*** 1.189***
(0.603) (0.153)
Any MID 0.239 0.323***
(0.150) (0.120)
Observations 1,167 1,338
Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses
*** p| < |0.01, ** p| < |0.05, * p| < |0.1, +p<0.1
the dependent variable, and because coe cients of interaction terms can be particularly
confusing (Braumoeller, 2004; Berry, DeMeritt and Esarey, 2010), I display some predicted
probabilities of certain levels of repression under di↵erent conditions. In Figure 5.1, I display
the predicted probabilities that a state will increase at least one category of the Political
Terror Scale, relative to the prior year. I display the likelihoods when states experience no
territorial MID and then a territorial MID as well as the di↵erent fatality levels experienced in
the same year as a territorial MID. The probabilities are drawn from Model 4 (Table 5.2) for
democracies and Model 5 (Table 5.2) for autocracies. The graphs show the pattern indicated
in Table 5.2’s significance tests. For democracies, there is a clear multiplicative impact for
territorial conflict and MID fatalities. As fatalities increase during years in which there was
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also a territorial MID, democratic states become more likely to become more repressive. By
contrast, there is the opposite e↵ect for autocratic states. Although there is a slight increase
in likelihood of an increase in repression when autocracies enter into a year in which there is
a territorial MID but no fatalities, as those conflict-years become deadlier, autocratic states
become more likely to decrease repression. An empirical illustration of both of these kinds
of shifts in repression is the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the early 1990s.
Armenia was engaged in a territorial conflict with Azerbaijan from 1992-1995. According
to the PTS codings, Armenia, a democracy, increased repression in 1994, while Azerbaijan,
an autocracy, decreased repression in 1995. The Amnesty International country report that
examines 1994 notes that although the ongoing conflict made it di cult to track what exactly
was going on in Armenia, there was evidence to suggest that Azerbaijani minorities were
being targeted privately, with complicity from the government (Amnesty International, 1995,
61). In Azerbaijan, Amnesty reports the government released prisoners of Armenian ethnicity
(Amnesty International, 1996, 83-85).
In order to check the robustness of the above findings on territory, I also conducted other
statistical analyses of di↵erent measures of democracy. I conducted robustness checks on the
split sample models presented in Table 5.2 and Table 5.4 employing a stricter definition of
democracy of seven or higher on the Polity scale, as is standard in the human rights literature.
I also conducted a similar robustness check employing the binary democracy measure from
Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010). The results are substantively similar to those displayed
above, albeit some of the theoretical variables are only significant and the one tailed level.16
Therefore, I can be reasonably confident in the inference that the mechanism of shifts in
16The result of democracy increasing repression as territorial MID-years have deadlier MIDs is only significant
in a one-tailed test using the Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) measure when testing on the PTS scores.
Robustness checks using the CIRI scores also largely conform to those displayed above, but the finding on
democracies in territorial MIDs is significant at the one-tailed level using the Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland
(2010) measure and the autocratic finding for decreasing repression as territorial MID-years have more fatalities
is only significant at the one-tailed level using the Polity 7 standard.
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Figure 5.1: E↵ect of Territorial Revision and Fatalities on Increasing Repression by at Least
1 Category from Previous Year
Note: From simulations of Table 5.2, Models 4 (Democracies) and 5 (Autocracies). The values are set as
follows. Prior year PTS set at the mode (Democracies=1, Autocracies=3), with control variables held at their
mean or modal categories. This figure displays the predicted probability that a state will reach at least level 2
on the PTS scale and an autocracy will reach at least a level 4 on the PTS. Predicted probabilities were
generated using CLARIFY software (King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000).
repression shown by my analysis is driven, at least in part, by the salience of the stakes of
the conflict experienced in a given year. The results of these robustness checks indicate that
territorial conflict is a particularly salient issue because it has shown to lead to shifts in the
repressive tendencies of both democratic and autocratic states.
5.4 Empirical Results: Rival Conflict and Overall
Repression
Tables 5.5 and 5.6 display the results of involvement in rival conflicts on repression for the full
sample (Table 5.5) and the split samples (Table 5.6) utilizing the PTS. The major di↵erence
between the results on territorial conflict and rivalry is that there are no consistent findings
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across the analyses of rivalry. In Table 5.5, there exhibits a significant increase in repression
by autocratic states involved in non fatal rival MID-years, but it is not robust to the split
sample models. Table 5.6 shows that democracies decrease repression during years in which
there are rival MIDs as those years also have deadlier MIDs, but it is not robust to the
full sample model in Table 5.5. The general lack of findings for rivalry are in line with the
theoretical logic that because states domestically adapt to rivalry, and there should be little
to no change in repression as a result of such conflicts. Control variables perform in a similar
fashion to the prior tests, except for involvement in any MID, which shows no e↵ect.
Tables 5.7 and 5.8 display the results of rival conflict on the CIRI human rights scale. Similar
to the results on the PTS, there are no findings that are consistent across the samples. In
Table 5.7, Model 18, the coe cient on the interaction between fatalities and democracies,
which is for non-rival conflict years, show democracies increasing repression, but this finding
is not consistent with the split sample model in Table 5.8. The controls generally perform as
they do in prior tests, although, contrary to the PTS results, participation in any MID does
lead to an increase in repression by democracies.
The findings on rivalry conform largely the theoretical framework, despite the findings being
largely null. The explanation contends that rivalry is a condition states experience that
becomes embedded in domestic politics, becoming an aspect of the status-quo. A conflict
against a rival is considered normal and expected behavior. Therefore, it is unlikely to alter
the repressive status quo. My findings on rivalry conform to this view, as the results show that
generally, when conflicting against a rival, democratic and autocratic states behave largely as
they do in peace time. This is supportive of a punctuated equilibrium view of rival behavior
(Diehl and Goertz, 2000), which emphasizes the consistency of rival relations over time.
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Table 5.5: Ordered Logit of Rival Conflict on Repression: Political Terror Scale, 1977-2001
Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample
(11) (12) (13)
Democracy (t-1) -0.428*** -0.381*** -0.392***
(0.117) (0.127) (0.125)
Rival Conflict 0.117 0.198 0.301*
(0.129) (0.167) (0.159)
Dem X Rival -0.189 -0.201
(0.195) (0.200)
MID Fatalities 0.049
(0.078)
Dem X Fatalities 0.134
(0.165)
Rival X Fatalities -0.157
(0.180)
Dem X Rival X Fatalities -0.137
(0.213)
Population (ln, t-1) 0.147*** 0.147*** 0.148***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Pop. Growth (t-1) 0.061 0.063 0.062
(0.048) (0.049) (0.049)
Econ. Development (ln, t-1) -0.239*** -0.237*** -0.237***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Econ. Growth (t-1) 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Civil War 1.271*** 1.282*** 1.301***
(0.165) (0.168) (0.169)
Any MID 0.122 0.118 0.076
(0.115) (0.116) (0.122)
Observations 3,088 3,088 3,088
Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses
*** p| < |0.01, ** p| < |0.05, * p| < |0.1
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Table 5.6: Ordered Logit of Rival Conflict on Repression: Political Terror Scale, 1977-2001
Democracies Autocracies
(14) (15)
Rival Conflict 0.140 0.201
(0.202) (0.175)
MID Fatalities 0.123 0.032
(0.158) (0.087)
Rival X Fatalities -0.298** -0.110
(0.131) (0.173)
Population (ln, t-1) 0.210*** 0.155***
(0.066) (0.044)
Pop. Growth (t-1) 0.121 -0.021
(0.086) (0.037)
Econ. Development (ln, t-1) -0.364*** -0.102*
(0.072) (0.053)
Econ. Growth (t-1) -0.003 0.002
(0.013) (0.006)
Civil War 1.541*** 1.238***
(0.466) (0.144)
Any MID -0.067 0.287*
(0.215) (0.148)
Observations 1,339 1,749
Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses
*** p| < |0.01, ** p| < |0.05, * p| < |0.1
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Table 5.7: Ordered Logit of Rival Conflict on Repression: Cingranelli-Richards Scale, 1982-
2001
Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample
(16) (17) (18)
Democracy (t-1) -0.417*** -0.441*** -0.465***
(0.114) (0.117) (0.119)
Rival Conflict -0.056 -0.106 -0.021
(0.124) (0.164) (0.165)
Dem. X Rival 0.103 0.000
(0.192) (0.202)
MID Fatalities -0.085
(0.086)
Dem X Fatalities 0.228**
(0.100)
Rival X Fatalities -0.045
(0.116)
Dem. X Riv. X Fatalities -0.016
(0.148)
Population (ln, t-1) 0.197*** 0.197*** 0.197***
(0.032) (0.033) (0.032)
Pop. Growth (t-1) 0.022 0.021 0.022
(0.054) (0.054) (0.054)
Econ. Development (ln, t-1) -0.319*** -0.320*** -0.319***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
Econ. Growth (t-1) 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Civil War 1.376*** 1.373*** 1.388***
(0.192) (0.191) (0.189)
Any MID 0.270** 0.273** 0.268**
(0.115) (0.116) (0.119)
Observations 2,505 2,505 2,505
Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses
*** p| < |0.01, ** p| < |0.05, * p| < |0.1
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Table 5.8: Ordered Logit of Rival Conflict on Repression: Cingranelli-Richards Scale, 1982-
2001
Democracies Autocracies
(19) (20)
Rival MID -0.149 0.045
(0.180) (0.177)
MID Fatalities 0.038 -0.061
(0.072) (0.089)
Rival X Fatalities 0.000 -0.047
(0.103) (0.112)
Population (ln, t-1) 0.261*** 0.205***
(0.053) (0.043)
Pop. Growth (t-1) 0.038 -0.030
(0.070) (0.041)
Econ. Development (ln, t-1) -0.491*** -0.178***
(0.063) (0.053)
Econ. Growth (t-1) 0.011 -0.000
(0.013) (0.011)
Civil War 1.789*** 1.219***
(0.557) (0.152)
Any MID 0.384** 0.262*
(0.167) (0.149)
Observations 1,167 1,338
Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses
*** p| < |0.01, ** p| < |0.05, * p| < |0.1
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5.5 Empirical Results: Territorial Conflict, Rivalry, and
Repressive Choices
Finally, I analyze the di↵erent repression types and how they are a↵ected by territorial conflict
involvement. These results are displayed in Table 5.9. First, for the most part, several factors
have a similar e↵ect across the repressive categories. When examining the theoretically
relevant factors, however, such an impression changes. In general, democracies are less
likely to imprison or torture.17 As shown by the interaction term, they become significantly
more likely to engage in both behaviors when fighting over territory. This is in line with
the prediction of Hypothesis 12. Autocracies seem not to increase repression along any
category during conflict, and appear to decrease disappearances during territorial conflict.
These findings are consistent with the above results presented for repression as a whole, as
well as the logic behind Hypothesis 13. There is no clear decrease in all repressive behaviors,
but there is some suggestion that autocracies become less likely to engage in one of the more
extreme types of repression: disappearances. Among the control variables, only the one for
”any MID” is a significant predictor of just a single category: imprisonment.
In order to gauge the substantive impact of territorial conflict on repressive choices, I cal-
culated some predicted probabilities based on Table 5.9. These probabilities are displayed in
Table 5.10 and show the likelihood of a one category increase for each type of repression by
democratic and autocratic states. Table 5.9 shows that when democratic states are involved
in territorial conflicts, they become much more likely to increase the use of torture and im-
prisonment. They are seventy-one percent more likely to increase torture and one hundred
and forty-six percent more likely to employ imprisonment as a tactic of repression. On the
17There appears to be little to no e↵ect of regime type on disappearances or killings outside of conflict,
according to the lower order term on democracy. I believe this has more to do with the fact that disappearances
and killing are much less common repressive choices across all states (see for example Conrad and DeMeritt
(2011b)).
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Table 5.9: Ordered Logit of Territorial Revision on Repressive Choices, 1982-2001
Disappearances Killings Imprisonment Torture
Democracy (t-1) -0.240 0.074 -1.101*** -0.323***
(0.191) (0.139) (0.139) (0.125)
Territorial Conflict -0.576* -0.084 0.101 -0.425
(0.313) (0.186) (0.319) (0.309)
Dem. X Terr. 0.418 0.291 0.816* 1.000***
(0.317) (0.321) (0.461) (0.358)
Population (ln, t-1) 0.144*** 0.175*** 0.213*** 0.234***
(0.055) (0.049) (0.052) (0.042)
Pop. Growth (t-1) -0.011 0.039 0.087 0.005
(0.040) (0.045) (0.085) (0.037)
Econ. Development (ln, t-1) -0.269*** -0.399*** -0.216*** -0.315***
(0.058) (0.053) (0.052) (0.049)
Econ. Growth (t-1) 0.005 -0.001 0.010 -0.002
(0.013) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Civil War 1.518*** 1.287*** 0.928*** 0.737***
(0.186) (0.213) (0.227) (0.190)
Any MID 0.213 0.176 0.303** 0.156
(0.159) (0.120) (0.120) (0.119)
Observations 2,523 2,513 2,516 2,518
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p| < |0.01, ** p| < |0.05, * p| < |0.1
other hand, autocratic states become twenty-seven percent less likely to increase the use of
disappearances to deal with domestic opponents.18
Finally, I ran similar models to gauge the impact of rival conflict on the choice of certain
repressive behaviors, which are displayed in Table 5.11. Similar to the models on overall
levels of repression, there is no clear link between rival conflict and repression dynamics.
Again, I attribute this to the regularity of rival conflicts. Because democratic and autocratic
18I also conducted similar analyses employing the Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) and Polity 7 standards
of democracy. The results are substantively similar as those presented in Table 5.9, with some exceptions. For
the Polity 7 analyses, democracies are shown to be more likely to increase disappearances. In the analyses
with the Cheibub measure, the imprisonment finding for democracies drops out, while autocracies are shown
to be likely to decrease torture. Similar to employing Polity 7, democracies are also more likely to increase
disappearances. I believe that the Polity 6 standard is the best measure to employ, given its comparability to
other work on international conflict, but future pursuit of this research question should more carefully explore
these results.
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Table 5.10: Predicted Probabilities of Increase in Repressive Choices, 1982-2001
No Terr. MID Terr. MID %  
Democracies
Torture 0.2044 0.3490 +71%
Imprisonment 0.1525 0.3756 +146%
Autocracies
Disappearances 0.0912 0.0669 -27%
Note: Predicted probabilities and changes calculate the likelihood di↵erence of a 1 category increase from the
modal dependent variable value for democracies (0 for imprisonment and 1 for torture) and a 1 category
decrease from the mode for autocracies (0 for disappearances). Calculated using CLARIFY (King, Tomz and
Wittenberg, 2000) from models in Table 5.9.
states normalize their repressive routines in the context of rivalry, such conflicts do not provide
the domestic shock necessary to alter their repressive strategies. Democratic publics do not
seem to feel the same sense of insecurity that territorial conflict provides, and instead are
less willing to support increases in repression when conflicts are against a rival, rather than
over territory. Autocratic states do not appear to alter their tendencies at all. In rivalry, their
domestic military apparatus likely maintains repression despite rival conflicts because such
conflicts are expected.
5.6 Conclusion
Does international conflict lead to changes in how states repress? The answer, in short, is
yes. I have shown that the way in which international conflict a↵ects repression is conditional
on two sets of factors: the salience of the conflict itself and domestic political considerations.
In order for repression to be a↵ected by international conflict, the conflict must be salient
or dangerous enough to present an alteration of the political status quo. How the conflict
manifests itself in terms of repression is a function of domestic politics. Democracies, whose
government must rely on public support to maintain o ce, and which are typically not re-
pressive, are more likely to find conflicts tied to the general public or public good to be the
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Table 5.11: Ordered Logit of Rival Conflict on Repressive Choices, 1982-2001
Disappearances Killings Imprisonment Torture
Democracy (t-1) -0.158 0.141 -1.029*** -0.282**
(0.209) (0.145) (0.136) (0.129)
Rival Conflict -0.367 0.116 0.219 0.073
(0.254) (0.188) (0.205) (0.213)
Dem. X Rival -0.136 -0.185 -0.030 0.116
(0.282) (0.247) (0.266) (0.236)
Population (ln, t-1) 0.140*** 0.175*** 0.215*** 0.225***
(0.054) (0.049) (0.052) (0.042)
Pop. Growth (t-1) -0.006 0.042 0.090 0.009
(0.042) (0.047) (0.087) (0.036)
Econ. Development (ln, t-1) -0.272*** -0.397*** -0.218*** -0.312***
(0.057) (0.054) (0.053) (0.049)
Econ. Growth (t-1) 0.004 -0.001 0.010 -0.003
(0.013) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Civil War 1.581*** 1.299*** 0.917*** 0.748***
(0.185) (0.213) (0.226) (0.185)
Any MID 0.400** 0.160 0.254* 0.085
(0.202) (0.153) (0.154) (0.133)
Observations 2,523 2,513 2,516 2,518
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p| < |0.01, ** p| < |0.05, * p| < |0.1
most salient. In terms of territory, this could mean nationally symbolic territory. Therefore,
democracies should try to deliver the public good of security by winning the conflict. When
the state is engaged in such salient conflicts, and they become more supportive of increases
in repression.
On the other hand, autocracies rely on elite support and maintain that support through the
provision of private goods (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). Because they must secure the
elite, they are generally repressive. When involved in particularly salient conflicts, autocracies
may become resource strapped, as one of their peace-time tools of repression, the military,
is now involved in fighting a conflict abroad. Therefore, such states may actually decrease
their repression during territorial conflicts.
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When fighting against rivals, states may not shift their repressive practices. Rival conflicts
are certainly salient, but the rivalry process leads states to adapt their domestic political
processes to rivalry. As a result, such conflicts do not present the exogenous shock to the
status quo required for repression to shift.
In future developments of this project linking interstate conflict to human rights, I would like to
better account for the role territorial conflict plays for non-revisionist states. I have attempted
a preliminary test on the Political Terror Scale of just the non-revisionist participants of
territorial MIDs, which may include allies or other participants that have no territory at stake,
and these preliminary results are a reversal of the empirical pattern in this chapter has for
revisionist states. This suggests that the human rights e↵ects of territorial conflict may vary
greatly depending on how important the issue at stake is to the participants. That being said,
I need to develop a systematic way to account for those non-revisionists who have territory
at stake in order to best account for the e↵ects of territoriality, which these preliminary tests
do not do.
The findings presented in this chapter confirm some of the theoretical logic developed. First,
for years in which democratic states are involved in territorial MIDs and as those years are
also increasingly fatal, they become more likely to increase repression. This confirms the idea
that when a publicly valued good, such territory, is contested, democratic publics feel more
insecure and are more likely to support repressive behaviors. The second major finding is
that autocracies actually become less repressive in years that they contest territory as those
years become more deadly. This supports the idea that as more military resources have to be
poured into the pursuit of a conflict, that autocracies might have to become less repressive
to make up for it. Years in which there are high fatalities as well as territorial MIDs may
thus present a challenge to the repressive status quo for dictatorships. Furthermore, I also
found that democracies focus their increase in repression on the use of imprisonment and
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torture, while autocratic states decrease the use of disappearances, but not other behaviors.
My findings for repression during rival conflicts also conforms to the theoretical logic. States
do not alter their repressive practices during rival conflicts.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
Does domestic politics influence the way states evaluate external threats? This major ques-
tion has motivated this dissertation project. In attempting to answer this broad question,
I have concentrated on several smaller questions that focus on two contexts in which in-
terstate conflicts occur, contested territory and international rivalry, as well as the di↵ering
political pressures that democratic and autocratic states experience. Chapter 1 introduced
this question, as well as the questions of how issues and domestic factors contribute to the
escalation of international conflict as well as how states repress during those conflicts. While
prior research has emphasized the role of contested territory, rivalry, or the institutional char-
acteristics of states on international conflict, most research does not attempt to integrate
these factors.1 Throughout this project, I have attempted to provide a coherent, overarching
explanation that gives some insight into all of these questions of how states evaluate threats,
escalate conflicts, or alter repressive strategies.
Chapter 2 introduced an general explanation, grounded in the logic of political survival
(Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). I argue that depending on the conflict context and domes-
tic politics, the provision of security may be a “public” or private good. Because democratic
states rely on the provision of public goods to maintain o ce through elections, they are more
prone to escalate conflicts when “public goods” issues are on the line. Autocratic states must
rely on the support of an elite through the provision of private goods. Due to this reliance on
1The major exceptions include works by Colaresi (2005), Goddard(2006; 2010), and Davenport (2007)
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the elite, the conflicts that they will find the most salient are those that present opportunities
to increase private good distribution or that threaten it. From the theoretical approach in
Chapter 2, it is possible then to develop specific theoretical frameworks for understanding
how states go to war over territory and rivalry, and then in turn how their domestic political
arrangements influence decisions to become violent domestically. In the subsequent chap-
ters, I drew out some of the empirical implications for understanding how democratic and
autocratic states escalate territorial conflicts and rival conflicts. In Chapter 5, I linked how
democratic and autocratic orientation toward territory and rivalry would impact repression
during international conflict.
In Chapter 3, I derived two hypotheses about the role that domestic institutions play in
territorial conflict. Democracies should find the intangible aspects of territory more salient,
because it appeals to the general public via nationalism or symbolic identity ties. Autocratic
states would find the the more tangible aspects salient, because those aspects may be linked
to private good distribution. Democracies and autocracies might therefore have trouble
negotiating contesting territory. I thus predicted that territorial conflicts between so-called
“mixed” dyads, with one democratic state and one autocratic state, would be the most
war-prone. I further argued that when the contested territory had a high intangible value
for the democratic state in a mixed dyad, war would be more likely. Empirically, there was
support for these predictions. Mixed dyads are more likely to go to war over territory, both
during a current dispute or within five years of that dispute. Furthermore, when mixed dyads
contested a claim with high intangible salience for a democratic state, war was also more
likely.
Chapter 4 deals with how domestic political events might shape escalation of conflict in inter-
national rivalry. Rather than view external threat as a single issue, such as territory, I argued
that the public and private good motivations that democracies and autocracies experience
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might be extended to a threatening context such as rivalry, which may encompass several
contested issues. Because rivals expect future conflicts between them, periods of domestic
pressure on regimes might influence when more severe conflicts might occur. Election years
for democratic states represented a period of public pressure and that rival outbidding might
be most intense. Periods of domestic unrest might be when autocratic states felt the kind of
domestic pressure that would lead to more escalatory conflicts. Domestic vulnerability might
lead to more severe conflicts not just because one state might seek conflict as a way of in-
creasing domestic support, as in diversionary theory, but also because its rival might seek to
take advantage of another state’s domestic weaknesses. I also predicted that mixed regime
dyads, similar to territorial conflict, would be the most war prone. Across twelve statistical
models, there was very little support for my argument overall. Domestic unrest in autocratic
states did lead to more severe disputes, but to war only in some models.
In Chapter 5, I placed the focus back on the domestic arena. Repression dynamics for states
involved in international conflicts are conditional on similar motivating factors that led them
to conflicts over territory and against a rival in the first place. When democratic states
fight over territory, the public pressure to deliver the good of territory and security through
victory makes democracies more inclined to increase repression. Autocratic states tend to
use repression as a regular tool of political order during peace time. When faced with a
salient conflict abroad, such as one over territory, these states may have to pour military
resources that might otherwise be used for repression into the conflict e↵ort, thus becoming
less repressive. Furthermore, autocratic and democratic states will di↵er with respect to
which types of repressive behavior they will choose. Democracies are more likely to increase
the use of torture and imprisonment, as opposed to killing and disappearances, because
these practices already exist within their legal repertoire. Furthermore, although democratic
publics might become more supportive of repression, they are not likely to become supportive
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of outright killing. Autocratic states might be more likely to decrease the more severe forms
of repression, killing and disappearances, because these kinds of behaviors might require the
military and may require the most resources to carry out.
For repression during rival conflicts, I argued that there may not be much of a shift in repres-
sion dynamics, either in overall levels of repression or in the choices of repressive behavior.
Because conflict between rivals is expected, repressive apparatuses in autocratic states should
adapt to this expectation. For democratic audiences, rival conflicts may not represent the
immediate salient threat that territorial conflict does. Nevertheless, I expected that given
the resource constraints that conflicts present as they approach war, autocrats may lessen
repression as rival conflicts become more deadly. Empirically, there was some strong support
for these predictions. Democratic states are more likely to increase repression overall during
years of territorial conflict as those years also have increasingly deadly conflict. They also
increase the use of torture and imprisonment in territorial MID years. Similarly, autocratic
states decrease repression in years in which there are territorial MIDs as those years have
more deadly conflicts. Autocratic states decrease the use of disappearances during territo-
rial conflicts. The findings were strongest for territorial conflict, as I found no comparable
findings for rival conflicts, in line with the idea that domestic politics adapts to rivalry and it
therefore does not act as an exogenous shock.
6.1 Major Lessons
Taking the argument and findings as a whole, there a few major lessons to take away from
this dissertation project. The first is that democratic and autocratic states have some fun-
damental di↵erences in the ways that they approach external threats. The general argument
presented in Chapter 2 has empirical support, particularly in the arena of territorial conflict.
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My argument, based on the findings in Chapter 4 and 5, does not apply nearly as well to the
arena of international rivalry. Although I expected that rivalry would not have the same im-
pact as territory on repression dynamics, that finding, combined with the findings of Chapter
4, indicates that perhaps the causal mechanism outlined in Chapter 2 is more appropriate
as an explanation for conflicts over specific issues, rather than long-term contexts such as
rivalry.
This project attempted to link four research programs together: the democratic peace re-
search program exemplified by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), the territorial conflict
program (Senese and Vasquez, 2008), the rivalry program (Diehl and Goertz, 2000; Co-
laresi, 2005), as well as the repression research program, exemplified by Poe and Tate (1994)
Davenport (2007). Building from the wisdom of the democratic peace research program that
emphasizes the major di↵erences between democracies and autocracies, I built an explana-
tion of conflict in di↵erent issue contexts to understand the way that issues and domestic
politics interact. I further attempted to link the logic of this integrated explanation into an
explanation of human rights abuses during international conflict, which had been heretofore
under-theorized. Although my predictions did not hold in the empirical arena of interna-
tional rivalry, this project nevertheless represents an increased accumulation of knowledge
and progress (Lakatos, 1970) for all of the programs upon which it draws.
Regarding the territorial research program, this project shows that it is important to under-
stand how di↵erent states find territory salient in di↵erent ways. That program, especially
the Steps-to-War model, has displayed the importance of territory as a cause of war, but does
not tell us much about why territory is important and when territory may be more salient than
at other times and in other cases. This dissertation presents a progressive step to that end.
Democracies and autocracies may simply find di↵erent aspects of territory more important,
and because of this, our understanding of why states fight wars over territory should take this
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into account. By further breaking down the components of territorial salience and examining
whether democracies are more likely to be involved in wars when intangible saliences increase,
this study has increased our understanding of why democracies go to war.
This project has less to say about international rivalry, and my findings tend to reinforce the
punctuated equilibrium model (Diehl and Goertz, 2000). An aspect of rivalry that is crucial
is that because it is a long term process with expected conflicts, domestic political processes
become endogenous to the rivalry process. Territorial conflict and war might come as a
surprise when it happens, as it did for Britain when Argentina invaded the Falklands. For an
enduring rivalry such as the India-Pakistan rivalry or the American-Soviet rivalry, it might be
more realistic to think that domestic politics are constantly adapting itself toward the rivalry.
As a result, the rivalry process itself is dominant in determining when conflicts escalate to war
than many domestic factors. Although some factors have been shown to “shock” the rivalry,
such as both states becoming democratic or a full-fledged civil war (Diehl and Goertz, 2000),
the more common domestic political events that I describe, such as elections or unrest, may
not have the same impact. Nevertheless, it is important to know when domestic politics
will matter and when it will not. This study, although limited in its ability to explain rival
processes, the exploration of rivalry nevertheless highlights an important limitation of the
theory. By knowing when and where the theory does not apply, future research can be guided
accordingly.
With respect to our understanding of how human rights is impacted by international conflict,
this project has generated several interesting findings. Although research on repression has
almost always incorporated international conflict in some form, it has received much less
theoretical attention than civil war or domestic institutions as a causal factor. My theoret-
ical approach incorporates what we know about how domestic institutions influence human
rights with how domestic institutions influence the salience of certain types of international
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conflict. The issue-based approach I have taken shows that some conflicts may influence
human rights abuse, while others may not. Because of this, we now know that democracies
may become more repressive under certain circumstances, and autocracies may become less
repressive in certain contexts. This is an important finding because one could infer from
prior research that democracy is a panacea for human rights protection (Davenport and
Armstrong, 2004; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005). Some prior research, most notably the
work by Davenport (2007), tackles this generalization, because from both a scholarly and
normative perspective, it is important to understand when democracy benefits human rights
and under what conditions the mechanism of popular sovereignty might actually hinder hu-
man rights protection. My study shows that in territorial conflicts at least, that democratic
institutions and processes might be the very processes that drive increases in abuse.
Furthermore, knowing when dictatorships might be less inclined to maintain high levels of
repression is also important. This is not to say that in some circumstances, democracies
are worse for human rights than autocratic states. If one looks at the average level of
repression in democratic and autocratic states during territorial conflict, autocracies are still
more repressive, on the whole. What the findings in Chapter 5 show is how conflict a↵ects
changes in repression by the two types of states. International conflict, when it happens for
autocracies, may represent an opening for pro-democracy activists and opposition to push
for regime change. Argentina’s military regime, in the wake of the loss of the Falklands war,
collapsed and democratized.2 By identifying a condition when democracies might become
more repressive and autocracies might become less repressive, this study sheds further light
on our understanding of democracy and autocracy.
2Oakes (2006) contends that even before the invasion, the Argentinian regime was losing its ability to
maintain the extreme levels of repression it was known for. The data I employ shows this drop in repression
and the Falklands war happening concurrently.
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6.2 Implications for Future Research
This project has answered some questions about the intersection between the salience of an
external threat and domestic politics, but it leaves many questions unanswered and raises
other ones. What emerges from this project is a potentially fruitful research agenda that
progresses research on conflict issues, human rights and the interaction between domestic
politics and international relations.
Chapter 3 introduces some new findings that further our understanding of how territory is
influenced by domestic political institutions. It broadly shows that democracies and autocra-
cies may place di↵erent amounts of importance on certain types of territory, and that may
in turn drive them to war against each other. What the chapter does not do is more fully
explore the di↵erences within democracies and autocracies. As Selectorate theory suggests,
the larger a government’s winning coalition, the more it must rely on the provision of public
goods to maintain power (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). The conception of autocra-
cies used throughout this dissertation project is a one size fits all approach that assumes all
dictatorships rely on a small winning coalition and assumes that they all rely solely on the
provision of private goods. This assumption leads to the expectation that the public goods
aspects of territory play no role in territorial conflicts for autocratic states. Although this
simplification made deriving hypotheses easier, it may be a limiting simplification to better
understand territorial conflict. Future work should seek to break down autocracies, according
to some schema of selectorate size. Some work on autocracy (Svolik, 2009; Weeks, 2012)
has already done this. By attempting to understand the relationship between the degree
of contestation in autocracies (Svolik, 2009), autocratic regime type (Weeks, 2012), and
how they di↵er with respect to domestic outbidding processes over territory, a more detailed
understanding of how territorial conflicts become territorial wars is possible.
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Another extension of this dissertation project lies outside of the arenas of territory and rivalry.
My abstract explanation of domestic politics and conflict may be applied to other issue areas
as well. One potentially fruitful avenue is explore economic threat and domestic politics.
Democratic states often employ economic sanctions against autocratic states. According to
my explanation, being the target of sanctions should place internal pressure on an autocratic
leader’s ability to distribute to his elite, as noted by Wood (2008). The aim of such policies
is to pressure a regime into changing its policies or to topple them. Yet, it might also
lead states to lash out. By hurting their ability to distribute private goods to the elite,
sanctions may lead autocratic leaders to look abroad for sources of revenue to distribute,
such as territory. Therefore, it might be that sanctions make autocratic leaders more likely
to initiate international conflicts. Economic threats such as sanctions, because they target a
government’s distributional capacity, may present an existential threat to autocratic regimes
and leaders might be much more willing to gamble on the outcome of an international conflict
(drawing on the logic of Chiozza and Goemans (2011)) in order to survive.
Although the portion of this dissertation devoted to repression dynamics sheds light on the
influence that international conflict may have, it is by no means a complete understanding. As
with territory, I do not attempt to disaggregate democracies and autocracies. Some research
(Davenport, 2007a) has done this in a general fashion to see the impact that di↵erent
autocratic styles of government a↵ect human rights. In the future, it would be beneficial to
see how international conflict a↵ects di↵erent aspects of democratic and autocratic regimes.
Furthermore, the findings on repressive choices indicate that democracies and autocracies
may repress in fundamentally di↵erent ways. Is the finding that democracies increase torture
and imprisonment more general than just for conflict? Does this mean that rather than
choose the more severe forms of physical integrity violations such killing or disappearances,
democracies choose instead to restrict other rights, such as civil liberties? From my argument
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and findings, such expectations seem reasonable. Another avenue would be to see if there
are di↵erences among democracies when their executive is elected independently from the
legislature, as in presidential systems, or from within the legislature, as in parliamentary
systems. These two types of democracy di↵er according to what Davenport (2007) refers to
as the “veto” mechanism, which is the ability for institutions to check executives. Although
he finds that the “voice” mechanism, which is popular accountability, is stronger for curbing
human rights abuse, this may vary during international conflict.
Some autocratic regimes are less repressive than others (Davenport, 2007a). Furthermore,
not all autocracies are equally conflict prone (Peceny, Beer and Sanchez-Terry, 2002; Weeks,
2012). Is the finding that autocratic states decrease repression as territorial conflict years
become more deadly generalizable to all forms of dictatorship? I think that the level of
repressive decrease will vary according to how repressive the state is during peace time as
well as how prone it is for conflict. More theoretical development is required to understand
how these regimes will approach conflict (over territory and other issues) and then in turn
how they might approach shifts in repressive practices. The finding that autocrats become
less repressive during territorial conflicts raises another question. Does this lessening of
repression lead to an opportunity for rebellion? If autocratic governments are no longer able
to repress to the great degree that they do during peace time, does this lead to an opening for
political violence, and possibly civil war, aimed against the state to occur? Because of the link
between international conflict and repression dynamics that is established by this dissertation,
new questions on the linkages between civil and international violence have emerged.
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